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Abstract: The object of this paper is to show why recent research in the psychology of deductive and probabilistic reasoning does
not have '"bleak implications for human rationality, " as has sometimes been supposed. The presence of fallacies in reasoning is
evaluated by referring to normative criteria which ultimately derive their own credentials from a systematisation of the
intuitions that agree with them. These normative criteria cannot be taken, as some have suggested, to constitute a part of natural
science, nor can they be established by metamathematical proof. Since a theory of competence has to predict the very same
intuitions, it must ascribe rationality to ordinary people.
Accordingly, psychological research on this topic falls into four categories. In the first, experimenters investigate conditions
under which their subjects suffer from genuine cognitive illusions. The search for explanations of such performance errors may
then generate hypotheses about the ways in which the relevant information-processing mechanisms operate. In the second
category, experimenters investigate circumstances in which their subjects exhibit mathematical or scientific ignorance: these are
tests of the subjects' intelligence or education. In the third and fourth categories, experimenters impute a fallacy where none
exists, either because they are applying the relevant normative criteria in an inappropriate way or because the normative criteria
being applied are not the appropriate ones.
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Introduction
Tlic experimental study of human rationality - that is,
of validity in deductive or probabilistic reasoning - has
become entangled during the past decade or so in a
web of paradox. On the one hand, reputable investiga-
tors tell us that certain psychological discoveries have
"bleak implications for human rationality" (Nisbett &
Borgida 1975), or that "for anyone who would wish to
view man as a reasonable intuitive statistician, such
results are discouraging" (Kahneman & Tversky
1972b), or that "people systematically violate princi-
ples of rational decision-making when judging proba-
bilities, making predictions, or otherwise attempting to
cope with probabilistic tasks" and they "lack the
correct programs for many important judgmental
tasks" (Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein 1976). On the
other hand, those investigators are reminded that
people could not even drive automobiles unless they
could assess uncertainties fairly accurately (Edwards
1975). The ordinary person is claimed to be prone to
serious and systematic error in deductive reasoning, in
judging probabilities, in correcting his biases, and in
many other activities. Yet, from this apparently
unpromising material - indeed, from the very same
students who are the typical subjects of cognitive
psychologists' experiments - sufficient cadres are
recruited to maintain the sophisticated institutions of
modern civilisation. Earlier decades, in an era of
greater optimism, may well have overestimated the
natural reasoning powers of human beings. But there
seems now to be a risk of underestimating them.
What is needed here is a conceptual framework
within which to think coherently about problems of
cognitive rationality and the relevant experimental
data, and the object of the present paper is to sketch
such a framework. For this purpose it is necessary first
of all to examine the credentials of those normative
theories by reference to which investigators may legiti-
mately evaluate the rationality or irrationality of a
naive subject's inference or probability judgment. Such
a normative theory, I shall argue, is itself acceptable for
the purpose only so far as it accords, at crucial points,
with the evidence of untutored intuition. This thesis
was also argued long ago by Goodman (1954, pp.
66-67). But the argument needs to be expanded and
fortified against more recent opposition. What then
follows from the thesis is that ordinary human reason-
ing - by which I mean the reasoning of adults who
have not been systematically educated in any branch of
logic or probability theory - cannot be held to be
faultily programmed: it sets its own standards. Of
course, various kinds of mistakes are frequently made
in human reasoning, both by laboratory subjects and in
ordinary life. But in all such cases some malfunction of
an information-processing mechanism has to be in-
ferred, and its explanation sought. In other words, the
nature of the problem constrains us to a coinpetence-
performance distinction. Our fellow humans have to be
attributed a competence for reasoning validly, and this
provides the backcloth against which we can study
defects in their actual performance. That is the theme
to be argued in the first part of the paper.
At the same time, allegations of defects in perfor-
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mance need to be carefully scrutinised. Some of these
allegations are correct and important. But others seem
to arise from a misapplication or misconception of the
relevant standards of rationality by which the experi-
mentally revealed phenomena should be judged, even
when those phenomena themselves are quite robust
and incontestable. The second part of the paper will
therefore suggest four categories to which a critical
assessment of existing allegations of performance
defects might appropriately assign them.
In sum, those who once tended to exaggerate human
reasoning powers may be construed as having concen-
trated their attention too much on the facts of compe-
tence, while those who have more recently tended to
underestimate these powers have concentrated their
attention too much on the facts of performance, and in
some cases have judged these facts too harshly.
I. The argument for rational competence
1. Intuitions as the basis of normative criteria for the
evaluation of deductions. Investigators who wish to
evaluate the validity of their subjects' deductions
would turn naturally to some educationally well
regarded textbook of formal logic, such as Quine
(1952), Copi (1954) or Lemmon (1965). The assump-
tion would be that all and only the rules of inference
that are given or derivable in those systems of so-called
natural deduction are valid principles of deducibility,
so far as deducibility hinges on the interplay of the
logical particles "not," "and," "or," "if," "some," and
"every" (or their equivalents in French, German, or
any other language). But how can an assumption of this
kind be defended? I shall argue that at a crucial point it
has to rely on ordinary people's intuitions of deducibili-
ty.
Note, however, that the term "intuition" here is not
being used in the sense of Spinoza (1914), Bergson
(1903), or Husserl (1911). It does not describe a cogni-
tive act that is somehow superior to sensory perception.
Nor, on the other hand, does it refer merely to hunches
that are subsequently checkable by sensory perception
or by calculation. Nor does this kind of intuition entail
introspection,1 since it may just be implicit in a spoken
judgment. Its closest analogue is an intuition of gram-
matical well-formedness. In short, an intuition that p is
here just an immediate and untutored inclination,
without evidence or inference, to judge that p.
To avoid any reliance on intuitions in that sense, it
would be necessary to show that the assumption in
question (about the nature of deducibility) is defensible
within some well-recognised system of scientific proce-
dure. Transcendental (that is, Kantian) arguments are
obviously too controversial for the purpose. So either
this procedure has to be empirically based and induc-
tive, or it has to depend on some appropriate meta-
mathematical theorem. But, as it turns out, neither of
these strategies can wholly succeed: at crucial nodes an
appeal to ordinary people's intuitions is indispensable.
The empirical-inductive strategy offers us an
account of logic (as in, Stich 1975) in which it is viewed
as an adjunct to science in general rather than, like
geometry, an adjunct to physics in particular. Such an
applied logic is understood as the combination of a
formal system with appropriate interpretative rules;
and it is to be tested, we are told, by assessing the
explanatory and predictive power of the total theory
that results from meshing it with the theories of the
several sciences. In this way, it seems, what are
accepted as logical truths turn out just to constitute one
type of component in the total holistic system of what is
accepted as scientific truth. They seem as much
beholden to experiment and observation for their
warranty as are any other scientific discoveries.
However, this kind of hard-line positivism comes up
against some serious difficulties, which preclude it
from supplying an intuition-free validation of deduc-
tive logic. First, certain regulative principles for theory
construction, such as ideals of comprehensiveness,
consistency, and simplicity, have in any case to be
granted a priori status, so that in the defence of this
status at least some principles of reasoning may have to
be conceded an intuitive warranty. Second, much of
the reasoning for which we need a logically articulate
reconstruction does not take place in science at all but
in law or administration, and is concerned not with
what is in fact the case but with what ought to be.
Third, the same logical principles have to be applied
within each piece of scientific reasoning about the
relative merits of two or more hypotheses, so that if
ever any hypothesis has to be given up in the face of
adverse experience it is always a factual, rather than a
logical one. For example, we cannot claim, as does
Reichenbach (1944), that quantum physics constitutes
a restriction on the range of application of classical
two-valued logic as well as of classical mechanics,
because it is only in accordance with shared logical
principles that it would be fair to elicit and compare
the differing experimental conseqences of classical
mechanics and quantum theory.2 Hence, so far as we
treat the totality of acceptable scientific hypotheses as
constituting a single holistic system, we also need a
single set of logical principles. Fourth, logically true
statements are statements that are true in all logically
possible worlds, and the evidence of happenings in the
actual world must thus fall far short of establishing
them.
Moreover, so far as the epistemology of a particular
discipline is obligated to endorse the criteria of evalua-
tion that are generally accepted in practice by reputa-
ble investigators in the field, it is certainly the appeal to
intuitions that deserves endorsement for applied logic
rather than the empirical-inductive strategy. Applied
logicians make no attempt at all to test out their
theories empirically within the context of a project for
the holistic systematisation of all knowledge. On all the
issues that are much discussed - issues about modality
(for example, Quine 1960), subjunctive conditionals
(Lewis 1973), indirect discourse (Carnap 1947), rela-
tive identity (Griffin 1977), proper names (Kripke
1972), adverbs (Davidson 1966), and so on - an implicit
or explicit appeal to intuition provides some of the vital
premises for the applied logician's argument.
Nor are the prospects for a metamathematical justifi-
cation of applied logic any better than those for an
empirical-inductive one. Any system in which rules of
derivation are specified in formal terms is said to be
"sound ' if under some interpretation for the formalism
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of the system it can be proved that from true premises
these rules lead only to true conclusions. So it might
seem as though, by thus using a semantic definition of
logical consequence to check on a syntactic one, the
rationality of a set of inferential rules could be estab-
lished by experts in a metamathematical proof, without
any recourse to intuitions other than those involved in
the perception of the proof (Dummett 1978). But,
though such a strategy has an agreeably professional
appeal, it does not come to grips with the whole of the
underlying epistemological problem. No reason is
provided for supposing that the deductive liaisons of
the logical particles of natural language can be mapped
onto those of the connectives and quantifiers in the
formal system that is proved to be sound.
For example, in any natural deduction system for
the classical calculus of propositions the formula
1. ((A — B) & (C-> D))
(or a notational variant) can constitute a premise from
which
2. ((A —D)V(C—B))
(or a notational variant) is derivable. And under the
interpretation that Russell (1919) proposed for this
calculus, a derivation could turn into an inference
from
3. If John's automobile is a Mini, John is poor, and if
John's automobile is a Rolls, John is rich
to
4. Either, if John's automobile is a Mini, John is rich,
or, if John's automobile is a Rolls, John is poor
which would obviously be invalid. But what makes this
invalidity obvious? The fact is that our own intuitions
about the legitimate deductive liaisons of the logical
particles (for example, the intuition that from the
conditional "If John's automobile is a Mini, John is
rich," we should be able to deduce the existence of a
connection between antecedent and consequent that is
independent of truth values) combine with our
empirical knowledge of automobile costs to make it
easy to imagine situations in which (3) is true and (4) is
false. So though the propositional calculus is demon-
strably sound, it resists Russell's interpretation as a logic
of everyday reasoning in which conditional sentences
may have a role, because it cannot capture intuitions
like those on the basis of which we judge an inference
from (3) to (4) to be invalid.3 Admittedly, those intui-
tions might be said just to concern the meanings of the
logical particles "if," "and," and "or," and there is
nothing particularly remarkable, it might be objected,
about the fact that one has to understand the meaning
of an utterance to be able to appraise its validity. But
the relevant point is that knowing the meanings of "if,"
"and," and "or" is indistinguishable from knowing, in
principle, their legitimate deductive liaisons. So we
cannot avoid appealing to intuitions of inferential
validity in order to determine the claim of an inter-
preted formal system to constitute a theory of deduci-
bility for everyday reasoning.
In other words, the problem of justification takes two
rather different forms in regard to theories of deduci-
bility. On the one hand, there is the issue of the theory's
soundness, on the other, the issue of its application.
Intuitions of inferential validity supply data in relation
to the latter issue, not the former. But these intuitions
are nevertheless an indispensable type of evidence for
any theory of deducibility in everyday reasoning.
Unless we assume appropriate intuitions to be correct,
we cannot take the normative theory of everyday
reasoning that they support to be correct. No doubt two
different people, or the same people on two different
occasions, may sometimes have apparently conflicting
intuitions. But such an apparent conflict always
demands resolution. The people involved might come
to recognise some tacit misunderstanding about the
terms of the problem, so that there is no real conflict; or
they might repudiate a previously robust intuition,
perhaps as a result of becoming aware that an other-
wise preferred solution has unacceptable implications;
or they might conclude that different idiolects or
conceptions of deducibility are at issue.4
2. Intuitions as the basis of normative criteria for the
evaluation of probability judgments. The position in
regard to normative theories of probabilistic reasoning
is rather analogous. We can take the mathematical
calculus of chance, as axiomatised by Kolmogorov
(1950), Reichenbach (1949), or Popper (1959a), to be a
formal system that is open to semantical interpretation
as a theory of the constraints that probability judg-
ments of certain kinds ought to place on one another.
But to just what kinds of probability judgment does the
theory apply? This question has been much discussed.
For example, proofs or arguments are available (Ram-
sey 1931; de Finetti 1931) to show that where probabil-
ities are measured by betting quotients within a suita-
bly coherent system of wagers their system conforms to
the calculus of chance. A similar conformity has been
demonstrated by Reichenbach (1949) and von Mises
(1957) for the conception of probability as a relative
frequency; by Carnap (1950) for the conception of
probability as a type of logical relation that varies in
strength along a spectrum that extends from contra-
diction at one extreme to entailment at the other; by
Popper (1959b; 1968)and Mellor (1971) for the concep-
tion of probability as a causal propensity - a causally
rooted tendency - and so on.
But none of those proofs or arguments establishes
which conceptions of probability are operative - and
under what conditions - in the everyday reasoning of
lay adults, such as are the typical subjects of experi-
ments carried out by cognitive psychologists. That is to
say, it is one thing to establish one or more probabilistic
interpretations for the calculus of chance, and quite
another to show that the resultant theory applies to
some or all of the probability judgments that are made
in everyday reasoning. In order to discover what crite-
ria of probability are appropriate for the evaluation of
lay reasoning we have to investigate what judgments of
probability are intuitively acceptable to lay adults and
what rational constraints these judgments are supposed
to place on one another. We have to select the concep-
tion or conceptions of probability in terms of which the
most coherent account of lay judgments can be given,
rather than evaluate those judgments by some single
independently established standard.
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The importance of this selection should not be
underestimated. There are at least four ways in which
it can make a lot of difference.
First, where probabilities are measured by betting
quotients or construed as logical relations, we have to
say - properly speaking - that they are functions of
propositions; where they are relative frequencies, they
are functions of sets; and where they are causal propen-
sities, they are functions of properties (Cohen 1977b).
Such categories of functions differ considerably in
regard to their appropriateness for the evaluation of
definite singular instances, as has often been pointed
out (see Reichenbach 1949, pp. 376-77; Carnap 1950,
pp. 226-28; Nagel 1939, pp. 60-75). They differ also in
regard to their appropriateness for counterfactual
inference (Cohen 1977b, pp. 306-9).
Second, whore a probability is measured by a betting
quotient, its statement is normally treated as an asser-
tion about the strength of the speakers belief in the
outcome. Such a subjective fact is logically quite consis-
tent with another speaker's having a different strength
of belief in relation to the same issue. So when two
people measure the probability of the same outcome
subjectively by different betting quotients, they are not
contradicting one another, whereas assertions of
different relative frequencies, different logical rela-
tions, or different causal propensities would be logi-
cally inconsistent if they concerned the same issue.
Third, different probability functions may legiti-
mately be assigned different values in relation to the
same situation of uncertainty. Carnap, for example,
demonstrated the existence of a nondenumerably infi-
nite number of different measures for his logical-
relation type of probability; the odds that are taken as
appropriate to betting on a particular outcome on a
given occasion need not correspond with the actual
frequency of such outcomes in the relevant population;
and the high frequency of B's among As may be due to
a series of coincidences, so that as a measure of causal
propensity p(BIA) [i.e. p(B given A)] = p(B) even
though as a measure of relative frequency p(BIA) >
p(B). There is no mathematically demonstrable reason,
therefore, why people should not in fact use different
measures of probability for different situations or
purposes, just as traders sometimes find it worthwhile
to measure quantities of apples by weight and some-
times by number.
Fourth, if one or more semantic characterisations of
probability are possible (as distinct from an implicit
definition in terms of a set of mathematical axioms),
then one might even need other formal systems than
the calculus of chance to represent the syntax of some
semantically defined categories of probability judg-
ments other than the four already mentioned. The
mathematics of probability may have no more reached
its apogee in the work of Kolmogorov, than the mathe-
matics of space did in that of Euclid. Nonclassical
theories of probability may turn out to have an interest
analogous to that of non-Euclidean geometries.
3. The systematisation of normative intuitions. It has
been argued so far that any normative analysis of
everyday reasoning - any statement that such and such
lay judgments of deducibility or probability are
correct, or incorrect, as the case may be - must in the
end rely for its defence on the evidence of relevant
intuitions. You cannot dodge this by an appeal to
textbooks of logic or statistics. Of course, on any issue
that can be settled empirically we naturally treat
intuitions only as hunches that either will be confirmed
by favourable observation or will give way to counter-
observations. And in some area, such as the grammar of
natural language, the question whether ultimate data
are observational or intuitive or both is currently
controversial: compare Chomsky (1965) and Sampson
(1975). But on indisputably normative issues - on issues
about how people may or ought to think or behave, as
distinct from how they do - we cannot expect a major
point at stake to be settled by observation. Here, if our
aim is to build up a comprehensive system of theory, it
is prudent to check our general hypotheses against
intuitions in concrete individual cases - though in order
to avoid an obvious risk of bias, these must always be
the intuitions of those who are not theorists themselves.
For example, the practice of the courts provides much
evidence for a theory of lay intuitions about probability
in forensic reasoning (Cohen 1977b), but writers on this
subject should not invoke their own intuitions.
Normative theories are subject to the usual inductive
criteria. They are better supported if they apply to a
wider rather than a narrower range of significantly
different kinds of intuitive inference or judgment, just
as the more comprehensively explanatory theories have
greater merit in natural science. But there would
obviously be a point at which even the mere process of
putting problems to a person in varied contexts, in
order to extract his intuitions, could reasonably be
taken to cross over into a procedure for changing his
normative outlook instead of just recording it. Thus,
recent writers on ethics (for example, Rawls 1972;
Daniels 1979; 1980) have distinguished between the
narrow reflective equilibrium that is constituted by a
coherent reconstruction of a person's existing moral
principles, where only an occasional intuition is repu-
diated (for the sake of consistency), and the wide
reflective equilibrium that is obtained when a person
chooses between his existing moral principles and
proposed alternatives, on the basis of sociological,
historical, economic, psychological, or other consider-
ations that may weigh with him. In matters of deduci-
bility or probability the analogue of this philosophical
choice would occur in the process of education,
research, or philosophising whereby hitherto uncom-
mitted students are sometimes transformed into thor-
oughgoing Quineians, say, or Bayesians, or Popperians,
so that they come to adopt substantially different
conceptions of deducibility or probability from those
once operating in their untutored judgments. But the
normative theories that are at issue in the present
context require a narrow, not a wide, reflective equilib-
rium. The judgments of everyday reasoning must be
evaluated in their own terms and by their own stan-
dards.
Nevertheless, even at the level of narrow equilibri-
um, generality is only purchased at a cost. In construct-
ing any normative theory the same strategy of abstrac-
tion and idealisation that we find in natural science is
appropriate as a trade-off for the purchase of increased
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in classical mechanics lor the acceleration of a falling
body. But it would have been too difficult to construct
a satisfactory general hypothesis about this figure
unless it had been supposed to apply to falling bodies in
abstraction from any frictional effect of the medium
through which they are falling. So most general theo-
ries in natural science have come to be constructed in
terms of idealised entities and precisely measurable
properties •- particles in friclionless media, perfect
gases, closed and isolated systems, lines without
breadth, and the like - irrespective of the fact that
these categories may not actually be instantiated
anywhere in nature. Such a theory may nevertheless be
used for the explanation or prediction of actual events
if appropriate allowances are made for the extent to
which, and the reasons why, they differ from the
pertinent idealisation. Analogously, normative hypo-
theses achieve generality I))' a similar process of
abstraction, idealisation and precisification that is
highly important to bear in mind.
For example, the moralist says that promises should
be kept. But implicitly or explicitly the moralist has to
safeguard that generalreation against the awkward
counterexamples - helping a potential murderer, and
the like - where a promise is rightly broken. The
unqualified norm must be regarded as holding good
only in an ideally simplified world in which none of
those awkward circumstances is ever present. In the
same way, logicians construct theories of natural
deductions in terms of propositions, which have truth
values and entailments but no time* or place or causal
connexions. Consequently, since the actual judgments
and reasonings of human beings occur on particular
dates and in particular locations, in a particular causal
context, a sequence of logical formulas can only be
taken to represent an actual piece of human reasoning
il due regard is paid to the various respects in which
the representation inevitably constitutes something of
an abstraction from - or idealisation of - its original.
4. The derivation of an account of human competence
in deductive or probabilistic reasoning. If a physicist
observes the position of the needle on a certain dial
under chosen experimental conditions, then the datum
to be explained is the position of the needle, not the fact
that someone observes it. The event observed, not the
act of observing it, is what is relevant. Otherwise optics
(and perhaps acoustics) would be all the science that
there is. Analogously, the datum that the moralist has
to take into account is the Tightness or wrongness of a
particular action, not the deliverance of conscience that
pronounces it right or wrong; and the logician's datum
is the validity or invalidity of a particular inference,
not the intuition that assures us of it. So enquiry into
the norms of everyday reasoning no more aims at a
theory abotit intuitions than physics or chemistry aims
at a theory about observations. Epistemology does not
dominate ontology here. And fortunately it is not
necessary for present purposes to determine what
exactly the study of moral value, probability, or deduc-
ibility has as its proper subject matter. For example, an
applied logician's proper aim may be to limn the
formal consequences of linguisitic definitions (Ayer
Cohen: Demonstrating irrationality
1946), the most general features of reality (Quine
I960), or the structure of ideally rational belief systems
(Ellis 1979). But, whatever the ontological concern of
applied logicians, they have to draw their evidential
data from intuitions in concrete, individual cases; and
the same is true for investigations into the norms of
everyday probabilistic reasoning.
It follows that for every such normative theory,
which determines how it is proper to act or reason,
there is room to construct a factual theory that does
take intuitions as its subject matter. This factual theory
will describe or predict the intuitive judgments that
formulate the data for the corresponding normative
theory. It will be a psychological theory, not a logical or
ethical one. It will describe a competence that normal
human beings have - an ability, uniformly operative
under ideal conditions and often under others, to form
intuitive judgments about particular instances of right
or wrong, deducibility or nondeducibility, probability
or improbability. This factual theory of competence
will be just as idealised as the normative theory from
which it derives. And though it is a contribution to the
psychology of cognition it is a by-product of the logical
or philosophical analysis of norms rather than some-
thing that experimentally oriented psychologists need
to devote effort to constructing. It is not only all the
theory of competence that is needed in its area. It is
also all that is possible, since a different competence, if
it actually existed, would just generate evidence that
called for a revision of the corresponding normative
theory.
In other words, where you accept that a normative
theory has to be based ultimately on the data of human
intuition, you are committed to the acceptance of
human rationality as a matter of fact in that area, in the
sense that it must be correct to ascribe to normal
humans beings a cognitive competence - however
often faulted in performance - that corresponds point
by point with the normative theory. Of course, it would
be different if you believed in some other source of
normative authority. If, for instance, you believe in a
divinely revealed ethics, you are entitled to think that
some people's competence for moral judgment may
fall short of correct moral ideals: you could consistently
invoke some doctrine of original sin to account for the
systematic failure of untaught intuition to accord with
the correct norms of moral judgment. But, if you claim
no special revelation in ethics, you will have to take
intuitive judgments as your basis, and then people's
competence for moral judgment - as distinct, of course,
from their actual performance in this - cannot be
faulted. Analogously, if you claim no special revelation
in matters of logic or probability, you will have to be
content there too to accept the inherent rationality of
your fellow adults.
To ascribe a cognitive competence, in this sense,
within a given community is to characterise the
content of a culturally or genetically inherited ability
which, under ideal conditions, every member of the
community would exercise in appropriate circum-
stances. It states what people can do, rather than what
they will do, much as the characterisation of a linguis-
tic competence can be taken to describe what it is that
native speakers must be assumed capable of recognis-
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ing about the structure of morphophonemic strings
(Chomsky 1965) rather than what they do actually
recognise. The fact is that conditions are rarely, if ever,
ideal for the exercise of such a competence. Just as
passion or self-interest may warp our moral discern-
ment, or memory limitations may restrict the length of
the sentences we utter, so too a variety of factors may
interfere with the excercise of a competence for deduc-
tive or probabilistic reasoning. A local unsuitability of
childhood environment may inhibit the maturation of
innate ability, education (that is, education in subjects
other than logic and probability theory) may fail to
make the most of it, individual disabilities or normal
memory limitations may set limits to what even the
best environment and education can achieve, and vari-
ous motivational and other factors may operate to
induce malfunctions of the relevant information-
processing mechanisms. To suppose that all normal
adults are able to reason deductively is certainly not to
suppose that they will never err in their judgments of
logical validity, and still less that they will in practice
execute any particular finite chain of reasoning that is
called for, however complex it may be, just so long as it
is licensed by intuitively evident rules of natural
deduction. In practice, our rationality is "bounded"
(Simon 1957, pp. 198-202). We are all able to walk, if
in normal health, but it does not follow that we can all
walk on a tight rope, or for a thousand miles without
stopping, or that none of us ever stumbles. It is here
that the issues arise that will be discussed in the second
part of this paper.
In short, accounts of human competence can be read
off from the appropriate normative theories, so far as
they are based on the evidence of intuitions; accounts
of actual performance under different conditions are to
be obtained by experiment and observation; and hypo-
theses about the structure and operation of human
information-processing mechanisms must then be
tested against the facts of competence and perfor-
mance that it is their task to explain. The structure or
design of such a mechanism must account for the
relevant competence, but its operation must be subject
to various causes of malfunction that will account for
the flaws found in actual performance.
One may be tempted to ask: "How do we know that
any intuition of the relevant kind is veridical?" But to
ask for knowledge here is to ask for what is in principle
impossible, at least in the sense in which knowledge is
something like justified true belief, and where there is
no alternative to invoking intuition, since an intuitive
judgment that p essentially lacks any external ground
to justify accepting that p. The best that normative
theorists can hope for in this field (and also what they
need to achieve), if they do not claim any special
revelation, is that the contents of all relevant intui-
tions - suitably sifted or qualified, if necessary - can be
made to corroborate one another by being exhibited as
the consequences of a consistent and relatively simple
set of rules or axioms that also sanctions other intui-
tively acceptable, but previously unremarked, patterns
of reasoning. The inductive principle of mutual corrob-
oration here is analogous to that operative in natural
science, as Bacon long ago pointed out in regard to
normative theories of ethics or jurisprudence (Kocher
1957; cf. Cohen 1970).
It would be different if we were evaluating the
cognitive competence of some other species, or even of
human children. We should be free to find their
intuitive efforts at probabilistic reasoning, for example,
or their moral sensitivity, to be rather inferior by the
standard of our own norms. But we cannot attribute
inferior rationality to those who are themselves among
the canonical arbiters of rationality. Nothing can count
as an error of reasoning among our fellow adults unless
even the author of the error would, under ideal condi-
tions, agree that it is an error.
Other arguments about rationality do not concern us
here. It is true that, even where animals, children, or
Martians are concerned, there are limits to the extent to
which we can impute irrationality. As has been well
remarked (Dennett 1979, p. 11), if the ascription of a
belief or desire to a mouse is to have any predictive
power, the mouse must be supposed to follow the rules
of logic insofar as it acts in accordance with its beliefs
and desires. But this is not to suppose that the mouse
has any great powers of ratiocination. Equally (Quine
1960) we have to impute a familiar logicality to others
if we are to suppose that we understand what they say:
different logics for my idiolect and yours are not
coherently supposable. But there is always the possibil-
ity that we understand less than we think we do and
that some imputations of logicality are therefore not
defensible on this score. Again, evolutionary pressures
in the long run eliminate any species that is not
sufficiently well equipped to surmount threats to its
biological needs. But evolutionary considerations are
better fitted to put an explanatory gloss on the extinc-
tion of a species after this event has already occurred
than to predict the precise level of rationality that is
required for this or that species' continued survival
within its present environment.
What I have been arguing is that normative criteria
for ordinary human reasoning rely for their substantia-
tion on a procedure analogous to what is called "boot-
strapping" in artificial intelligence (see Dawes & Corri-
gan 1974). The intuitions of ordinary people are the
basis for constructing a coherent system of rules and
principles by which those same people can, if they so
choose, reason much more extensively and accurately
than they would otherwise do.5 Consequently these
ordinary people cannot be regarded as intrinsically
irrational in regard to any such cognitive activity. An
investigator who wanted to make out a serious case for
deep-level human irrationality in this area might be
tempted to operate with normative criteria that were
the product of philosophical argument for some appro-
priately wide reflective equilibrium and consequently
differed from the narrow, bootstrapping, reflective
equilibrium which merely reconciles intuitions. But
any kind of scientific or mathematical reasoning to
which such criteria directly apply has a specialised and
technically regimented quality that makes it difficult
or impracticable for those who have not been trained
appropriately. For example, it may involve deduction
within an artificial language system, or employ rela-
tively sophisticated concepts of statistical theory.
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Hence the investigator's experiments would founder in
a characteristic indeterminacy. They would constitute
an accurate test of their subjects' competence for
reasoning only to the extent that these subjects were not
ordinary people but specially trained experts. So the
results of the test might reveal how good was the
training or how effective were the procedures for
selecting people to be trained; they would tell us
nothing about the rationality or irrationality of
untrained people. Though a person may well acquire a
wide reflective equilibrium with regard to ethical
issues that is inconsistent with a previously existing
narrow reflective equilibrium, there is no possibility of
an analogous inconsistency with regard to deducibility
or probability. In the case of deducibility, narrow
reflective equilibrium remains the ultimate framework
of argument about the merits of other deductive
systems, and in the case of probability, we are merely
replacing some modes of measuring uncertainty by
others.
II. Four categories of research into defects of
cognitive rationality
The past decade or so has seen the growth of a vast
literature of psychological research into replicable
defects of human reasoning. Often investigators are
content just to argue for the existence of such defects
and to suggest explanations. But sometimes they also
claim justification for extensive criticisms of human
rationality. Several convenient reviews of this literature
are already available (for example, Slovic, Fisehhoff &
Liechtenstein 1977; Nisbett & Ross 1980; Einhorn &
Hogarth 1981), and I do not aim to produce another
here. Rather, the purpose of the second part of the
paper is to establish four categories, into one or the
other of which, on close assessment, any item in this
literature may be seen capable of being assigned with-
out "bleak implications for human rationality," once
an account of the normative criteria for ordinary
human reasoning is agreed to entail an ascription of the
corresponding competence to ordinary human adults
(as argued in part I). For reasons that will emerge in
the sequel, these four categories of research activity are
appropriately entitled "Studies of cognitive illusions,"
"Tests of intelligence or education," "Misapplications
of appropriate normative theory," and "Applications
of inappropriate normative theory." Examples will be
furnished for each category. It will be assumed in every
case that the phenomena reported are replicable, and
that no technical faults occur in the presentation of the
data, such as miscalculations of statistical significance:
if the examples furnished here are in fact faulty, others
are easily found. The issues raised here do not concern
the robustness of the phenomena, solely their interpre-
tation.
The categorisation is intended to be an exhaustive
one, not in the sense that every item in the literature is
actually assigned to one of the four categories but that
in principle it could be. Claims that human reasoning
tends to be invalid in certain circumstances are either
correct or incorrect. The correct claims relate either to
Cohen: Demonstrating irrationality
fallacies that, on reflection, everyone would admit to
be such, as in studies of cognitive illusions, or to
fallacies that require some more elaborate mode of
demonstration as in tests of intelligence or education;
the incorrect claims result either from misapplications
of appropriate normative theory or from applications
of inappropriate normative theory.
1. Studies of cognitive illusions. In view of what has
been argued above about ordinary people's compe-
tence for deductive and probabilistic reasoning, there is
a prima facie presumption, in regard to any experi-
mental data in this area, that they can be explained as a
manifestation of some such competence, even though
the details of the explanation may not be easy to fill in.
Where no explanation of this kind is available, one
possibility is that experimenters have created a cogni-
tive illusion. They have manipulated the circumstances
of a situation in such a way that subjects are induced to
indulge in a form of reasoning that on a few moments'
prompted reflection they would be willing to admit is
invalid.
A very good example of this is the familiar four-card
problem (Wason 1966). The subjects are presented
with four laboratory cards showing, respectively, 'A,'
'D,' '4,' and '7,' and know from previous experience
that every card, of which these are a subset, has a letter
on one side and a number on the other. They are then
given this rule about the four cards in front of them: "If
a card has a vowel on one side, then it has an even
number on the other side." Next they are told: "Your
task is to say which of the cards you need to turn over
in order to find out whether the rule is true or false."
The most frequent answers are "A and 4" and "only
A," which are both wrong, while the right answer "A
and 7" is given spontaneously by very few subjects.
Wason and his colleagues, in attempting to account
for these data (see Johnson-Laird & Wason 1970),
interpret the error as a bias towards seeking verifica-
tion rather than falsification in testing the rule. But if
that were the nature of the error one would expect "D"
to show up in the answer like "4" does, since the
contrapositive equivalent of the rule is, "If a card does
not have an even number on one side, it does not have a
vowel on the other." Perhaps it will be said that this is
simply owing to a failure to grasp the equivalence of
contrapositives here. But such a failure would account
also for the absence of "7" from most answers, without
the need to suppose that in testing a conditional rule
subjects do anything other than check, in each case in
which the antecedent holds true, whether the conse-
quent does also: this is because the presence of "4" in
many answers may then be put down to the prevalence
of inference from an utterance that is of the form "if p
then q" to an utterance that is of the form "if q then
p" - a prevalence for which there is independent
evidence (see II.3 in regard to the fallacy of illicit
conversion). I shall assume, therefore, that the subjects'
specific error here is best interpreted as a failure to
apply the law of contraposition. What then causes that
failure?
It would be wrong to conclude that the deductive
competence of most logically untutored subjects does
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not embrace the law of contraposition. A subsequent
experiment (Wason & Shapiro 1971) has been claimed
to show that if the four cards are those related to a
more concrete rule, namely, "Every time I go to
Manchester, I go by train," then substantially more
subjects are successful. Even better results were
obtained (Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi & Sonino Legrenzi
1972) when the rule was, "If a letter is sealed, then it
has a fivepenny stamp on it" and the laboratory cards
were replaced by (sealed or unsealed, stamped or
unstamped) envelopes. Further experimentation (Van
Duyne 1974; 1976) has also been claimed to show that
degrees of realism in fact affect performance in a
continuous, linear way. However, it looks as though we
need to distinguish here between two different ways in
which realism may be increased. One is by writing
descriptive words or sentences on the cards, instead of
just letters and numerals, and altering the rule accord-
ingly: the other is by using real objects (envelopes)
instead of cards. The results of Manktelow and Evans
(1979) suggest that when realism is increased in the
former manner the fallacy still occurs. But those results
do not weaken the finding that when real objects
replace cards the fallacy hardly ever occurs. It seems,
therefore, that experimenters' power to generate an
illusion here depends on the relative unfamiliarity and
artificiality of their apparatus. In their familiar
concrete concerns human beings show themselves well
able to apply the law of contraposition to appropriate
problems. Faced instead with a situation in which the
items against which a conditional rule is to be checked
are things (cards bearing letters, numerals, words,
sentences, geometrical diagrams, and the like) that
echo the symbolism in which the conditional rule itself
is formulated, subjects' reasoning tends to be led astray
in the "matching bias" to which Manktelow and Evans
have traced the fallacy.
The point of describing experimental effects like
Wason s as cognitive illusions is to invoke the analogy
with visual illusions: it is in no way intended to dero-
gate from their importance, nor to suggest that if the
circumstances that cause the illusion occur naturally (as
distinct from being the result of an experimenter's
contrivance) then the illusion will not occur.6 The
discovery of any such effect in human performance
generates a significant piece of evidence about the way
in which the underlying information-processing mech-
anism operates. The findings about the four-card prob-
lem may legitimately be said (Johnson-Laird & Wason
1977) to support the view (Piaget 1972) that most
people manage to apply their logical competence with-
out ever formulating it expressly at a level of generality
sufficient for it to be readily applicable to wholly
unfamiliar tasks. People will distinguish form from
content in their reasoning, or extrapolate accurately
from one content to another, only to the extent that
similarity of form is accompanied by some rough
equality of vital interest. So subjects who reason falla-
ciously about the four-card problem need not be
supposed to lack the correct deductive "program."
Indeed, none of the experimenters in the area suggests
this. The subjects merely fail to recognize the similarity
of their task to those familiar issues in which they have
profited by using the deductive procedure of contrapo-
sition. As a result, either that procedure receives no
input or its output is deleted, and the behaviour of the
subjects manifests a matching bias.
Analogously, other experimental data show, it has
been argued (Wason 1960; 1968), that in an abstract
task, like hypothesising about the rule that generates a
given series of numbers, most people are unable to use
the procedure of proving a hypothesis by eliminating
alternatives to it.' They tend to seek confirmatory
evidence for their favoured hypothesis rather than
disconfirmatory evidence for alternatives to it. In addi-
tion, they often do not relinquish hypotheses that have
been shown to be false. Nor is people's eliminative
performance substantially better when confronted with
a computer-screen simulation of a simple mechanical
problem (Mynatt, Doherty & Tweney 1977). Yet it
hardly needs an experiment to show that most people
are quite capable of using eliminative procedures
correctly when dealing with real objects - not simu-
lated ones - in familiar everyday situations: if the soap
is not in the basin, we reason, it must be in the bath; if
one's caller has not come by automobile, he must have
walked; and so on. So it is not that ordinary people lack
competence for the kind of deductive inference that
moves from "p or q" and "not-;/' to "q," which is
essential to all such eliminative reasoning. It seems
rather that in normal investigative situations the
disjunctive premise for this pattern of reasoning is
supplied by previous experience, and in an artificial or
unfamiliar situation we lack the relevant kind of
previous experience to supply the input. To build up
that experience some pursuit of confirmatory (as
distinct from disconfirmatory or eliminative) strategies
would not be unreasonable, as is recognised by Mynatt,
Doherty, and Tweney (1978, p. 405); and retention of a
falsified hypothesis would even be desirable if it
explained quite a lot of the evidence and no unfalsified
hypothesis were available that had as good explanatory
value. So too the sharply falsificationist model of scien-
tific progress that was originally offered by Popper
(1959a) has rightly met with substantial criticism from
other historians and philosophers of science (for exam-
ple, Swinburne 1964; Lakatos 1970).
Again, it may seem puzzling that subjects seem
unable to judge correctly in the laboratory that some
event is controlled by another, or is independent of it,
as the ease may be, and yet the very same subjects get
along all right most of the time in their everyday life
(Jenkins & Ward 1965). But the puzzle may be lessened
by considering some of the ways in which their experi-
mental tasks are not representative of the normal
conditions for such judgments: check-ups are excluded,
temporal variations are absent, the output considered is
unnaturally discrete, the response has to be a relatively
hurried one, and so on.
Experimenters need to devise a great variety of
experiments involving such cognitive illusions in order
to test out theories about how human beings in fact
perform, or fail to perform, the various acts of reason-
ing for which they apparently possess a competence.
But one should recognise these experiments for what
they are, and not conceive of the illusions that they
generate as some kind of positive, though fallacious,
heuristic that is employed by the subjects. Consider, for
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example, the supposed heuristic of availability
(Tversky & Kahneman 1973). A person is said to
employ this heuristic whenever he estimates frequency
or probability by the ease with which instances or
associations are brought to mind. For example, if
student subjects, when asked in the laboratory, errone-
ously judge English words beginning with re to be
more frequent than words ending with re, they are
diagnosed to have employed the heuristic of availabil-
ity because the former words are more easily brought
to mind than the latter. But a heuristic is a way of
finding something out that one does not already have at
the front of one s mind. The availability illusion
consists instead in relying on data that one already has
at the front of one's mind. There is a lot of evidence
that most people are too slow to change certain kinds of
beliefs (Ross & Lepper, forthcoming). But no one
thinks that this evidence establishes a "conservatism
heuristic," rather than that it just manifests the
influence of factors which make for belief inertia.
Analogously, if the argument for rational competence
(in part I) is accepted, the "availability" results must be
interpreted to have shown, not that the subjects are
estimating the frequency or probability of an x by
reference to the availability of an x, but that they are
doing this by reference to those x's that happen to be
available. The subjects are not to be construed as
operating on the evidently wild assumption that
frequency can safely be taken to equal availability.
Rather, where A is the available population, they are to
be construed as operating on the not so evidently wild
assumption that frequency can safely be taken to equal
frequency in A, which is a very different matter.
In other words, to be entitled to recognise an error in
subjects' reasoning hero, wo have to attribute to them a
conception of the frequency or probability of an x,
p(.v), such that it is incorrect to infer p(x) " n, where x's
are i/s, from p(x|y) [p(x given </)] ^ n, unless the y's
are a suitably representative sample of the total popula-
tion. So we thereby (see part I) also attribute to them
the competence to avoid those incorrect inferences. It
follows that their probability-estimating mechanism
must be supposed to include some such procedure as:
check whether available evidence constitutes a fair
sample in relevant respects, and, if not, seek evidence
that is of the missing kind or kinds. What happens is
just that the operation of this procedure tends to be
obstructed by factors like the recency or emotional
salience of the existing evidential input, by the exis-
tence of competing claims for computing time, or by a
preference lor least effort. Cognitive illusions, in the
laboratory or in real life, depend on the power of such
factors to hold subjects back, under the pressure of
interrogation, from obtaining an appropriate addi-
tional input to their information-processing operation,
just as when a visual conjurer relies at a crucial moment
on his own speed of action, and on the visual inatten-
tiveness of those who are watching, to hold the latter
back from obtaining an appropriate additional input to
their visual information-processing operation.
Another procedure referred to in the literature as a
"heuristic ' is the method of anchoring and adjustment,
whereby a natural starting point or anchor is used as a
first approximation to the required judgment of
frequency, probability, expected value, and so on, and
is then adjusted to accommodate the implications of
additional information. Tversky and Kahneman (1974)
have shown the existence of a tendency for adjustments
to be insufficient: subjects with high starting points end
up with higher estimates than those with lower ones.
This tendency has also been noted (Lichtenstein &
Slovic 1973) in an experiment with people who were
gambling in a Las Vegas casino. Even there, an
element of conjuring was present, in that the game that
was played was specially designed for the purpose. But
it would obviously be implausible to suppose that any
kind of cognitive illusion occurs only when the circum-
stances that cause it are deliberately contrived: conjur-
ing is not the only source of visual illusions either.
A somewhat similar phenomenon has been demon-
strated in relation to hindsight (Fischhoff 1975): judges
with knowledge of the outcome tend to overestimate
the probability that they would have declared prior to
the event. This is like starting with an anchor at 100%
probability and adjusting to allow, not for more infor-
mation, but for less, that is, for ignorance of the actual
outcome.
However, unlike in the case of the supposed heuristic
of availability, there is nothing intrinsically fallacious
in the procedure of anchoring and adjustment. It is a
perfectly legitimate heuristic if correctly operated.
What goes wrong is just that the effects of recency or
salience are generally too strong to permit correct
operation. Thus Slovic et al. (1976) are right to point
out that bias from anchoring, like that from availabili-
ty, is congruent with the hypothesis that human reason-
ers resemble computers that have the right programs
and just cannot execute them properly. But Slovic et al.
also claim that there are certain other errors prevalent
in probabilistic reasoning, concerned with sampling
and prior probabilities that are not congruent with this
hypothesis, and we shall see shortly that the latter claim
cannot be sustained.
2. Tests of intelligence or education. A second cate-
gory of research activity found in the literature
concerns ignorance, not illusion. It demonstrates a lack
of mathematical or scientific expertise.
A lack of mathematical expertise here amounts to an
ignorance of principles that not everyone can be
expected to acknowledge readily, still less to elicit
spontaneously from their relevant competence. Posses-
sion of a competence for deductive or probabilistic
reasoning entails the possession of a mechanism that
must include not only certain basic procedures, corre-
sponding to a set of axioms or primitive rules for the
normative system concerned, but also a method of
generating additional procedures, corresponding to the
proof of theorems or derived rules in that normative
system. But the actual operation of this method,
beyond its simplest forms, may require skills that are
relatively rare, just as a particular talent is required for
the discovery of proofs in logic or mathematics wher-
ever no mechanical decision procedure is known. In
the latter case what are needed in an outstanding
degree are such capacities as those for discerning
shared structure in superficially different materials, for
memorising complex relationships, and the like - in
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other words, whatever promotes the proposal of worth-
while hypotheses in the trial-and-error search for
appropriate connexions. Correspondingly, only people
with those skills in an outstanding degree can be
expected to generate interesting new procedures for
eliciting deductive consequences or estimating proba-
bilities. Only they will be able to supply spontaneously
the input, in terms of perceived similarities and the like
that will enable the method of generating additional
procedures to operate fruitfully. Others will have to
learn these proofs or derivations, or acquire the addi-
tional procedures, at second hand. Education must
supplement innate intelligence, where intelligence is
understood not as the competence that everyone has
but as the level of those skills that are required to
supply the novel input essential for the discovery of
proofs. So experiment in this area may be able to show
us the limits of ordinary people's intelligence, in the
appropriate sense, or the extent to which subjects have
profited from logical or mathematical education. But it
cannot demonstrate an erroneous competence.
For example, it required the genius of a great
mathematician (Bernoulli 1713) to discover and prove
that, if you estimate the probability of a certain charac-
teristic's incidence in a population from its frequency
in a sample, then the probability of your estimate's
being correct, within a specifiable interval of approxi-
mation, will vary with the size of the sample. So it is
easily understandable that psychological experiment
finds a tendency among ordinary people, untutored in
statistical theory, to be ignorant of this principle and its
applications (Tversky & Kahneman 1971). No doubt
equally cogent experiments could be designed to estab-
lish the fact that those untutored in Euclidean geome-
try are still ignorant of the fact that the square on the
longest side of a right-angled triangle is equal in area to
the sum of the squares on the other two sides, since it
required another outstanding mathematician, Pythago-
ras, to discover a proof of this fact. Again, it is said
(Tversky & Kahneman 1971, p. 109) that at a meeting
of mathematical psychologists and at a general session
of the American Psychological Association the typical
respondent attached excessive significance to infer-
ences from relatively small samples. But what this adds
to the previous finding is just a reason for reassessing
the extent or success of the education that the respond-
ents had in fact undergone. And the same holds true in
relation to those who are supposed to have some
statistical training but still fail to recognise new exam-
ples of regression to the mean for what they are
(Kahneman & Tversky 1973).
Not all errors of estimation that are due to ignorance
arise from subjects' deficiencies in mathematical exper-
tise. Some arise instead from subjects' deficiencies in
scientific (for example, psychological) expertise. For
example, there is a good deal of evidence (reviewed in
Slovic et al. 1977, pp. 5-6) that people are often
overconfident in their second-order estimates of the
accuracy of their own primary estimates. What
happens here is that they are unaware of the various
ways in which the information-processing mechanism
that generates the primary estimates may be affected
by performance error. However, this is scarcely
surprising, since the facts about those patterns of error
are being discovered only gradually and only by diffi-
cult (and sometimes controversial) research. No doubt
it would be salutary if all nonpsychologists were taught
every such fact that has been properly established. But
all that is discovered, when their ignorance of such a
fact is discovered, is a gap in their education.
3. Misapplications of appropriate normative theory.
We have been concerned so far with genuine fallacies,
to which experiments reveal that people are prone,
because of either illusion or ignorance. However the
literature also contains several examples of more ques-
tionable claims that a common fallacy exists. These are
situations in which the experimental data may be
explained as a direct manifestation of the relevant
competence without any need to suppose an error in
performance. Such claims arise either through a misap-
plication of the appropriate normative theory or
through an application of an inappropriate one.
One particularly instructive example of the former
kind relates to the alleged prevalence of the fallacy of
illicit conversion, and, in particular, of inference from
a proposition of the form "if p then q" to one of the
form "if q then p." Intellectuals have remarked for
over two millennia (Hamblin 1970) on the tendency of
their inferiors to commit this fallacy, and in recent
years it too has been a topic for psychological investiga-
tion (Wason & Johnson-Laird 1972). The investigators
conclude that, in situations in which subjects are appar-
ently prone to illicit conversion of conditionals, "this is
not because the subjects possess faulty rules of infer-
ence but because they sometimes make unwarranted
interpretations of conditional statements" (p. 65). The
subjects are claimed to treat these conditionals as if
they were statements of causal connexion which allow
one to infer from effect to cause as well as from cause
to effect.
But it is not clear that the subjects must in fact be
supposed even to be making an unwarranted interpre-
tation. We have to bear in mind here that the princi-
ples of a normative theory, such as one that systema-
tises criteria for deducibility, inevitably involve
abstraction and idealisation (see part I, section 3). So
what are to be taken as the actual, concrete premises
that are represented by the initial formulas in a primi-
tive or derived rule for natural deduction, when such
rules are taken to be the norms relevant to some actual
sequence of human reasoning? The mere sentences
uttered do not normally constitute all of the premises
conveyed by the total act of communication, since we
are presumptively entitled to take the latter as includ-
ing also any judgments that are implied by the act of
uttering those sentences in the contextual circum-
stances. For example, as far as human conversation is
governed by rules of relevance, brevity, informative-
ness, and so on, as required by the purpose in hand
(Grice 1975),8 the information provided by the utter-
ance of a solitary conditional sentence - if p then
q - may be presumed, unless there are specific indica-
tions to the contrary, to be all that is required in the
circumstances to satisfy the interest either of someone
who wants to know what is also true if the antecedent
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of the conditional is true, or of someone who wants to
know the conditions under which the consequent of the
conditional sentence is true. In the former case ("If you
interrupt him now, he'll be cross") the conditional is
convertible because its utterance would normally be
pointless unless "if not-p then not-q" were also true and
"if not-p then not-q" is formally equivalent to the
converse of "if p, then q." In the other case ("If you
give him a tip, he'll let you in") the conditional is
convertible because its solitary utterance may be
presumed to state the only condition under which the
consequent is true.
Hence if we consider the total content of the message
communicated, rather than just the conditional
sentence that is uttered, it would not be fallacious or
unwarranted for subjects to presume, unless there are
specific indications to the contrary, that the converse of
the conditional is implicit in the message, and the
convertibility of causal conditionals is just a special
form of this. A psychological experimenter who wishes
to exclude the legitimacy of presuming the converse in
such a case must contrive suitable instructions to his
subjects and teach them how to distinguish between the
implications of a sentence uttered and the implications
of its utterance. But how could we judge the suitability
of such instructions without taking into account the
extent of their success in averting inferences to the
converse? In other words, a tendency to commit the
fallacy of illicit conversion in everyday life is demon-
strable only on the basis of an unrealistic assumption -
namely, that when a normative theory is invoked for
the evaluation of commonsense reasoning its criteria
should be applied to nothing but the linguistic forms
that are actually uttered.
Another line of research activity (see, for example,
Wagenaar 1972) in which appropriate norms seem to
be sometimes misapplied is in studies of judgments of
randomness. Results over quite a variety of tests seem
to confirm the hypothesis that subjects who are
attempting to behave randomly will produce series that
have too many alternations and too few repetitions. But
as has been well pointed out (Lopes 1980), a series may
have randomness with respect to its atomic or elemen-
tary events, while still possessing molecular units, such
as groups of ten consecutive atomic events, that do not
exhibit randomness. Or randomness may be achieved
for a certain category of molecular events, at the cost of
sacrificing randomness with respect to elementary
events. Unless this distinction between different kinds
of randomness is clearly presented to the subjects, they
are not in a position to know what kind is being sought
by the experimenters. And again it is not easy to see
how the subjects' apparent failure to produce correct
judgments of randomness should not be regarded as
simply a measure of the aptness of their instructions.
A different way in which an appropriate normative
theory may be misapplied was instantiated in the
course of an attempt to show that, as compared with
their treatment of predictive evidence, people are
prone to "a major underestimation of the impact" of
diagnostic evidence "which could have severe conse-
quences in the intuitive assessment of legal, medical, or
scientific evidence" (Tversky & Kahneman 1977, p.
186). Subjects were given two sets of questions that
were regarded by the experimenters as similar in
relevant structure. But in fact the predictive set
concerned conditional probabilities, as in - for one
instance - "The chance of death from heart failure is
45% among males with congenital high blood pres-
sure," while the diagnostic set concerned unconditional
ones, as in "The radiologist who examined Bill's X-ray
estimated the chance of a malignancy to be 45%," and
this difference sufficed to account quite rationally for
differences in the numerical answers to the two sets of
questions (see Cohen 1979, pp. 403-5). Moreover,
when the dissimilarity of structure was remedied, the
alleged phenomenon of diagnostic underestimation
failed to emerge. Other results that appear to evince
this phenomenon have to be discounted for different
reasons (Cohen 1979, pp. 401-3). But the failure to
distinguish appropriately here between conditional and
unconditional probabilities is a good example of how
the appearance of a fallacy in subjects' reasoning may
be generated by a slip in the application of the appro-
priate probabilistic analysis,9 since within normative
probability theory the distinction between conditional
and unconditional probabilities is well established.
Even the so-called gambler's fallacy, or "fallacy of
the maturity of chances," which is sometimes referred
to in the literature on cognitive irrationality (Tversky &
Kahneman 1974; Hogarth 1975), comes under some
suspicion. More empirical work seems necessary here,
but there are at least three possible approaches to the
phenomenon that call into question its interpretation as
a fallacy of probabilistic reasoning.
If some people believe that after a long run of heads
the probability of tails on the next toss will be greater
than ',4, then one possibility is that they should be
interpreted as believing thereby in a spirit of distribu-
tive justice that regulates the whole cosmos with a
policy that ensures ever-increasing probabilities of a
trend-reversing intervention whenever identical out-
comes begin to succeed one another within an other-
wise chance set-up. On this construal, a gambler's
metaphysical belief may be at fault, but not the ration-
ality of his reasoning from it. However, such an inter-
pretation needs independent evidence to support the
attribution of belief in the particular case. Otherwise it
is open to the charge of being culpably ad hoc, if not of
merely repeating what is to be explained within the
explanation.
Second, we may need to distinguish here between
two rather different probabilities, either of which
might be a matter for estimation. Is the gambler
supposed to be estimating, in relation to the next toss of
a fair coin, the probability of a tails outcome within a
space that consists of the two alternative outcomes:
heads and tails? Or is the probability in mind, at the
nth toss of a fair coin, that of having at least one tails
outcome within any space that consists of n outcomes?
Whereas the correct figure for the former would be %
the correct figure for the latter would get greater and
greater than '/k as n itself increases beyond 1, in
accordance with Bernoulli's theorem. To ascertain
clearly and unmistakably which of the two probabili-
ties is being estimated it would be necessary to question
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the gambler in a way that would tend to discourage
any incorrect estimate, since in order to convey the
exact meaning of a particular type of probability
assignment (or, indeed, of any other type of statement),
one needs to state the conditions under which such a
judgment is true. So we are left with a characteristic
indeterminacy here. Any attempt to extract an exact
answer from the gambler would transform the situa-
tion in a way that would tend to disconfirm the
occurrence of fallacious reasoning, and to the extent
that the situation was not so transformed, the exact
nature of the situation would remain in doubt. But it
remains an open question, in view of what was said
earlier about ordinary people's ignorance of Bernoulli's
theorem, whether ordinary gamblers may legitimately
be expected to be aware of its implications.
Finally, it may be that the matter at issue needs to be
regarded more as a pragmatic than as a cognitive
phenomenon. In the long run a gambler could inte-
grate the so-called fallacy into a winning strategy
against any opponent who always insists on even odds
but is willing to play as long as the gambler wants: the
gambler has only to continue increasing the stakes
sufficiently at each toss until tails actually comes up.
But, of course, such a strategy could be executed only
within the limits of any restriction that is imposed on
the stakes either by the opponent or by the gambler's
resources, just as any intellectual competence is subject
to limitations in actual performance.
4. Applications of inappropriate normative theory.
There is a tendency for some investigators of irrational-
ity to proceed as if all questions about appropriate
norms have already been settled and the questions that
remain open concern only the extent of actual confor-
mity to these norms. It is as if existing textbooks of logic
or statistics had some kind of canonical authority. But
in fact many important normative issues are still
controversial. For example, it seemed at one time that
at least the Frege-Russell logic of quantification had
become a universally received doctrine. But its close-
ness of fit for the appraisal of natural-language reason-
ing is now under a powerful challenge (Sommers 1981)
from work that exploits hitherto undiscovered ways of
developing the Aristotelian tradition. Again, it seemed
at one time to be generally agreed - and accepted by
psychological investigators of decision making (see
Slovic et al. 1977) - that the rational way to base action
on estimates of chance was to follow the rule: "Rank
possible courses of action according to their conditional
subjective estimations of utility. " But this rule has been
seriously challenged in recent years because it seems
not to take proper account of the difference between
actions as symptoms, and actions as causes, of states of
affairs that we act to promote or avert (Jeffrey 1980).
Great care has certainly to be taken also in selecting
the normative criteria by which the correctness of
subjects' probability judgments is assessed. In one
experiment, for example, subjects were told that in a
certain town blue and green cabs operate in a ratio of
85 to 15, respectively. A witness identifies a cab in a
crash as green, and the court is told that in the relevant
light conditions he can distinguish blue cabs from
green ones in 80rr of cases. The subjects were then
asked: what is the probability (expressed as a percent-
age) that the cab involved in the accident was blue?
The median estimated probability was .2, and investi-
gators (Kahneman & Tversky 1972a) claim that this
shows the prevalence of serious error, because it
implies a failure to take base rates (that is, prior
probabilities) into account. Kahneman and Tversky
commented: "Much as we would like to, we have no
reason to believe that the typical juror does not evalu-
ate evidence in this fashion." Lyon and Slovie (1976)
have confirmed the robustness of the phenomenon,
which is impervious to variations in the topic, numer-
ical details, and sequential formulation of the story told
to the subjects (with the proviso that blue and green
cabs were present in equal numbers during the tests on
the witness). And they complain that "since the world
operates according to Bayes's theorem, experience
should confirm the importance of base rates " despite
the apparent failure of subjects to recognize that it docs
SO.
At best, these experiments would constitute a test of
their subjects' intelligence or education, since the ordi-
nary person might no more be expected to generate
Bayes's theorem spontaneously than Bernoulli's. But in
fact it is doubtful whether the subjects have made any
kind of mathematical error at all. The experimenters
seem to be reasoning as follows. In the long run, they
say to themselves, the witness may be expected to make
68?c correct identifications of a cab as blue (4/i x 85fc),
3/6 incorrect identifications of a cab as blue ('/•; x 15?c),
12/6 correct identifications of a cab as green (% x
15%), and 17fr incorrect identifications as green ('/3 x
85%)- Therefore he will altogether make 29'c identifi-
cations as green, and the fraction of them that will be
incorrect is 1T/29. Consequently, according to the way in
which the experimenters seem to be reasoning, the
probability that the cab involved in the accident was
blue is 17/29, not %
But this last step is a questionable one. The ratio l7/2a
is the value of the conditional probability that a cab-
colour identification by the witness is incorrect, on the
condition that it is an identification as green. Jurors,
however, or people thinking of themselves as jurors,
ought not to rely on that probability if they can avoid
doing so, since reliance on it assumes the issue before
the court to concern a long run of cab-colour identifica-
tion problems - whereas in fact it concerns just one
problem of this type. Jurors here are occupied, strictly
speaking, just with the probability that the cab actually
involved in the accident was blue, on the condition that
the witness said it was green. And the latter probability
is equivalent in the circumstances to the probability
that a statement to the effect that the cab actually
involved in the accident was green, is false, on the
condition that the statement is made by the witness. If
the jurors know that only 20?c of the witness's state-
ments about cab colours are false, they rightly estimate
the probability at issue as '/•;, without any transgression
of Bayes's law. The fact that cab colours actually vary
according to an ^/is ratio is strictly irrelevant to this
estimate, because it neither raises nor lowers the proba-
bility of a specific cab-colour identification being
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correct on the condition that it is an identification by
the witness. A probability that holds uniformly for each
of a class of events because it is based on causal
properties, such as the physiology of vision, cannot be
altered by facts, such as chance distributions, that have
no causal efficacy in the individual events. For exam-
ple, if the green cab company suddenly increased the
size of its fleet relative to that of the blue company, the
accuracy of the witness's vision would not be affected,
and the credibility of his testimony would therefore
remain precisely the same in any particular case of the
relevant kind.
The same point can be put another way by empha-
sising the difference between probability functions that
measure relative frequencies and probability functions
that measure causal propensities (see part I, section 2).
Propensity-type probabilities may be estimated from
frequencies in appropriate samples (as with the
witness's reliability), but what is actually evaluated is
something different: a propensity, not a frequency.
And propensity-type probabilities can be derived for
individual events because they are predictable distribu-
tively. So it is natural to suppose that this is the kind of
probability with which a jury is properly concerned,
whereas the mere relative frequency of blue and green
cabs is an accidentally accumulated characteristic of
the town's cab population, considered collectively, and
does not generate any causal propensity for the particu-
lar cab in the accident. Of course, if no testimony is
mentioned and subjects know nothing except the rela-
tive frequeue)' of the differently coloured cabs, then no
causal propensity is at issue and the only basis for
estimating the required probability is indeed the rela-
tive frequency. And this is in fact the kind of estimate
that the investigators have then found to occur under
experimental conditions (Lyon & Slovic 1976, p. 294).
The issue here is an important one since it has many
ramifications. If the investigators had been right to
impugn the rationality of commonsense judgments in
the above example, it would have certainly been diffi-
cult to defend the continued use of lay juries. Consider
too what you yourself would decide in the following
circumstances. You are suffering from a disease that,
according to your manifest symptoms, is either A or B.
For a variety of demographic reasons disease A
happens to be nineteen times as common as B. The two
diseases are equally fatal if untreated, but it is danger-
ous to combine the respectively appropriate treat-
ments. Your physician orders a certain test which,
through the operation of a fairly well understood causal
process, always gives a unique diagnosis in such cases,
and this diagnosis has been tried out on equal numbers
of A- and B-patients and is known to be correct on 80%
of those occasions. The tests report that you are suffer-
ing from disease B. Should you nevertheless opt for the
treatment appropriate to A, on the supposition
(reached by calculating as the experimenters did) that
the probability of your suffering from A is 19/o3? Or
should you opt for the treatment appropriate to B, on
the supposition (reached by calculating as the subjects
did) that the probability of your suffering from B is %?
It is the former option that would be the irrational one
for you, qua patient, not the latter; and in a rather
comparable experimental situation (Hammerton 1973)
subjects tended in fact to judge the matter along just
those lines. Indeed, on the other view, which is the one
espoused in the literature, it would be a waste of time
and money even to carry out the tests, since whatever
their results, the base rates would still compel a more
than % probability in favour of disease A. So the
literature under criticism is propagating an analysis
that could increase the number of deaths from a rare
disease of this kind.
Admittedly, the standard statistical method would
be to take the prior frequency into account here, and
this would be absolutely right if what was wanted was a
probability for any patient considered not as a concrete
particular person, not even as a randomly selected
particular person, but simply as an instance of a long
run of patients. The administrator who wants to secure
a high rate of diagnostic success for his hospital at
minimal cost would be right to seek to maximise just
that probability, and therefore to dispense altogether
with the tests. But a patient is concerned with success in
his own particular case, not with stochastic success for
the system. So he needs to evaluate a propensity-type
probability, not a frequency-type one, and the stan-
dard statistical method would then be inappropriate.
Note, however, that the causal propensity analysis does
not involve any repudiation of Bayes's theorem. It is
just that the prior probabilities have to be appropriate
ones, and there is no information about you personally
that establishes a greater predisposition in your case to
disease A than to disease B. We have to suppose equal
predispositions here, unless told that the probability of
A is greater (or less) than that of B among people who
share all your relevant characteristics, such as age,
medical history, blood group, and so on. An analogous
supposition has to be made about the cab colours,
unless we are told that because of faulty maintenance,
say, the probability of a blue cab's being involved in
accidents that share all the relevant characteristics of
the present one, such as poor braking, worn tires, and
the like, is greater (or less) than that of a green cab's
being involved. Similarly, in a criminal law court the
object is to do justice in each individual case, without
taking a defendant's past criminal record, if he has one,
into account. But it is easy enough to imagine analo-
gous cases in which a shoplifter, say, would escape
conviction on the basis of probabilistic testimony about
identification, if the relative frequency of honest shop-
pers could be cited in his defence! Or consider an
exmple very like that cited by Todhunter (1949/1865,
p. 400) in connection with the danger of applying the
standard statistical method - which he traces to
Condorcet - indiscriminately. A witness of 99.9% relia-
bility asserts that the number of the single ticket drawn
in a lottery of 10,000 tickets was, say, 297: ought we
really to reject that proposition just because of the size
of the lottery?
The difference between frequency probability and
propensity probability is a difference between two
functions that both satisfy the formal axioms of the
classical calculus of chance. The two functions differ in
their semantics, that is, with regard to the nature x and
y must have, and the relation they must bear to one
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another, when, for a particular n, it is true that
p(*l</) = n- But both functions have the same logical
syntax; that is, each satisfies a multiplicational law for
conjunction, a complementational law for negation,
and so on. Nevertheless (as remarked in part I, section
2) it should by no means be taken for granted that all
valid types of probability judgment in everyday
reasoning can be modeled by functions that share this
syntax.
For example, it has been held (Kahneman & Tversky
1972b; 1973; 1974; Tversky & Kahneman 1974) that
intuitive judgments of probability are biased towards
predicting that outcomes will be similar to the evidence
afforded by typical cases. It is claimed that people use a
representativeness heuristic as a rough-and-ready,
though often misleading, guide in their probabilistic
reasoning. But the validity of this claim depends on the
assumption that such a judgment about degree of
representativeness has to be interpreted as a means
towards drawing some conclusion about probability in
a sense of that term that conforms to the classical
calculus of chance. If instead we abandon that assump-
tion, we can avoid imputing any fallacies here. We can
suppose that the judgment of representativeness leads
to a conclusion about probability in a sense in which an
inference from representativeness to probability is
always quite legitimate - albeit a sense that conforms
to principles different from those derivable within the
calculus of chance. In fact, these principles can be
shown to be implicit in the logic of controlled experi-
ment, which was first developed by Francis Bacon
(Cohen 1979). Bacon, in the preface to his Novum
Organum, described the central concern of his own
enquiry in just the same terms as Bernoulli (1713, p.
211) described his, namely, the determination of "de-
grees of certainty." But Bacon's method defines a
different concept of probability from Bernoulli's
(Cohen 1980b). Hume (1739) called it "probability
arising from analogy, " and he wrote:
Without some degree of resemblance, as well as
union, 'tis impossible there can be any reasoning; but
as this resemblance admits of many different
degrees, the reasoning becomes proportionally more
or less firm and certain. An experiment loses of its
force, when transfer'd to instances, which are not
exactly resembling; tho' 'tis evident it may still retain
as much as may be the foundation of probability, as
long as there is any resemblance remaining.
When all this is made precise and its implications are
developed systematically, one can show that, in appro-
priate contexts, concern'with representativeness is not a
potentially fallacious heuristic but rather a quite relia-
ble, albeit somewhat crude, mode of commonsense
reasoning under conditions of uncertainty (Cohen
1979; 1980d). It appears otherwise only if evaluated
against a type of normative theory that is inappropriate
in the circumstances (though admirably appropriate in
many other circumstances).
Conclusion
The upshot of all this may be summarised as follows.
No doubt ordinary people often err in their reasoning,
and such a mistake begins to be of scientific interest
when it can be shown to instantiate some regular
pattern of performance error. However, nothing in the
existing literature on cognitive reasoning, or in any
possible future results of human experimental enquiry,
could have bleak implications for human rationality, in
the sense of implications that establish a faulty compe-
tence. At best, experimenters in this area may hope to
discover revealing patterns of illusion. Often they will
only be testing subjects' intelligence or education. At
worst they risk imputing fallacies where none exist.
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NOTES
1. The same is true for intuitions of grammaticalness, pace
Sampson (1975).
2. This issue is too complex to be treated adequately here;
for a useful review see Haack (1974).
3.1 leave open here the much discussed question whether
Lewis and Langford, 1959, Anderson and Belnap 1974, or
some other system provides a better fitting logic of everyday
reasoning.
4. For example, the intuition that B is deducible from A
whenever A-and-not-B is inconsistent (Lewis & Langford
1959) clashes with the intuition that one may not deduce
every proposition from an inconsistent one (Anderson &
Belnap 1974). So, though consistency is normally an overrid-
ing ideal for theory construction, one cannot treat the
demand for it as the only foundation needed for a theory of
deducibility: other intuitions, too, have to be taken into
account.
5. Cf. how, in a maximally specific case, the systematic
model of a clinician's judgmental strategies may be a better
predictor than the clinician's own judgment (Goldberg 1970).
6. The analogy with perceptual illusion (such as the Miiller-
Lyer) was also drawn by Chapman and Chapman (1967, p.
194) in their interpretation of the partly experimental and
partly real-life data about erroneous use of Draw-a-Person
tests in psychiatric diagnosis. Both here and in their work on
the psychodiagnostic use of Rorschach cards (1969) they
traced the source of illusory correlations to a powerful bias by
verbal association, since subjects with no clinical experience at
all tended to make the same erroneous correlations as many
clinicians.
7. Apparently none of Wason's subjects objected, as would
have been justified, that no finite number of questions and
answers, whether falsificatory or verificatory, could prove
such a hypothesis correct.
8.1 take Grice to have established the mental or social
reality of some such rules. In the logical context, however, he
does not use them, as I do, to explain the alleged prevalence of
the fallacy of illicit conversion. Instead he tries to use them to
explain away the apparent inappropriateness of a truth-
functional logic for the analysis of deductive reasoning in a
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natural language, and in this he attempts an impossible task
(see Cohen 1971; 1977a).
9. This has now been acknowledged by its authors (Kahne-
man & Tversky 1979).
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Rational animal?
Simon Blackburn
Pembroke College, Oxford OX IIDW, England
Jonathan Cohen's central contention sounds very radical:
"nothing in the existing literature on cognitive reasoning, or
in any possible future results of human experimental enquiry,
could have bleak implications for human rationality, in the
sense of implications that establish a faulty competence." But
before researchers into our cognitive defects lay down their
tools, they will want to reflect that this optimism is only
protected by a "competence/performance" distinction: In
Cohen's own terms it is quite possible that we suffer from
systematic tendencies to poor performance, even if these can
only be located within a general view of the subject that
regards him as competent in the use of the kinds of argument
that he has performed badly. But I doubt whether the
argument Cohen offers supports even this dilute optimism. Its
essence is that if we are to attribute faulty performance to an
individual (e.g. illicit conversion of a conditional) we must be
sure that the sentences he is using (e.g. English ones with "if
then" syntax) are used to express conditionals in the sense of
our logical theory. But doing this is in part discovering that
the sentences are used with the correct deductive liaisons of
conditionals. If the speakers didn't do this much, then we
couldn't be sure that conversion was illicit at all (e.g. if the
conditional form actually expressed belief in the bicondition-
al).
Certainly it behooves us to look out for this possibility. But
sometimes people might exhibit enough of a tendency to
accept and reject certain inferences that this would put quite
definite constraints on what they could be doing in using the
"if then ' construction; they might then proceed to judge and
perform in such a way that no consistent model of their
reasoning could be reconstructed. In that case there would be
no defence of them along the lines that perhaps we mistrans-
late the connective. For example, we all incline to accept
argument forms such as conditional proof; these are only
valid if "if then" expresses material implication; we then
disallow other properties of that operation. There is no
consistent logic we could be obeying. If these things are true
of us, then they point to a flaw in competence, not perfor-
mance. Of course, as Cohen rightly says, we must be very
careful to ascertain that people are actually doing such things.
We are very quick to include collateral information in our
processes of argument, which therefore look invalid to anyone
who only takes account of the strict and literal content of our
sentences. But that points to an experimental pitfall, not to an
a priori certainty in our competence.
One might reply: Well, what if we are just vague in what
we mean by "if then, " or let it move amongst possible
meanings? We would then preserve our rationality even in
the face of the worst kind of result. We would; but only at the
cost of a different kind of irrationality. A feature of our
cognitive lives is irrational if it increases the likelihood of
arriving at false judgment. A language that allowed system-
atic jumps in the meaning of logical particles would increase
the likelihood of arriving at false judgment, unless the jumps
were clearly signalled, so that people knew where they were.
Since we clearly don't have such signalling ("now I'm going
to use "if then" to mean "if and only if"), it would be
irrational to use such a language.
When the witness has reported the green colour of the cab,
we have a piece of evidence putting us in an "epistemic
situation" which has the following relation to the truth: If in
that situation we believed the cab to have been green, we
would be right in 12 cases out of 23. In the diagnosis case,
believing the result of the test, we would be right 4 times out
of 23. It is bad to form such beliefs in such epistemic
situations: It is doing something that increases the likelihood
of arriving at false judgment. How did Cohen come to
recommend it? As John Mackie [q.v.] rightly points out, the
principles of the cases have been known since Hume, roughly,
and Thomas Bayes, precisely.
I suspect that the root trouble is the metaphysical notion of
a propensity, thought of as a particular real, but gradable
feature of individual trials on a chance setup. We can protect
ourselves from the harmful consequences of this notion only
by invoking a battery of distinctions, as Mackie does: the
patient's "abstract propensity" to contract a disease, versus his
"propensity in the actual situation," versus the frequency
with which patients get the disease, versus the epistemic
probability that he will get it. This is surely too cumbersome
to be helpful in guarding against the fundamental opportu-
nity for error which the concept brings: the belief that
"mere" statistical evidence is irrelevant to me, because my
propensity to get the disease is what it is, regardless of other
people's no doubt different propensities. I have argued else-
where that legitimate talk about propensities is best seen as a
projection of our concern in getting the best judgment we can
about the individual case: It is not something to set over and
against rational judgment, but our way of projecting the
norms that guide rational judgment (Blackburn 1980). On my
picture we may legitimately ask whether my propensity is
different from the 4/23 chance that I have the B disease, but
only because we can envisage a different, narrower reference
class into which, ideally, I should be put. While there is no
such class, to have any other than 4/23 confidence that I have
the B disease is doing something that increases the likelihood
of false judgment. [This would be apparent from the disas-
trous results of a hospital that institutionalized the tendency.]
It is quite true that to get the single-case confidence from the
long-run truth requires the exercise of what I have called the
Population Indifference Principle: If the best epistemic situa-
tion you can get into about an individual case is one in which
judging it to be X would be right P% of the time, then you
should have P% confidence in that judgment. But this is
constitutive of rational response to evidence. (Blackburn
1973).
When should we attribute a defect that increases the
likelihood of false judgment to irrationality, and when to
simple lack of education? The only illuminating suggestion I
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can think of has a pleasant connexion with some of the
experimental results. We would censure someone for possess-
ing such a defect the more if ordinary life afforded him
opportunities for self-correction (self-education) but he did
not profit from the lesson. Thus, ordinary people who are not
surveyors have no opportunity for practicing Pythagoras's
theorem, and require teaching. But the experimental results
seem to support the view that we show defects in our pursuit
of truth mostly where we don't often pursue it, which is
exactly where ordinary life has given us no opportunity to
practice self-correction. Perhaps basic optimism about ration-
ality where we need it is therefore justified. Still, if a jury
finds me guilty, or a politician blows me up, it is small
consolation to think that their mistake was due only to an
unfortunate lack of practice in extending a basic competence
outside their familiar fields.
Status of the rationality assumption in
psychology
Marvin S. Cohen
Decision Science Consortium, Inc. Falls Church, Va. 22043
The claim that something cannot in principle be established
experimentally does not itself, presumably, rest on experi-
mental evidence. Thus, Professor Cohen appears to be offer-
ing a constitutive principle for the scientific study of ordinary
human reasoning: It can never be regarded as systematically
flawed. Errors, when they occur, must be attributed not to
basic competence, but to features of performance such as
fatigue, motivation, inattention, or lapse of memory. In this
claim, however, the argument takes on the look of an
empirical hypothesis. This ambiguity bears closer scrutiny.
Unraveling its implications will reveal, I believe, that Cohen's
thesis is neither plausible as an empirical hypothesis nor
fruitful as a constitutive principle.
Consider the class J of all instances of "human reasoning. '
In evaluating human rationality, according to Cohen, one
must use criteria based on the normative theory (or combina-
tion of theories) that best accounts for actual instances of
reasoning; that is, that comes closest to generating the class J.
Ignoring the issue of uniqueness, let us refer to the theory (or
combination of theories) that is most successful in this sense as
T. Now most instances of reasoning in J will turn out_to be
correct according to T (the class A), but others will not (A). To
explain A, we introduce the class B, containing all instances in
which performance factors cause a change in the outcome of
reasoning. Now the claim with which we are concerned can
be formulated thus: All members of A are members of B.
An opposing view maintains that errors in reasoning may
be caused by the same processes that lead on other occasions
to "correct" reasoning, and that no interference or distortion
from other sources is necessary. Such processes are, of course,
"heuristics': Even when properly used, they need not always
produce the desired result.
The issue as stated seems amenable to experimental test, at
least in principle. For example, fatigue, motivation, demands
on attention, and memory can all be manipulated by standard
experimental techniques, and the effect on a concurrent
reasoning task can be observed. The question of interest
would be whether evidence indicates that the use of heuristics
increases with the disturbing factor, independently of any
increase in errors. If it does, we have experimental support for
the claim that heuristics replace more normatively appro-
priate procedures under conditions of stress. If the use of
heuristics does not vary as a function of stress, on the other
hand, it is likely that they are employed in ordinary unstress-
ful human reasoning, with occasional erroneous conse-
quences. _
Let us imagine_it established that some members of A are
not members of B. Now what can Cohen's reaction to this
hypothetical state of affairs be?
1. He can reject the claim that all members of A belong to
B, as a disconfirmed empirical hypothesis. But this would be
an admission of human irrationality on experimental grounds,
contrary to the main thesis of his paper.
2. He can conclude that T is not, after all, the best
normative theory in accounting for J. Some different theory
T" must be found, such that all instances of reasoning that are
erroneous according to T" are in fact members of B. In effect,
empirical data _on performance determine the portion of
J (A' = J A B) that must be generated by the selected
normative theory.
3. As a final option, Cohen might retain T as the best
normative account of /, but conclude that B does not
correctly represent the role of performance factors. In its
place we put B', which is simply defined as A, the class of all
erroneous instances of reasoning. This is the opposite tack
from (2), where the empirical theory of performance deter-
mined the domain of the normative theory. Here instead the
normative theory defines the theory of performance.
Unfortunately, options (2) and (3) may have quite unpalat-
able consequences. For concreteness, consider the availability
heuristic. An appropriate normative theory, proposed by
Cohen for this situation, features the assumption (T) that
frequency in a population can be estimated by frequency in a
representative sample. Errors occur, he says, only when
performance factors distract subjects from determining that
the available sample is, in fact, representative. Now it is not
impossible that experimentation would disconfirm this, show-
ing that no identifiable performance factors are responsible
for the observed results. Is there a revised normative theory,
T' that, as in option (2), depicts the observed behavior as
rational? The critical point is this: There is no guarantee that
such a normative theory, T\ exists.
Such a theory is guaranteed only if "normative" is
construed loosely enough. We simply adopt as T' the "theory '
corresponding to the heuristic itself: that frequency is avail-
ability, or alternatively, that all available sample's are repre-
sentative. This, of course, trivializes Cohen's thesis, and he
will have none of it.
The result of applying option (3) is analogous. The theory
of performance, defined by reference to T, is vacuous. We are
at liberty to invoke "inattention," "lapses of memory," and
"failures of motivation ' whenever and wherever we need to
in order to preserve T as a theory of competence. But these
terms have left behind them any connection to their use in an
experimental science.
What can we conclude about the status of Cohen's thesis
that all errors are attributable to performance? If it is an
empirical hypothesis, we must be prepared to relinquish it in
the event that (a) performance factors are not experimentally
supported for some instances of A, and (b) no plausible
alternative normative theory is available to account for
JAB. Nor should these eventualities be regarded as improb-
able. Ethology reveals numerous instances of behaviors that
are adaptive in certain contexts but not in others. Evolution-
ary success does not imply that a structure or trait has been
appropriate wherever it occurred, only that it has been
appropriate often enough.
As a constitutive principle for the psychological study of
human reasoning, Cohen's thesis seems off the mark. It can
lead, in principle, either to the adoption of utter nonsense as a
normative theory, or else to the abandonment of the
empirical study of attention, memory, and motivation.
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Whether in fact it does so, depends on the outcomes of
experiments. It might turn out that competence, as defined
by normative theory T, is the exact complement of perfor-
mance, as defined by experimental psychology. But this result
would be quite fortuitous in light of the evolutionary consid-
erations referred to in the previous paragraph. And the mere
possibility of a negative outcome is enough to warrant rejec-
tion of Cohen's principle.
Where the thesis does have plausibility, perhaps, is as a
"constitutive principle" for ordinary reasoning about our
fellow human beings. In this sense, it is akin to the principle of
charity in translation: We attempt to construe another's words
and actions so as to make them seem as rational as possible. If
someone denies the obvious, we try to construe his words in a
different sense. Ad hoc "lapses of attention are invoked
where we fail. It is in this sense only that human reasoning
ability is to be regarded as "flawless."
Kmpirieal psychology is not evaluative in this way. Heuris-
tics that correctly describe reasoning will occasionally violate
obvious norms and thus not be sensibly interpretable as
"beliefs of the subject. For the same reason, such heuristics
are not part of a theory T that purports to be normative. Such
constraints can only hinder the effort to find an account of
reasoning that is consistent with theories of attention,
memory, and motivation - however flawed our reasoning
ability turns out to be.
The persistence of cognitive illusions
Persi Diaconis" and David Freedman6
'Statistics Department. Stanford University. Stanford, Cat. 94305 and
"Statistics Department. University of California. Berkeley. Cat. 94720
Introduction. Cohen asserts that "normative theory . . . is
itself acceptable . . . only so far as it accords, at crucial points,
with the evidence of untutored intuition. Fie goes even
further: "Ordinary human reasoning . . . sets its own stan-
dards." However, our view is that untutored intuition is of ten
wrong, and much can be learned by examining common
mistakes in reasoning.
A focal point for our discussion will be the idea of "cogni-
tive illusions." Cohen introduces this idea as follows: "subjects
are induced to indulge in a form of reasoning that on a few
moments' prompted reflection they would be willing to admit
is invalid." Much of the research under review is said by
Cohen to demonstrate at most the existence of such cognitive
illusions. On our view, many of the illusions cannot be
dispelled by a "few moments' prompted reflection," or
several months of college teaching; if dispelled, the illusions
seem to return in full force the next time a similar situation
comes along. Such illusions seem to be rooted very deeply in
the human mind. Our main point is that these illusions exist
and are worth studying. We will draw three examples from
Cohen's article: More, we will try to show that Cohen himself
commits all three fallacies. The first does not seem to have
been named: We dub it "the fallacy of the transposed
conditional."
The fallacy of the transposed conditional. In part II,
section 4, Cohen discusses the example of a witness to a
lottery; the "reliability" of this witness is given as 99.9%.
There are 10,000 tickets in the lottery. One is drawn at
random; the witness says it was 297. What is the probability
that it really was 297? According to Cohen, the "standard
statistical method ' takes into account the number of tickets in
the lottery; he considers this to be wrong. However, there is a
real ambiguity in Cohen's statement of the problem. Let X be
the number drawn in the lottery, and Y the number reported
by the witness. Does "reliability" mean P(X - n|Y « n) or
P(Y = n | X = n)? If the former, contrary to Cohen's assertion,
the number of tickets in the lottery will not affect the
probability of error, as computed by the "standard statistical
method." If the latter, the problem is incompletely specified:
the missing information being P(Y <= n | X - m) for n ¥" m.1
As far as we can see, Cohen reaches his conclusion by sliding
from one of these interpretations of reliability to the other.
Confusing P(A | B) with P(B|A) is "the fallacy of the trans-
posed conditional." It is the statistical analogue of confusing
"p implies q" with "q implies p."2 Both errors are made
frequently, even by people who ought to know better. Cohen
cites Todhunter (1949/1865) in his discussion of witness
reliability, and Todhunter cites de Morgan (1856). l)e
Morgan got it right, in 1856; Cohen's error is an example of a
persistent cognitive illusion.
The base rate fallacy. Cohen construes the base rate fallacy
(part II, section 4) as a "test of . . . intelligence or education."
We do not agree. To see why, consider his discussion of the
jury trial involving eyewitness identification of a taxicab. Was
the cab blue or green? At one point Cohen concedes that, in
the absence of other evidence, base rates are a "basis for
estimating the required probability ": there is an 85?c chance
for the cab to be blue and 15% to be green. Just before this,
Cohen stipulates that, under the relevant conditions, there is
an 80% chance that the witness can correctly distinguish
between the two colors. In short, Cohen seems to accept the
two hypotheses of Bayes's theorem.3 This theorem, like any
other, is a statement of the form "if p, then q. ' Stripped of
irrelevant detail, Cohen's argument amounts to granting p
but denying q. Indeed, as soon as the jury has both the base
rate and the witness, Cohen instructs it to disregard the base
rate. As he insists later, "we have to suppose equal predisposi-
tions here. . . ."4 Cohen's argument for disregarding the base
rate is as follows: "A probability that holds uniformly for each
of a class of events because it is based on causal properties,
such as the physiology of vision, cannot be altered by lacts,
such as chance distributions, that have no causal efficacy in
the individual events. In this lapidary sentence, Cohen not
only commits the base rate fallacy, but positively defends it.
Evidently, the base rate fallacy is a persistent cognitive
illusion.
The gambler's fallacy. According to Bernoulli's theorem, if
a fair coin is tossed a large number of times, the proportion of
heads will be close to .5, with high probability. The deviation
between the actual number of heads and the expected
number is swamped by the number of tosses.5 There is no
compensation: A run of heads is as likely to be followed by a
head as by a tail. In short, the coin has no memory. There is
good experimental evidence to support the theory. However,
as Tversky and Kahneman (1974) show, and as we see over
and over again in the classroom, people have a hard time
believing the theory. The belief that a run of heads is likely to
be followed by a tail is called "the gambler's fallacy. ' The
fallacy is as current today as it was in Bernoulli's time, and as
hard to extirpate. This is our third example of a persistent
cognitive illusion.
Consider Cohen's discussion (part II, sections 3 and 4). He
makes three points, which can be summarized (a little
brutally) as follows:
i. People who believe that the coin has a memory should
be interpreted as believing that the coin has a memory.
ii. There is in fact no evidence that people actually do
believe the gambler's fallacy; such evidence is in
principle impossible to obtain; and even if it could be
obtained, it would have no psychological significance.
iii. Someone with infinite resources, who believed the
fallacy, could make money by betting according to in-
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tuition, if only casinos tossed fair coins and lifted the
house limit on the size of bets.
Many gamblers would be very happy to meet the person
described in (iii). Leaving that vision aside, Cohen's discussion
obscures the two main points:
i. The gambler's fallacy is a fallacy,
ii. People believe it anyway.
Conclusion. Both of the present commentators make a
living by teaching probability and statistics. Over and over
again, we see students and colleagues (and ourselves) making
certain kinds of mistakes. Even the same mistake may be
repeated by the same person many times. Cohen is wrong in
dismissing this as the result of "mathematical or scientific
ignorance." Analysis of such repeated mistakes is crucial to
successful teaching. The work of Tversky and Kahneman
(1974) is very helpful in this respect. Their psychological
explanations are, at a minimum, valuable heuristics which
help organize experience and lead to new understanding.
Their examples are wonderfully illuminating.
By comparison, Cohen's analysis seems to be both sterile
and wrong. There is nothing in his target article that helps us
to understand the difficulties people have in dealing with
standard probability theory. In other publications, he has
attempted to develop some alternatives to the standard theo-
ry. But his alternatives are cranky. Standard theory says some
useful things about the empirical world, but the insights often
contradict basic intuition. As a result, people have a hard time
learning the theory. Cohen's solution seems to be to revise the
theory so it will accord with his a priori idea of "untutored
intuition. " This must be the philosopher's version of throwing
out the baby with the bathwater.
NOTES
1. On the first interpretation of reliability, P(X - n | Y - n) = .999
by assumption, regardless of the number of tickets in the lottery.
Now take the second interpretation. There are 10,000 tickets in the
lottery, so X is uniform from 1 to 10,000. By Bayes's theorem, P(X =
n|Y = n) - a/a + b: where a = P(Y - n | x = n) . P(X - n) -
.999 x 1/10,000; and b is the sum over m * n of P(Y = n | X -m) •
P(X - m), so b is between 0 and (1 - .999) x 9,999/10,000. Thus,
P(X = n | Y •= n) is between .09 and 1, depending on the values of the
missing parameters. That is quite a range. If, for example,
P(Y = n|X = m and Y ^
 m ) j s 1/9,999, then the number of tickets
in the lottery really does enter into P(X — n | Y — n), both in theory
and in practice. On these assumptions, an observer who uses Bayes's
rule would have a better chance of being right than an observer who
uses Cohen's calculus.
2. P(A | B) can be interpreted as the probability of A, if you know
that B has occurred.
3. These hypotheses may be open to question, but Cohen does not
raise such issues. And we doubt that these issues are relevant to an
understanding of the base rate fallacy.
4. This must be an application of Laplace's principle of insufficient
reason, first published around 1780: another example of a long-lived
cognitive illusion.
5. This deviation is likely to be on the order of .5 times the square
root of the number of tosses (DeMoivre's theorem).
Rationality and the sanctity of competence
Hillel J. Einhorn and Robin M. Hogarth
Center for Decision Research. Graduate School of Business, University of
Chicago, Chicago, 111.60637
We are sympathetic to a number of points made by Cohen:
the importance of context in assessing error in judgment; the
crucial role of intuition in judging rationality; the conditional
nature of normative models, and so on. Indeed, these issues
are discussed at length in our review of behavioral decision
theory (Einhorn & Hogarth 1981). What is new in Cohen's
paper is the proposed distinction between competence and
performance in reasoning tasks. This distinction not only
provides the basis for many of his criticisms of the existing
literature, it also serves to justify the negative answer to the
question posed in his title. We consider this distinction in
detail below but note that Cohen's basic arguments about
human rationality fall into the class of explanations termed
"imaginary reconstructions" (Lewontin 1979), that is,
attempts to rescue rationality in behavior despite much
evidence to the contrary. While we believe that some
psychologists have gone too far in describing people as
"cognitive cripples, " Cohen has overreacted and gone to the
other extreme. To show this, we first consider the compe-
tence-performance distinction and its implications.
Consider that performance on some inference task is a joint
function of competence, knowledge, motivation, and environ-
mental factors (including random variation). This can be
expressed by the conceptual equation
Performance = f (Competence, Knowledge,
Motivation, Environment) (1)
If, as seems likely, these factors trade off to some extent in
producing a particular level of performance (e.g., f could be
multiplicative or additive), there is an immediate implication:
Variability in performance can be explained by changes in
factors other than competence. Thus, if rationality is to be
defined in terms of a constant level of competence, we should
have no difficulty in attributing any defect in performance to
one or more of the other factors. Thus, Cohen's position is
untestable. Moreover, we are puzzled by the title of his target
article, since the above position makes it impossible to demon-
strate that any behavior, irrespective of whether or not it is
experimentally produced, is irrational. Perhaps we have over-
simplified Cohen's position, and a more complete analysis is
needed. In particular, how are the various factors in (1)
defined and used in the paper?
Consider what Cohen means by competence. He states:
"To ascribe a cognitive competence . . . is to characterise the
content of a culturally or genetically inherited ability which,
under ideal conditions, every member of the community
would exercise in appropriate circumstances." Later on, in
discussing information-processing mechanisms he says, "The
structure or design of such a mechanism must account for the
relevant competence." This seems to suggest that our infor-
mation-processing equipment, which is our biological heri-
tage from a long evolutionary process, is sacrosanct and not to
be considered defective in any way. Furthermore, although
Cohen agrees that human rationality is bounded, he states
that this is the case "in practice," thus implying that limited
short-term memory, selective attention, lack of attentional
control, and so on, are not inherent biological limitations in
design but rather performance defects caused by insufficient
motivation, lack of knowledge, or environmental effects. We
call this type of competence "design competence" and
consider it shortly. However, Cohen seems to have another
meaning of competence in mind when he includes "culturally
inherited ability" as part of his definition. This seems to imply
a "competence for learning" as well. Indeed, in his example
of a child being inferior in competence to an adult, the result
can be seen as due to either a lack of maturation in the
biological structures used in reasoning (design competence) or
the lack of learning about and experience in performing
certain mental operations (competence for learning). [See also
Brainerd: "The Stage Question in Cognitive-Developmental
Theory" BBS 1(2) 1978.]
If one asks for the rationale underlying the sanctity of
design competence, or, to put it another way, why we must
assume an underlying rationality for structure/design, no
answer other than a naive evolutionary adaptationist position
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is given. This position is most clearly articulated in an earlier
paper (Cohen 1980b) in which we are told (p. 91) that the
continued use of fallacious reasoning would have dire, and
thus highly unlikely, genetic implications: "How strange that
the top species in an evolutionary struggle for survival should
end up with such lethal genes!" Whatever the merits of
talking about the lethality of genes, we do not find the
existence of persistent dysfunctional mechanisms to be
incompatible with an evolutionary framework. This is partic-
ularly the case when one realizes that humans also adapt the
environment to overcome their deficiencies (invent eyeglasses
to correct poor eyesight; develop insulin for diabetics, and so
on). Moreover, the time frame of evolution is such that we
don't know whether any particular mechanism is being
selected for or against, or is a vestige without function
(Eichorn & Hogarth 1981, pp. 58-59; also see Lewontin
1978). Thus, Cohen's claims for design competence rest on no
grounds that we can discern.
A second problem for Cohen's analysis is that a distinction
between the competence for learning and what is learned is
unclear. For example, one can agree with Cohen that lay
adults who have not studied probability theory should not be
faulted for failing to respond as though they had. However,
how far should this argument be taken? Should one consider
ignorance of formal physics a valid excuse for an adult who
attempts to fly by jumping off a roof? Since people experi-
ence both sampling variability and the forces of gravity, at
what point is it necessary that they receive explicit instruction
in the laws of nature when judging the rationality of acts?
While we have no answer, this is a more complicated question
than Cohen seems to realize. In fact, the general difficulties
involved in correctly learning about the quality of ones
judgments and choices are ignored. While it could be argued
that much of the literature Cohen criticizes does the same, the
fact that learning and adaptation play a certain role in
defining rationality (cf. Simon 1978) makes this a serious
omission. For example, numerous investigators have discussed
the difficulties of learning from outcome feedback, especially
in probabilistic environments (e.g., Brehmer 1980; Einhorn &
Hogarth 1978; Hammond 1978). Moreover, the disappear-
ance of dysfunctional behavior is not assured by feedback and
may even be strengthened by it (Einhorn 1980). In addition,
there is evidence of biological limitations in the learning
process itself (Seligman 1970). Thus, as was the case for design
competence, we can find little support for an inherent ration-
ality in the competence for learning. [See also Johnston:
"Contrasting Approaches to a Theory of Learning" BBS 4(1)
1981.]
Where does this critique of Cohen leave us with respect to
defining an error of reasoning in particular and the rational-
ity of thought in general? First, Cohen's definition, whereby
"nothing can count as an error of reasoning among our fellow
adults unless even the author of the error would, under ideal
conditions, agree that it is an error," is too vague to be useful
(what, for example, are "ideal conditions "?) and conceptually
unsatisfactory. It is not difficult, for instance, to think of
situations in which real errors are not acknowledged as such
(as in rationalizations) or errors are admitted where none has
occurred (as in Galileo's retraction). Unlike those working in
the field of perceptual illusions, we do not have commonly
accepted yardsticks by which to assess mistakes. Instead, we
must rely on the very judgment we wish to measure. Unfortu-
nately, the elements that make up such judgments remain
elusive.
With regard to the general issue of the rationality of
behavior, we have given our own views on this matter
elsewhere (Einhorn & Hogarth 1981). Briefly, judgments of
rationality involve a mixture of the efficiency by which
means secure ends (instrumental rationality - see Tribe 1973)
and the goodness of the ends themselves (moral rationality).
Thus, a calculating mass murderer may be judged as irra-
tional to the degree that the attainment of despicable goals is
accomplished with efficiency. Moreover, even internal crite-
ria for rationality, such as consistency and coherence of
behavior, are not without difficulty. For example, paranoids
exhibit remarkable consistency and coherence in their belief
systems. However, it is extremely difficult to convince such
people that they have made errors in reasoning. [See Colby:
"Modeling a Paranoid Mind" BBS 4(4) 1981.]
Although this comment has focused on our disagreement
with Cohen, we do in fact agree with many of his opinions.
Indeed, the need to study reasoning in natural environments
seems to us to be especially important (Brunswik 1956). We
cannot assume, as do many experimental psychologists, that
performance in simple environments can necessarily be
generalized to situations rich in a diversity of informational
cues, where the use of multiple cues of equivocal validity is
the rule rather than the exception (Hammond 1955; Postman
& Tolman 1959). To quote Toda: "Man and rat are both
incredibly stupid in an experimental room. On the other
hand, psychology has paid little attention to the things they
do in their normal habitat; man drives a car, plays compli-
cated games, and organizes society, and rat is troublesomely
cunning in the kitchen" (1962, p. 165).
On defining rationality unreasonably
J. St. B. T. Evans and P. Pollard
Department of Psychology. Plymouth Polytechnic, Plymouth, PL4 8AA,
England
Cohen has argued that human irrationality cannot be demon-
strated by the "existing literature" or by "any possible future
results of . . . experimental enquiry " into deductive and
probabilistic inference, in that a faulty competence can never
be established from observation of faulty performance. In so
arguing he adopts a philosophical stance that is impossible to
refute and is of little practical relevance to the scientific study
of human reasoning.
Cohen copies Chomsky's treatment of language in two
respects. He argues for a distinction between underlying
competence and observed performance and also insists that
the definition of what constitutes a rational inference - by
analogy to what constitutes a grammatical sentence - is its
intuitive acceptability to ordinary people. There are thus two
grounds on which apparently irrational behaviour may be
explained: Competence may be disguised by the operation of
performance factors, or else an a priori normative definition
of rationality may be disqualified.
In reasoning experiments, the tasks normally require
subjects to make intuitive assessments of the validity of
inferences. By Cohen's definition, their responses can only be
counted as errors if "the author of the error would, under
ideal conditions, agree that it is an error. " In this event the
subject is said to be suffering from a "cognitive illusion" or a
lack of appropriate education. Here we encounter the first
major problem with Cohen's position. No criteria are speci-
fied for the definition of "ideal conditions," so we can never
actually know when the subject is being "rational" or when he
is exhibiting an illusion. The subject's agreement about an
error is, in fact, of no use in this context. Although the
experimenter can explain a problem and cause a subject to
admit an error, on many problems the experimenter could
just as easily persuade a subject that a normatively correct
response was incorrect. Similarly, experimental manipulation
of the effect of an "illusion" can produce spuriously high
frequencies of normatively correct responses.
This problem becomes apparent in Cohen's discussion of
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the Wason (1966) selection task as an example of a cognitive
illusion. Naive subjects make a logical error on this task which
Cohen terms a failure to apply the law of contraposition. That
subjects do in fact possess the competence to apply this rule,
he argues, is shown by the fact that responses tend to conform
to logical requirements when the problem is phrased in
realistic rather than abstract terms. Cohen himself appears to
be suffering from a cognitive illusion here. He has argued
that the failure to observe a logical response in some circum-
stances cannot be taken to imply that the subject lacks
competence for the inference, as he may be "led astray" by a
cognitive illusion. However, Cohen then expects us to accept
the notion that observing the inference in other circumstances
does mean that the subject possesses competence for its
execution. "'Competence" may be as illusory as "incompe-
tence."
Perhaps Cohen would wish to argue that the use of familiar
materials reduces the chance of illusory behaviour. He states
that "most people manage to apply their logical competence
without ever formulating it expressly at a level of generality
sufficient for it to be readily applicable to wholly unfamiliar
tasks." Fie is on shaky ground here. First, Cohen's definition
of competence becomes unclear if it is held to be situation
specific. Second, it is not in general the case that more
realistic material improves logical performance. For instance,
a priori beliefs about, or emotional attitudes towards, the
content of a reasoning problem can be a major cause of
erroneous inference (see Revlin & Leirer 1978; and, for a
review, Evans 1982).
Another performance factor proposed by Cohen relates to
the subject's degree of appropriate education and training. It
is not clear whether he would wish to pursue the analogy with
Chomsky s linguistics. To do so would involve the assumption
of a genetically predetermined competence system, which
could be "released" by appropriate experience, but whose
fundamental structure could not be altered. If he believes
this, then it should be possible to formulate a specific compe-
tence theory with testable consequences. If not, then Cohen's
"competence" refers simply to learning capacity. [See also
Chomsky: "Rules and Representations" BBS 3(1) 1980.]
The argument about education reveals an important incon-
sistency in Cohen s position. Unlike ethical problems, with
which Cohen seeks to compare them, deductive or statistical
reasoning problems lead to solutions that can be empirically
validated. For instance, the gambler's fallacy can be said to be
wrong because, if a person afflicted by the fallacy bet at
subjectively reported "fair odds," he would tend to lose
money. Cohen appears to accept the importance of sample
size, although most subjects do not intuitively do so. It thus
emerges that there is a normative system (which, at least in
certain cases, Cohen himself accepts) that does not accord
with general intuition. Cohen accounts for this discrepancy
by arguing that subjects cannot be expected to know, but have
the competence to learn, the principles. However, it follows
from this that the lay person does not have the competence to
apply the principle to relevant problems. This is the type of
competence that is of interest to the psychologist.
In our view, the question of subjects' ability to behave
rationally if properly trained to do so, or if not afflicted by
certain irrational "illusions," diverts attention from the main
purpose of research into human inference. It is theoretically
desirable to understand the factors that actually determine
inferential behaviour, and practically important to consider
the consequences for actions and decisions in real life
contexts. For example, Nisbett and Ross (1980) claim that
people are far more influenced by vivid than by pallid
information, regardless of its objective predictive power. A
very good example of this is provided by Cohen himself. In
the case of the illness problem, Cohen is clearly affected, and
is inviting the reader to be affected, by an availability bias.
The salience to the individual of a personal test is very high
and far more vivid than tabulations of population base rates.
The fact that Cohen's argument would lead to 15 more deaths
than necessary out of 23 people diagnosed as having illness B,
attests to the importance of investigating the possible effects
of such biases in real life contexts.
A bias towards vividness might well mean that a power-
fully placed decision maker will act on the basis of unrepre-
sentative, but highly vivid, personal experiences or anecdotes
and ignore the "dull " results of large, well designed statistical
surveys. It is of no practical value to consider whether such
behaviour can, by some philosophical device, be deemed to
be "rational." It is evident that such behaviour is undesirable,
in the sense that it is likely to produce inefficient decisions
and costly errors. The point is that performance factors are
not a theoretical complication to be removed in a search for
rational competence. Understanding performance is the very
essence of the scientific study of human inference.
Can any statements about human behavior
be empirically validated?
Baruch Fischoff
Decision Research, A Branch of Perceptronics, Eugene, Ore. 97401
Two hundred years ago, psychology and philosophy were
largely inseparable. Since they separated, the twain have
seldom met. Few psychologists receive any training in philos-
ophy, follow developments in philosophy, or even explore the
way philosophers develop their own research topics. For their
part, few philosophers are trained in the experimental study
of the mind; few have "hands-on" experience with the
intricacies and frailties of such work, or even track the
research literature relevant to their own pedagogical efforts.
Sallies across this particular disciplinary boundary, like those
across others, often involve deprecating attacks or simplistic
"solutions" to the others' problems, advanced with missionary
or demagogic disrespect. Such miscommunication may be
worse than no communication at all.
Before one concludes that this state of affairs is a reflection
of lamentable ignorance or arrogance, it may be worthwhile
to ask what philosophers and psychologists could or should be
learning from one another, at least entertaining the thought
that they would be better off extending a warm smile and a
deaf ear to one another. Although the topics of the two fields
are ostensibly similar, their agendas may be sufficiently
different that mutual attention is likely to lead to mutual
confusion. Interdisciplinary borrowing always runs the risks
that arise from adopting methods and messages without the
appreciation of the cautions accompanying their use that is
only acquired through apprenticeship in a discipline.
Thus, the philosophers' chosen "isolation ' may be
explained by a feeling that psychologists have a less rigorous
notion of what it means to get to the bottom of things. Rather
than polishing their concepts, psychologists seem to have an
insatiable need to get on with their business of collecting and
interpreting data. In doing so, they make auxiliary assump-
tions about the nature of people and reality that are accepted
by their colleagues as a matter of faith and taste. Often, as
research areas gain self-confidence, attention will turn to
testing these assumptions - at the price of making other ones.
Philosophers have identified the indeterminacy of induction;
psychologists must live with it, running the risk that entire
research fields will prove to be poorly moored.
The psychologist who does peek across the border may feel
frustrated by philosophers' fascination with the conceivable,
rather than the probable; by philosophers' interest in identify-
ing the full range of assertions that might be made, rather
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than in testing the subset that might reasonably be subscribed
to; by philosophers' penchant for keeping the debate on
fundamental issues alive at ull costs, rather than reaching
some tentative conclusions on subsidiary issues and then
moving on to new ones. The psychologist may acknowledge
the legitimacy of abstract discussions about what the mind
might entail, but prefer the more clumsy process of poking it
to see what it does.
In this light, a case might be made that psychologists and
philosophers would do well to ignore one another. The
putative results that each offers are grounded in pursuits that
are somewhat irrelevant to the other; moreover, they hide
subtle issues to which outsiders are insensitive. Perhaps a
more realistic aspiration at the present stage of nonintegration
is to learn to respect and gradually adopt some of one
another's guiding predispositions. Perhaps at some future
date, cooperative arrangements will be possible.
One predisposition that psychologists might learn from
philosophers is to strive for maximum clarity in the terms one
uses, so as to facilitate comparison between studies, avoid
internal contradictions, and present coherent tasks to subjects.
Another is to explore in depth the logical relationships
between different theories and hypotheses, so as to reduce the
incidence of associative theorizing, as expressed in unelabo-
rated claims that "another related idea seems to be . . . " A
third is to appreciate the arguability of all assertions about
what behavior is or should be, and the richness of the
assumptions underlying them.
From psychologists, philosophers might acquire a feeling
for the extent to which speculations about behavior need to be
disciplined by data, however feeble and imperfect. Extreme
skepticism may enable one to dispatch any study. Yet the
vigor with which such critiques are pursued may require
some consideration of what beliefs about behavior will come
ill the stead of those empirical conclusions that have provoked
the skeptics' wrath. In the absence of data, anyone's word
may be advanced as a law of behavior. Rhetoric rather than
statistics may carry the day.
At times, one may prefer the half-understood data of the
psychologist, at times, the half-baked ideas of the philosopher.
Such a balancing act is needed for each reader to derive the
personally relevant insights that Cohen and those he criticizes
have to offer.
Can children's irrationality be
experimentally demonstrated?
Sam Glucksberg
Department of Psychology, Princeton University. Princeton, N.J. 08544
The assertion that all normal adults are fully competent to
reason validly raises an interesting developmental question. If
we cannot demonstrate incompetence in adults, then how
might we do so in children? Cohen argues that any observa-
tion of less than optimal reasoning in adults cannot be taken as
evidence of incompetence. What such observations can
reflect is one or another performance factor. Among the
performance factors that may affect reasoning are education
and intelligence. In contrast, children reason differently from
adults, and Cohen assumes that they are less competent than
adults. How might children acquire adult competence if we
exclude intelligence and education as developmental mecha-
nisms?
Cohen alludes generally to experience and to maturation as
mechanisms of developmental change. It is difficult to imag-
ine that an abstract reasoning competence might develop
solely as a function of neurological growth of maturation. [Cf.
Chomsky: "Rules and Representations" BBS 3(1) 1980.] It is
far more likely that such a competence develops through
quite complex interactions among a child s experiences and
his physiological maturation over a relatively prolonged
developmental span. The usual outcome of this kind of
developmental mechanism consists of marked differences in
both the rate and the final level of development. It is,
therefore, reasonable to assume that adults with different
experiences will differ in at least some aspects of their
reasoning abilities. Such differences must, according to
Cohen, be attributed to performance factors, such as educa-
tion or intelligence. But are not these just the factors that
enable children to acquire adult competence in the first
place? If so, then what are the grounds for rejecting the
notion that adults may differ from one another in reasoning
competence, but accepting that same notion when comparing
adults with children?
Of course, the appeal to differences in education or intelli-
gence to account for differential reasoning performances
among adults is a neat way to preserve the assumption of
universal and equal competence. But this seems to rob the
notion of competence of any, interesting psychological
content. Consider this simple situation: Persons A, B, and C
are given a test of reasoning. B and C do equally poorly, while
A does quite well. A is a normal adult, educated in Western
Europe, while B is also a normal adult who has not had any
formal schooling, having grown up among a tribe in a South
American rain forest. Cohen must assume that A and B are
equally competent to reason validly, but that A has one or
another performance advantage. C is a normal four year old,
brought up either in the rain forest or in Western Europe. C is
judged to be not as competent as either A or B. How does C
become competent? He must simply grow up, either in the
rain forest or in Western Europe. It shouldn't make any
difference.
Perhaps it won't make a difference. There is something
quite appealing to the argument that all people, irrespective
of education or experience, will acquire reasoning compe-
tence simply because of their adulthood and humanity. In this
respect, Cohen's competence assumption is analogous to
Chomsky's (1968) assumption of universal and innate gram-
matical competence. However, there is a fundamental differ-
ence between grammatical competence, which is ascribed to
all people, and Cohen's reasoning competence, which is
ascribed only to adults. The grammatical competence
possessed by the young child is quite abstract, and its primary
function is to enable children to acquire language. Cohen
denies such an abstract reasoning competence to young chil-
dren, yet children must surely have some such competence if
they are to use inference to acquire linguistic knowledge, and
if they are to use inference to acquire the ability to reason
validly in a wide variety of domains and contexts. It thus
seems reasonable to extend the assumption of basic reasoning
competence to children as well as to adults. As Cohen himself
argues, no empirical evidence could, in principle, demon-
strate incompetence in adults. This argument must be fully
applicable to young children as well. We must then conclude
that infant or child irrationality cannot be experimentally
demonstrated.
If this seems unreasonable, then we might consider another
alternative. It seems likely that many people do not use
optimal reasoning strategies in a wide range of situations.
Some people do use more optimal strategies than others in
some domains. Do these differences among individuals,
regardless of age, reflect differences in basic competence at
some level of abstraction? We will not be able to answer this
question until we can agree upon a coherent definition of
"basic ' competence. I suspect that when we have such a
definition, young children will be shown to be competent. Yet
they will not be as competent as the most competent adults.
We should then be able to demonstrate relative levels of
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irrationality between adults and children, and among adults
as well.
Human reasoning: Can we judge
before we understand?
Richard A. Griggs
Department of Psychology. University of Florida, Gainesville. Fla. 32611
It should be made clear from the outset that many researchers
engaged in studying human reasoning do not interpret the
behavior of their subjects as having "bleak implications for
human rationality." In fact, it is my contention that the main
concern of most reasoning researchers is not (and should not
be) the question of whether they can or cannot demonstrate
human rationality but rather the provision of a description
and explanation of the observed behavior. I will return to this
point, but first let me substantiate my first statement.
If the deductive reasoning literature over the past decade
were examined, one would find that one of the most popular
views of human reasoning (especially categorical reasoning) is
represented by the rationalist school of thought led by Mary
Henle. As Evans (1980) points out, this approach has been so
influential that the two most recent collections of papers on
human reasoning (Flamagne 1975; Revlin & Mayer 1978)
"have been effectively dedicated to her cause" (p. 229). In
Henle's forward to the Revlin and Mayer volume, she states
(ironically in the context of some claims that I made about
faulty reasoning behavior of subjects in a sorites task), "I have
never found errors which could unambiguously be attributed
to faulty reasoning" (p. xviii). These do not seem to be the
words of a person despairing about the irrationality of
humans. In fact, I have not found reasoning researchers to be
worrying about human irrationality. Thus, the quotations
with which Cohen begins his paper are really not reflective of
the reasoning research area, at least as I perceive it.
Above I content that most reasoning researchers are not
concerned with experimentally testing for rationality. If this
is so, then how can I justify the rationalist school of thought? I
do not see this as a problem. What has been labeled the
rationalist school of thought argues that human reasoning
behavior can be explained without resorting to "nonlogical"
explanations, such as the atmosphere theory (e.g., Wood-
worth & Sells 1935). Thus, followers of this school feel that
reasoning errors are brought about by such variables as the
failure to accept the logical task, misinterpretation of prem-
ises, and the like. Part of the information-processing system
postulated to account for the behavior employs rules that
have been accepted as "rational." These rules, however, may
be employed on a faulty data base. The prime example of
such an explanation would be Revlin's model for categorical
reasoning (e.g., Revlin & Leirer 1978). Even in this case I do
not perceive the researchers as arguing that the experiments
are testing human rationality but rather that the behavior
may be brought about by an information-processing system
that has a "rational" component. What about the misinterpre-
tation of the premises, the failure to accept the logical task?
Are these rational behaviors? I maintain that reasoning
researchers are not really addressing such questions. Such
judgments of rationality would seem, at least at the present
time, not to be of primary importance.
It is difficult to judge a system as rational or irrational
without first understanding the system. I do not perceive the
progress of reasoning research to be advanced to a point that
would permit such judgments. The main concern of reasoning
researchers should be to gain an understanding of the cogni-
tive functioning underlying the observed behavior in reason-
ing experiments. Formal systems, such as propositional logic
and statistical theory, may be employed in the design of the
experimental tasks, but subjects only make responses. The
responses themselves are neither correct or incorrect. We can
define them as such according to formal systems, but it is the
reasoning researcher's job to explain why the responses were
made and not to judge their rationality. The use of formal
systems as components in such explanations (e.g., the rational-
ist school) does not entail a judgment of rationality on the
researcher's part.
One recent criticism of cognitive research has been that it
lacks ecological validity (e.g., Neisser 1976). Cohen seems to
hint at this in his discussion of "cognitive illusions." For
example, in the section of Wason's four-card selection prob-
lem, he states, "It seems, therefore, that experimenters' power
to generate an illusion here depends on the relative unfamil-
iarity and artificiality and their apparatus." Cohen distin-
guishes between two types of realism; one using descriptive
words or sentences on cards instead of letters and numerals,
and the other using real objects (e.g., envelopes instead of
cards). He then argues that for the first type of materials,
subjects may still make the wrong choices in the selection
problem (Manktelow & Evans 1979) but for the second type
they hardly ever do (Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi & Sonino
Legrenzi 1972). With real objects (the envelopes), the experi-
menters' power to generate an illusion supposedly disap-
pears.
Such an explanation depends upon the replicability of the
results that Cohen is using to support his argument; and, to be
fair to Cohen, he clearly states at the outset of his discussion of
the experimental work in reasoning that he is assuming that
"in every case . . . the phenomena reported are replicable." In
this particular case, however, they are not; and thus, Cohen's
argument is not supported. We have twice attempted in our
laboratory to replicate the Johnson-Laird et al. experiment
and were completely unsuccessful both times. Merely using
concrete objects like addressed, stamped envelopes instead of
cards does not automatically bring about "logically " correct
performance. Behavior in the selection task is more complex
than that. This task is an excellent example of the struggle of
reasoning researchers to understand their subjects' responses.
Evans (1980) has recently considered the question of
ecological validity in deductive reasoning research. He argues
that to understand real-life reasoning we must study it "etho-
logically, under real-life conditions" (p. 238). I agree that we
should attempt to understand human behavior in laboratory
settings and in more "real-life" environments, but in both
cases we are trying to describe and understand behavior and
not to judge it. Judgments of rationality could be made in
either setting after we understand the information-processing
mechanisms underlying the behavior. Reasoning behavior in
laboratory conditions may be different from reasoning behav-
ior in real-life conditions; but in both settings, humans are
engaging in reasoning behavior. Both will provide useful
information about human reasoning. Our goal should be to
develop an understanding of such behavior in as many
environments and for as many tasks as possible.
My final point was made recently by Newell (1980), but I
would like to underscore it. Substantial literatures exist for
deductive reasoning, probabilistic reasoning, decision mak-
ing, and problem solving. Yet, in looking closely at any one of
these literatures, it is difficult to detect the existence of the
others. What we find are fragmented attempts to understand
human cognitive functioning. Newell (1980) has argued for a
unified theoretical endeavor in which all these various areas
of cognition are viewed in a problem-solving framework. I
support this notion and bring it up in this commentary
because I feel that such an enterprise is crucial to our
understanding of human cognition. Let us first understand as
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best we can. Afterwards, we can worry about Cohen's ques-
tion; but if we understand, Cohen's question becomes rather
moot.
Another vote for rationality
Mary Henle
Graduate Faculty, New School for Social Research, New York, N.Y. 10011
We do not discuss what we take for granted. The present
decade is not one in which to expect serious discussion of such
conceptions as: faulty programming of reasoning, malfunc-
tions of information processing, deductive programs, and the
like. This situation is unfortunate because - if we did not
assume that the process was computation - we would add
"process " to Cohen's important variables of competence and
performance. May I, nevertheless, suggest that the computer
metaphor masks problems of how people reason.
My remarks will be addressed to the second part of Cohen's
paper. Since my experience is mainly with deductive reason-
ing, I will largely confine my comments to this area. They
will serve to support, from a different perspective, Cohen's
demonstrations that research purporting to have "bleak
implications for human rationality" has, indeed, no implica-
tions at all for rationality.
There is an increasing body of research (see, for example,
Revlin & Mayer 1978) that suggests that errors in evaluation
or selection of conclusions in deductive problems may be
understood, first of all, by examining the premises as under-
stood by subjects. Whether errors remain that cannot be so
understood, I do not know. Indeed, the categorical syllogism,
which I have mainly studied, seems almost to be a device for
misleading the subject. The difficulties inherent in the copula
have been much discussed. Recently Meyer (1980) has shown
that when the copula is replaced by a noncopular verb,
performance on syllogisms is much improved; and some of
Revlis's work (1975) may be interpreted in the same way. I
have suggested elsewhere other sources of misunderstanding
of the premises of categorical syllogisms (Henle 1978), and I
would guess that hypothetical syllogisms present difficulties
of their own. On the logical particles, most invite difficulties
of understanding. The misunderstandings of "some" are well
known. Wertheimer (1959, pp. 256-58) has pointed out that
"and" and "not" may have different meanings in different
propositions; they may be "empty" or else have structural
meaning. What differences these various meanings make for
the reasoning process is worth investigation. Does "if" mean
"if and only if" to a given subject? Again, judging from its use
in the conversation of educated adults, my impression is that
"every" deserves study.
Cohen's paper continues in new directions the close exami-
nation of instances in which performance errors do not argue
for logical mistakes - a major task, I believe, for the investi-
gation of logical reasoning.
The author's excellent discussion of the illicit conversion
may also apply to other problems of the logical performance
of untutored subjects. It is an example of how the subject's
(here putative) understanding of the presented material
determines the outcome of the reasoning. Given the implicit
context of the utterance as presumably understood, what at
first appears to be an illicit conversion is no longer illicit. (See
Henle 1978 for a similar analysis of subjects' willingness to
draw conclusions from two particular premises.)
Cohen points out that, to determine with certainty what
probability a gambler has in mind in making his estimates, it
would be necessary to question him in such a way as to rule
out possibly incorrect estimates. The same "characteristic
indeterminacy" applies to other kinds of reasoning. In order
to explicate all the premises a reasoner employs in a deductive
problem, it is necessary to question him so as to give him an
opportunity to alter his argument. As Mill remarked long ago,
an individual "has it almost always in his power to make his
syllogism good by introducing a false premise; and hence it is
scarcely ever possible decidedly to affirm that any argument
involves a bad syllogism" (1874, p. 560). Rather than direct
questioning, other devices, such as asking subjects to choose
among Venn diagrams, will have to be found, if we are to
understand their premises.
Cohen gives too much ground, it seems to me, to the
proponents of human irrationality when he allows empirical
knowledge to enter into the determination of the validity of
inferences in everyday reasoning. The empirical truth of a
proposition is one thing, its deducibility from premises is
another. If a person evaluates a proposition on the basis of the
former, he has renounced the deductive task. This does not
mean that he is incapable of performing it; it does not even
tell us whether he understands or remembers that that is what
he was asked to do. The question is again one of what the
subject is doing, not the result he obtains. It is unnecessary to
water down deductions in everyday reasoning by introducing
nonlogical considerations.
"It seems . . . that experimenters' power to generate an
illusion here [Wason's four-card problem] depends on the
relative unfamiliarity and artificiality of their apparatus,"
remarks Cohen. It seems to me that the role of both artificial-
ity and unfamiliarity requires further study. It is true, as
Cohen illustrates, that artificial and unfamiliar situations may
encourage error. This is often the case in situations that the
subject regards as absurd, although, as Cohen points out, he
can solve formally similar problems without difficulty in
everyday life. It is also true that syllogisms stated in "sym-
bolic" terms are usually more difficult than those whose terms
are "concrete." On the other hand, there may be cases in
which the very concreteness and immediacy of the problem's
materials distract one from its logical properties; I wonder, for
example, whether this is why Wason's "Thog" problem is
difficult (1977, p. 126). And the artificiality of the syllogism
offers one great advantage to the solver: The premises from
which a conclusion is to be drawn are presented neatly
organized. In much real life problem solving, the relevant
material must be recognized, sorted out from other material,
and brought together before deduction can proceed. With
regard to familiarity, it is not only a help in problem solving
but may, on occasion, be an enemy of new solutions. The two
roles of familiarity need to be sorted out.
It must be added that presenting a logical problem does not
guarantee ratiocination by subjects: They may guess, evaluate
the material truth of propositions, apply learned rules, or
whatever.
Who shall be the arbiter of our intuitions?
Daniel Kahneman
Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, B.C.,
Canada V6T 1WS
Cohen's paper addresses a significant issue: What is the
relation between the psychological study of human reasoning
and the normative study of inductive inference? The issue
arises at this time because of the current surge of interest in
the psychological study of biases and shortcomings of intui-
tive reasoning. This trend should be seen in historical perspec-
tive: It is a reaction against the fashion of using normative
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models of optimal performance as theories of actual perfor-
mance, a fashion that had taken hold after World War II
under the influence of the sciences of information and deci-
sion, and as a reaction against behaviorism.
The use of normative models in a descriptive role had
many beneficial consequences, and some unfortunate ones. It
tended to stifle psychological investigation of processes and
mechanisms, because people's responses were "explained ' by
the fact that they were correct; it also tended to give any
refutation of a normative-descriptive theory the character of
an attack on human rationality. We are trapped by the
ambiguity of denials: The statement that it is not the case
that people are always rational " merely rejects an extreme
thesis that would attribute rationality to every belief and act.
This statement, however, is easily misunderstood as claiming
that people are never rational. Cohen apparently misread the
psychological literature in just this way, and was prompted to
a superfluous defense of the human race against accusations
of "deep-level irrationality" that had not in fact been made.
There are two major thrusts in Cohen's target article: an
argument to the effect that the rationality of intuitions cannot
be questioned because rationality is ultimately rooted in
intuition, and an attempt to discredit psychological studies of
errors of reasoning.
Cohen makes much of the standard argument that the
authority of normative theories ultimately derives from their
appeal to intuition. Indeed, one of the criteria for a norm of
thought and action must be that reasonable people will want
to obey it. It follows that reasonable people must be able to
recognize a rational argument, and in this restricted sense that
they must be rational. But it is improper to argue, as Cohen
does, from this general belief in human rationality to a belief
in the rationality of any notion for which a majority can be
found. For example, one can think that Cohen's defense of
the base-rate fallacy is irrational without being committed to
a position concerning the irrationality of people in general, or
of Cohen in particular.
An obvious difficulty for Cohen's position is that there are
intuitions that are stubborn but make no sense. He chooses to
dismiss some of those as cognitive illusions and to defend
others as normative, but neither solution is very satisfactory. A
deeper difficulty with which an intuitionist treatment of
normative issues must deal is that the criterion of intuitive
appeal, although necessary for normative power, cannot be
sufficient, since people often find inconsistent intuitions
appealing. It is all well and good to say that "an apparent
conflict always demands resolution," but it is an article of
faith that a resolution can always be found that will have as
much intuitive appeal as the originally conflicting notions. At
least in the domain of probability and inductive reasoning, it
is a common occurrence to be convinced by a statement,
equally convinced by a contradictory one, and unsatisfied by
any proposed resolution. Indeed, the prevalence of such
situations is more troubling for believers in human rationality
than mere failures to apply accepted standards. I have a
strong intuition that the strong intuitions of a rational person
should be consistent, but my own intuitions fail this test.
Cohen has nothing of substance to offer on these difficult
issues, beyond a vague message of faith, charity, and authori-
ty. Faith that all inconsistencies are apparent, none real;
charity in finding an interpretation of any person's judgments
that will eliminate all inconsistency; the authority of experts
in competence to arbitrate remaining difficulties. Faith and
charity are good things, but I find Cohen's faith in the
consistency of intuitions puzzling, and his charity excessive
and misplaced. Thus, it is clear from Cohen's article that he
and I share similar intuitions about the gambler's fallacy and
the base-rate problem, but we do not have the same attitudes
toward those intuitions. I admit mine to be errors, which
makes them so (unless Cohen issues a ruling to make such
confessions inadmissible), but Cohen prefers to view the same
intuitions as part of his reasoning competence. Unless the
resolution of conflicting intuitions is itself intuitively appeal-
ing, the type of interpretive charity that Cohen advocates
could easily become a reward for obstinacy.
How such intrapersonal and interpersonal conflicts of intui-
tion are to be resolved is a problem for which I see no easy
solution. But Cohen does have one, or rather a sort of
administrative program for constructing solutions. He simply
proposes that a theory of competence be read off "appro-
priate normative theories, ' which are apparently defined by
their passing unspecified tests of intuitiveness. Because no
hints are given of how this is to be done, the question of who
will do it becomes relevant. Who will specify the tests, select
the appropriate theories, and tlo the reading off? It is discon-
certing to be told that this function will be performed by
practitioners of a new domain of study, located in psychology
but apparently reserved for competent philosophers.
In the first part of the paper, then, Cohen improperly
extends an argument for the rationality of Homo sapiens to
the rationality of almost every human belief; he effectively
ignores the central issue of conflicting intuitions, and offers as
a solution to the normative problem the suggestion that
experts in matters of competence be trusted with it.
The second part of the paper is, I think, less good. Cohen
distinguishes four categories in psychological research, and
assures us that he can classify any psychological study in one
of these categories. I believe him. In fact, he could have done
just as well with only two categories, namely pardonable
errors by subjects and unpardonable ones by psychologists.
And it does not much matter which of his four categories is
used, since the system is largely arbitrary. For example,
almost any mistake that can be described as a cognitive
illusion can also be viewed as a failure in a test of intelligence
or education. The scheme is designed to guarantee that at
least one of the categories will fit. Subjects who quickly admit
that they have committed the gambler's fallacy by mistake
will be classified as having suffered a cognitive illusion. If
they stick to their guns, the experimenter will be accused of
having applied an inappropriate model. Cohen's categories
can be used as a handy kit of invective in encounters with
psychologists. He also offers subjects in psychological studies a
handy kit of defenses that they may use if accused of errors:
temporary insanity, a difficult childhood, entrapment or
judicial mistakes - one of them will surely work, and will the
restore the presumption of rationality.
The argument that defends the base-rate fallacy is a
caricature of the position that any error that attracts a
sufficient number of votes is not an error at all. Here Cohen
argues that a patient and a physician, looking at the same test
data and sharing all their information, should be allowed to
have different probabilities for a diagnosis. Furthermore, he
agrees that the physician, who uses long-run frequencies, will
in the long run make more correct diagnoses (and presumably
make more correct decisions) than the ensemble of individual
patients who ignore these frequencies. Would Cohen really
insist on being treated according to his probabilities, rather
than trust his physician's? This is irrational.
Improvements in human reasoning and an
error in L. J. Cohen's
David H. Krantz
Bell Laboratories, Murray Hill, N.J. 07974
Cohen's treatment of rationality fails to recognize that adult
humans continue to learn and to improve. He grants that
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human children are inferior reasoners by adult norms; but the
same point can be made ab out human adults, in terms of
norms that they themselves subsequently may attain, and that
others may have attained already.
New cultural inventions, such as probability theory, also
improve reasoning. The analogy with human linguistic
competence and performance is inapt: Natural languages do
not improve, they only drift and borrow, but natural reason-
ing does improve. To deal with this, we must posit that the
relevant "reflective equilibrium" is wide, not narrow, and it is
only an approximate equilibrium at that; on a long time scale,
it evolves.
1 would agree that errors of human reasoning can often be
classified as cognitive illusions or failures of education, [n
fact, most errors are both of these. The most important
practical question is how to educate people (ourselves) so that
we can avoid many illusions while not sacrificing much in our
ability to cope with the rapid stream of inferences that we
make in everyday life.
The preceding comments concern the main substance of
the paper. 1 cannot, however, refrain from commenting on
Cohen's egregious errors in his discussion of Bayes's rule (part
II, section 4). I surely do not wish to defend Bayesian
methods, in general, or to criticize propensity notions of
probability, in general, But if 19,000 people suffer from
disease A, for every 1,000 who suffer from disease B, and if a
certain test result (call it T) occurs in '/i of those who suffer
from A and in *,':, of those who suffer from B, then the 19,000
who suffer from A will produce about 3,800 instances of T,
while the 1,000 who suffer from B will produce only about
800 instances of T. Thus, out of ever)- 4,600 instances of T,
about 3,800 will come from individuals having disease A and
only about 800 from those having B. If I were presented with
that information, and had myself produced test result T, I
would surely opt for the A treatment, rather than the B one.
The population base rate of 19 to 1 is every bit as relevant to
my ease as the 1 to 4 and 4 to 1 population rates at which As
and IVs produce T's. Neither population rate has anything to
do with my test result T; neither has any causal linkage to my
disease. I might just as well ignore one kind of population
frequency information as the other. In fact, 1 would ignore
neither, but would combine them, by the simple Bayesian
arithmetic shown above, to obtain the posterior rate: given T,
there are 38 A's to every 8 B's; and this arithmetical result
makes me want very strongly to be treated as A, not as B.
1 suspect most people would react in the same way:
Knowing only that they had produced a T, and that the ratio
of A's to B's among all people producing T's is 38 to 8, they
would decide on the A treatment. There are two points here.
First, even if we accepted Cohen's ideas about probability, his
reasoning about the disease example would be wrong: Both
probabilities involved are population frequencies, and by his
analysis, neither the 19 to 1 base rate nor the 4 to 1 and 1 to 4
test-outcome rates would be relevant to the patient's treat-
ment decision. Second, the example points up the absurdity of
Cohen's use of propensities. It is hard to see, given Cohen's
position, how any medical data at all could be used to help
decide on treatment, from the patient's standpoint. So
Cohen's position is wrong. Frequency information does
provide arguments (though not necessarily overwhelmingly
strong ones) for how to handle specific cases. These argu-
ments should not just vanish when other arguments, not based
on frequency, become available. If people do fail to use
frequency arguments, then their reasoning should be criti-
cized.
The question is not whether to adopt frequency or propen-
sity notions of probability but how different arguments
should be combined. That's a tough issue, as shown by Shafer
(1976). But that thorny issue doesn't arise in Cohen's disease
example, because both pieces of information are simple
population frequencies, and the only tool needed to combine
them is simple arithmetic.
Intuition, competence, and performance
Henry E. Kyburg, Jr.
Department of Philosophy, University of Rochester, Rochester, N.Y. 14627
1. Intuition is a slippery notion; the harder one tries to grasp
it, the more difficult it is to hold onto. Cohen argues that
criteria of rationality must be based on the intuitions of
ordinary people, of lay adults. In some sense (which I return
to below) this may be true. As his references to untutored
intuition, ordinary people, lay adults, normal human beings,
a given community, and untrained people reveal, however,
Cohen means to advance a very strong thesis indeed. He
wants to take the intuitions of ordinary people as the basis of
"a coherent system of rules and principles by which those
same people can, if they so choose, reason much more
extensively and accurately than they would otherwise do." In
doing this, they should be concerned only with a narrow
reflective equilibrium - they should make the minimum
modifications and qualifications in this set of intuitions
required to render them mutually consistent. (According to
whose standards of consistency? Cohen's intuition tells him
that systems of belief ought to be "consistent ' - although
what that means is not spelled out in detail, and it would
presumably depend on some systematic standard of deduc-
tive soundness. In any event, it presumably excludes the
affirmation of both p and not-p. But Cohen need look no
farther than his neighboring continent to find individuals
whose intuitions on this score differ from his.)
Cohen also admits, though, that "however often faulted in
performance" it must be correct to ascribe to normal human
beings a cognitive competence that corresponds to the norma-
tive theory (part I, section 4). On the one hand, we are to
discover the rational intuitions of people by looking at their
performance; and on the other, we are not to suppose that
failures of performance (how can we tell a failure?) impugn
the normative theory of cognitive competence. This seems
very much like eating your cake and having it.
Despite his constant emphasis, in the first part of the target
article, on ordinary, untutored, lay intuitions, Cohen makes
clear in the later section entitled "Tests of Intelligence or
Education " that many apparent cognitive failures are simply
due to lack of knowledge or intelligence on the part of those
who are subject to them. This and the passage quoted earlier
from part I, section 4 suggest that the intuitions of ordinary
people can be guided by and even replaced by systems of
rules and principles. If this is so, then we may properly ask for
some guidance as to how one passes from the intuition
embodied in actual (often faulty) performance to the compe-
tence into which people can be tutored.
2. One step consists in the systematization of the intuitions
culled from performance. But systematization comes in many
forms. Cohen refers to the criteria that are "the product of
philosophical argument for some . . . wild reflective equilibri-
um" and contrasts this with "the narrow, bootstrapping,
reflective equilibrium" which he thinks more appropriate for
assessing the "rationality or irrationality of untrained
people. But of course there are no "untrained people;
people differ in the degree and amount of training they have,
and it is not at all clear that the rationality of people should be
assessed by examining only people trained in public schools,
and not people trained in universities. It is easy enough to
understand the temptation to consider only narrow reflective
equilibria, however (except that this does not solve the prob-
lem of deciding when they are "consistent"). It results from
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the difficulty of finding a philosophical argument for a wide
reflective equilibrium. That difficulty, in turn, reflects the
fact that the last word has not been said concerning vast areas
of rationality - particularly inductive and probabilistic
rationality, but also rationality as applied to deontic, modal,
or counterfactual argument.
Nevertheless, a lot has been said. We have systems of
mathematics and geometry and set theory - not to mention
systems of first order logic - for which good philosophical
arguments do exist. Cohen points to the fact that even in
sentential logic it is possible to find "obviously. . . invalid"
arguments that can be given valid formalizations. But this is
an argument for being careful about transcribing ordinary
language into formal symbolism and vice versa. Of course,
when people say "If p then q" they sometimes mean "p <-• q";
logic instructors have always had to be careful to avoid such
usages in constructing problems for their classes. Much ordi-
nary argument, and practically all technical formal argu-
ment, can without strain be represented in the systematiza-
tion provided by first order logic. There are also arguments
that cannot be so represented, and it is an open question,
often, how best to represent those arguments and how best to
systematize their representations. This is just to say that
deductive logic is not a finished system. When it comes to
probabilistic reasoning, inductive reasoning, reasoning from
empirical data to generalizations, hypotheses, and theories,
the situation is even more open. There are a number - a
relatively small number - of beginnings of systematizations
vying for attention and approval in the market. There are also
a reasonable number of general principles about which there
is a fair degree of consensus.
3. Cohen gives the impression that what we need to do is to
take a broad set of actual judgments and systematize them.
But (to take the most successful case) this is not the way in
which we arrive at the systematization of deductive argument
provided by first order logic. On the contrary, progress in first
order logic has consisted in the progressive reduction of the
intuitions required for its basis. The model-theoretic proofs of
the soundness and completeness of first order logic depend on
a very few intuitions of a particularly compelling sort. It may
well be that one can never dispense with intuitions altogether;
but intuitions often can (and should) be dispensed with in
favor of arguments.
It seems to me that the object of developing norms of
rationality is not to honor all intuitions indiscriminately -
even in qualified form - but to reduce collections of intuitions
to a relatively small number of very basic intuitions from
which others can be derived. The deductive intuition that q
follows validly from p and if p then q seems to be such an
intuition. This probabilistic intuition seems to be another: If r
of the As are B's, x is an A, and no reason can be given for
thinking that x is more or less likely than any other A to be a
B, then the probability that x will be a B is r; the appropriate
degree of belief in "x is B" is r; the appropriate betting ratio is
r:l-r; the appropriate number to put into the relevant compu-
tation of expectations or decision matrices is r; and so on.
4. What is the bearing of this on questions of the cognitive
competence and performance of people? It seems to me that
there are three quite separate questions involved. There is the
question of the rationality of "ordinary people" in a variety of
circumstances. It seems altogether natural (as Cohen agrees)
that people should be more or less adept at cognitive perfor-
mance. If, as Cohen suggests, it is fair of us to criticize
children and animals for not measuring up to our standards of
rationality, I do not see any reason why experts in rationality
should not criticize ordinary people for not living up to their
standards. We should hardly regard the system of mathemat-
ics as embodying inappropriate standards of mathematical
rationality just on the ground that the vast majority of the
people in the world can't add correctly. On the contrary, the
point of developing standards of rationality - far removed
though they may be from the ordinary performance of
ordinary people - is, in some degree, to encourage an
improvement in that performance.
There is also the question of what these standards of
rationality are to be that are invoked in either the critical
assessment or the constructive improvement of people's
cognitive performances. The analysis of fragmentary
accepted standards, the systematization of standards, and
critical assessment of proposed standards, are all proper
subjects for mathematical, logical, and philosophical inquiry.
As Cohen shows forcefully, there are areas in which there is a
lot of room for improvement of such standards of rationality
as we have. This should not be taken as suggesting that in the
course of history - particularly recent history - we have not
made great strides in the articulation and refinement of
systematic standards of rationality. Nor should it be taken as
showing that the vox populi (of the educated middle class?)
should be taken as the final arbiter of such standards.
It is a perfectly legitimate, and interesting, question to
examine the extent to which people live up to the best
standards of rationality we have; it is a perfectly proper social
goal to attempt, insofar as it is feasible and worthwhile, to
inculcate habits of thought and argument that conform to
these standards; and it is a perfectly legitimate and important
area of inquiry to attempt to develop yet more global and
comprehensive systems of rationality, based on ever stronger
and fewer intuitions of ever more limited scope. Indeed, the
social goal may well be made more attainable by the very
knowledge obtained from studies of the ways in which poeple
fall short of current standards of rationality, as well as by the
development of more coherent, comprehensive, and refined
standards.
There is also a deeper question that Cohen may be address-
ing: the question of whether people are in some sense "intrin-
sically" rational, or have innate cognitive competence. I am
not sure what to make of this question. Cohen seems to argue
that no psychological tests or investigations can coherently
reveal that ordinary people lack cognitive competence. Yet
there is no doubt that such tests reveal that people often fail
when it comes to cognitive performance. One would expect
different communities (Cohen uses the word "community"
only once, but he puts children and animals apart from the
group with which he is concerned) to exhibit different sorts of
defects. Perhaps he is suggesting that every human, qua
human, can potentially achieve the same level of cognitive
competence? The mention of Bernoulli and Euclid suggests
that this isn't what he means, and if it were, it would still be a
very strong and doubtful conjecture. It is quite obvious that
standards of rationality, to the extent that we can develop
them, are human standards, and that a standard that no
human could approximate would clearly be inappropriate.
But if we construe the investigation of rationality to be the
investigation of the ways and the degrees to which various
groups of people fall short of ideal rationality, we need not
alter the ideal to conform to the performances of individu-
als - even of the most competent. We need not alter Peano's
axioms because he couldn't balance his checkbook; even he
may have had some bum intuitions about arithmetic.
Should Bayesians sometimes neglect base
rates?
Isaac Levi
Philosophy Department, Columbia University, New York, N. Y. 10027
Tversky and Kahneman (1977) and others allege a wide-
spread tendency among experimental subjects to make judg-
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merits of probability that neglect base rates in violation of
Bayesian norms of rationality. Cohen correctly notes that the
neglect of base rates is sometimes legitimate. He appears to
concede, however, that legitimate neglect may require devia-
tion from Bayesian norms.
Cohen is right in suggesting that Bayesian norms are not
always appropriate. But even if one endorses a Bayesian view
of correct probabilistic reasoning for the situations that
Kahneman, Tversky, et al. consider, the neglect of base rate
information often remains legitimate. On this score, the
experimental subjects reveal themselves to be better Baye-
sians than Kahneman and Tversky.
In his discussion of the task of assigning a subjective
probability to a hypothesis as to the color of a taxicab involved
in an accident, Cohen correctly distinguishes that task from
the estimation of the long-run accuracy of the witness who
reports the color in making such indentifications.
However, subjective probability assignments are often
grounded in knowledge of objective, statistical probabilities in
accordance with principles of direct inference. Thus, knowl-
edge that the statistical probability of coin a landing heads up
on a toss is p and that the coin is tossed on a given occasion
might justify assigning a degree of subjective probability
equal to p to the hypothesis that coin a will land heads up on
that occasion.
Sometimes, however, the knowledge of statistical probabil-
ity or long-run frequency needed for direct inference is not
available, and other principles are invoked. The best known
type of supplementary principle is insufficient reason, where
equal probabilities are assigned to rival hypotheses when
information favoring one alternative over another is lacking.
It is well known that careless use of insufficient reason leads to
inconsistency, and advocates of its use go to great lengths to
avoid the contradictions - to no avail in my opinion.
Mistakes can also be made with direct inference. Kahne-
man and Tversky manage to commit some in their analysis of
the taxicab example and kindred cases. The experimental
subject can compute (using Bayes theorem) a long-run
frequency of success of the witness's in identifying the color
of cabs in the city along lines explained by Cohen.
But this chance cannot be used via direct inference to
assign a subjective probability to the hypothesis that the
witness has correctly identified the color of the cab as green.
The reason is not that jurors are not concerned with the long
run. That is true but irrelevant. The problem is that the jurors
know that the cab under consideration was involved in an
accident, and if they are to ground subjective probability on
knowledge of long-run relative frequency, it must be on
knowledge of the long-run relative frequency of the witness
correctly identifying the color as green of a cab involved in
an accident.
To obtain this information, the experimental subjects need
to be told the percentage of blue (green) cabs in the city
involved in accidents. This information is not given to them.
It could be any value from 0% to 100%.
Hence, a good Bayesian should neglect the base rate given
in the example because it is useless for the purpose of
determining subjective probabilities.'
It is precisely in situations of this sort that principles of
insufficient reason are invoked. If we assume that the experi-
mental subjects reason like Bayesians, they proceed as if they
supposed that 50% of cabs in the city involved in accidents are
blue and 50% are green. But that is precisely what insufficient
reason recommends.
Kahneman and Tversky have reported on variants of the
taxicab experiment. According to one variant, the subjects are
told that 85% of the taxicabs involved in accidents are blue
and the remainder green. In that case, the subjects do not
neglect base rates. That is not surprising; for in that case, the
knowledge of statistical probability needed for direct infer-
ence becomes available. Insufficient reason is not invoked.
In another variant, the subjects are told that 85% of the
taxicabs in the city (whether in accidents or not) are blue and
the remainder green. The testimony of the witness is not
reported. There, too, they rely on the base rate information.
Once more, this is not surprising. Direct inference is as
illegitimate here as in the first situation. But insufficient
reason seems to favor considering it just as likely that the cab
involved in the accident is any one cab in the city as any
other. This use of insufficient reason is inconsistent with the
use of that principle in the first example. But we already
know that persistent use of insufficient reason leads to incon-
sistency.
The remarks made here are grounded on strict obedience
to Bayesian canons of correct probability judgment. They
show that insofar as inconsistencies with these canons emerge,
they appear to derive from a tendency to use insufficient
reason when knowledge of statistical probability of the sort
required for direct inference is unavailable. Since this prac-
tice is notoriously inconsistent, it is not surprising that it is
revealed in the experiments under consideration.
But, as far as the issue of neglecting base rates is concerned,
the experimental subjects studied by Kahneman and Tversky
et al. seemed to have a better grasp of the matter - even from
a Bayesian point of view - than do the experimental psychol-
ogists.
NOTE
1. The issue raised here concerns the misleadingly called "problem
of the reference class." The topic is discussed in Levi (1977; 1980)
where it is demonstrated that the general practice exemplified in the
analysis of Tversky and Kahneman (1977) and preached by Kyburg
(1974) violates fundamental canons of Bayesian reasoning.
Performing competently
Lola L. Lopes
Department of Psychology, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wise. 53706
Cohen's challenge to the current proclivity of some psycholo-
gists for reading "bleak implications for human rationality"
into the behavior of naive subjects in laboratory tasks that
require deductive or probabilistic reasoning is important and
timely. I am in sympathy with many of the points that Cohen
makes - although not with all of them - and I believe that the
category structure he suggests for organizing the experimen-
tal literature on cognitive defects will be useful to those
psychologists who are not already committed to the "bleak
implications " viewpoint. But I have reservations concerning
how useful it is for psychologists of thinking about human
reasoning, in terms of the competence/performance distinc-
tion that Cohen proposes. In fact, it is possible that framing
psychological analyses of human reasoning in such terms may
exacerbate the already unfortunate tendencies of many
psychologists to assume first, that only poor performance in
reasoning tasks requires psychological explanation, and
second, that the questions that are answered by normative
theories are the same questions that arise in ordinary living. I
will discuss these points in turn.
What needs to be explained? The entire literature on
"human irrationality" can be taken to show that when
subjects in reasoning tasks fail to perform in accord with some
normative theory, psychologists feel obliged to explain why.
But there is little corresponding interest in explaining those
cases in which the behavior of naive subjects is exactly what it
should be. For example, in the risky decision task in which
subjects judge the worth of gambles (Anderson & Shanteau
1970; Shanteau 1974; Tversky 1967) and in the joint probabil-
ity task in which subjects judge the likelihood of joint events
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(Beach & Peterson 1966; Lopes 1976; Shuford 1959), subjects
produce data that look "as if" they had been generated by
multiplying. Since multiplying is the normatively correct
response for these situations, the subjects must be doing
something right. But what they are doing is not clear,
particularly since most subjects do not know the multiplica-
tive rules for expected utility and compound probability and
since such subjects seldom report performing numerical
computations of any sort.
Explaining how subjects multiply without multiplying is
the kind of question that might be expected to interest
psychologists. But I know of no research done on that topic
save my own (Lopes 1976; Lopes & Ekberg 1980) in the more
than twenty years since such multiplicative data first
appeared in the literature. The problem, of course, is that
when subjects perform correctly with respect to some norma-
tive theory, the theory itself seems to provide a ready expla-
nation of their behavior: The subjects' data conform to the
theory because their thought processes and symbol structures
are somehow like the operators and variables that occur in the
theory. Thus, subjects who produce data that look like
expected utilities are assumed to be intuitive utility maxi-
mizers, and subjects who produce data that look like joint
probabilities are assumed to be intuitive statisticians.
In developing the competence/performance distinction,
Cohen seems equally prone to concentrate on performances
that deviate - or seem to deviate - from a theoretical ideal.
Little is said about the exercising of human competence save
that it must be accounted for by the structure or design of
human information-processing mechanisms. Yet it is this
intuitive competence that demands psychological explana-
tion, not as it exists in normative theories that have been
systematized by logicians and mathematicians, but rather as it
exists in the basic cognitive activities of ordinary people.
What are the real questions? In arguing for the compe-
tence/performance distinction, Cohen seems to accept the
idea that normative theories necessarily answer the kinds of
questions that are important to ordinary people. I am not so
sure that this is true. For example, logic deals with the
conditions under which patterns of argument are valid or
invalid. People, however, are usually more concerned with
whether conclusions are true or false. Thus, they often answer
questions about the validity of arguments in terms of the
correctness of the conclusion (Hcnle 1962).
I assume that Cohen would classify errors of this sort as
cognitive illusions that most subjects would recognize as such
on a few moments' prompted reflection. And I would not
disagree. But I wonder whether emphasizing subjects' compe-
tence at recognizing the error of their ways might not obscure
the functional significance that such "errors' have when
subjects must evaluate unidealized arguments in the real
world (involving, for example, vagueness, uncertainty,
incompleteness, ignorance, and deceit) for which no norma-
tive theory holds.
When ordinary people reject the answers given by norma-
tive theories, they may do so out of ignorance and lack of
expertise, or they may be signaling the fact that the norma-
tive theory is inadequate. How a psychologist interprets such
behavior may depend on how he construes human reasoning
abilities. For example, in behavioral decisions theory there
has been growing sentiment over the last few years that
current normative theories are unduly limited and unable to
deal effectively with decisions made under realistic assump-
tions and constraints (cf. Einhorn & Hogarth 1980; March
1978). The fact that decision researchers have come to ques-
tion the appropriateness of the theory rather than the exper-
tise of the subjects probably reflects the fact that it has been
many years since naive subjects were assumed to be intuitive
statisticians or intuitive Bayesians.
It seems to me that it is healthy now and then to challenge
the validity of normative theories - and Cohen seems to
agree, given his warning concerning ascribing canonical
authority to existing logic and statistics texts. But I wonder
whether such challenges can reasonably be expected to occur
if our assumptions concerning human competence for reason-
ing in accord with current normative theories keep us looking
for the reasons that "performance errors " occur rather than
asking whether something quite different might be going on.
Having concentrated in this commentary on explaining
why the competence/performance distinction seems to me to
have limited - and perhaps even negative - utility for
psychological theorizing, I should not close without reaffirm-
ing the major usefulness that I see in Cohen's analysis of the
categories into which research on human rationality can be
sorted, particularly his sections on "misapplications of appro-
priate normative theory" and "applications of inappropriate
normative theory. ' These sections show all too well that some
of the bleakest implications to be found in the literature on
human irrationality bear on the unseemly enthusiasm that
some psychologists have shown for portraying human reason-
ing abilities in the worst possible light.
" Is" and "ought" in cognitive science
William G. Lycan
Department of Philosophy, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio 43210
1 find myself largely in sympathy with Cohen's approach and
have no serious quarrel with his scheme for classifying allega-
tions of performance error. Instead of criticizing his paper
directly, 1 shall offer a few positive suggestions as to the
nature of epistemic warrant, and then briefly apply these to
his argument against the possibility of a "probative wide
reflective equilibrium" in inductive logic (part I, section 3).
It is an acknowledged but considerably underappreciated
fact that the key notions in logic and epistemology are
normative through and through: justification, warrant, legiti-
macy, license. To say that an inference is unjustified, unwar-
ranted, illegitimate, illicit, impermissible, unreasonable, or
irrational is to make a value judgment: It is to say precisely
that the inference is one the subject ought not to have drawn.
The "ought" here is not a moral "ought"; epistemic values
appears to be sui generis, but it is value nonetheless. For this
reason there is a prima facie difficulty in seeing how the
property of epistemic warrant can be "naturalized" or
located within the closed causal order that is the real world,
exactly parallel to the much better publicized difficulty of
locating the property of moral goodness within that same
natural order. Epistemic warrant is no more obviously a
matter of fact than is moral goodness.' And supposedly
science treats just of fact, of what does happen in nature, and
not of what ought to happen instead, or of what would
happen in a better world than ours. This consideration lends
real force to the concern expressed in Cohen's title. A psychol-
ogist who claims to have demonstrated experimentally that
subjects exhibit systematic irrationalities is setting himself up
in the always dubious business of deriving "ought" from "is."
Is there after all some naturalistically specifiable difference
between what we call good reasoning and what we call bad or
irrational reasoning, a difference that can be reconstructed
within a genuinely empirical psychology? Armstrong (1973)
and Goldman (1976 and elsewhere) have tried to bridge the
face-value gap by explicating goodness of reasoning in terms
of causal sufficiencies obtaining between belief states. By
contrast, Cohen is trying to take some of the pressure off the
naturalistic epistemologist by invoking a competence/perfor-
mance distinction and assimilating theories of epistemic
competence to theories of idealized physical entities not
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actually found in nature. (See also Sober 1978.) Let me
propose a third, alternative, hypothesis as to the natural
ground of epistemic value.
There are certain deductive and inductive rules that we do
in lact use in inference and that are (on pain of regress)
fundamental rather than derived. Finding out exactly what
rules these are and articulating them explicitly is an empirical
task of Herculean difficulty, but we can be sure that even
after it has been performed, we will still be able to ask of the
fundamental rules, why we ought to obey those rules rather
than others. Now, this question cannot properly be a request
for a proof or derivation of the rules from any more funda-
mental principles, for by hypothesis the rules are themselves
fundamental. The question must rather have the force of
asking why it is good or desirable or useful for us to use those
rules, to operate according to those principles, rather than
others. Anil an illuminating response is available.
Let us suppose that we are the products of a benign
developmental process (hat has our welfare, survival, and
propagation at heart. (It does not matter whether we think of
this process as the handiwork of Cod or simply as biological
evolution. I will speak of Mother Nature.) And let us conceive
of beliefs as being tools that we use in getting around the
world and making life easier for ourselves. Now we may ask,
what cognitive propensities would a benevolent Mother
Nature have given us in order that we might be able to form
the most useful beliefs? The first thing to grasp is that the sort
of environment we occupy, our general shape and size, and
the chemicals of which we are made jointly constrain Her
further choices; She has only a very small space inside our
skulls into which She must fit all the cognitive resources She
can provide. She will be able to allow us only a small, finite
stock of basic principles with which we may amplify and
extrapolate from our immediate environmental input; these
principles will have to promote great efficiency at some cost
in care and detail. For example. She will build us to prefer
simpler hypotheses to more complex ones, because they are
easier to work with and afford plenitude of prediction out of
parsimonious means (hence the canons of simplicity that
implicitly govern straight-rule induction and explanatory
inference; see also Sober 1981). Except in certain special
cases, She will not sanction our changing our minds without
reason, because the instability created by arbitrary changes in
belief would be inefficient and confusing (hence the conserv-
atism implicit in much of our epistemic practice). And so on.
My hypothesis is, then, that our fundamental epistemic prin-
ciples and habits, whatever ones they turn out to be exactly,
are good principles, in that they are the ones that a wise and
benevolent Mother Nature would have endowed us with,
given Her antecedent choices of materials and overall
anatomical structure. As Dennett (1978; forthcoming a; forth-
coming b) observes, our having survived as long and in as
handsome a style as we have proves that we are in fact well
designed; our fundamental epistemic principles are as useful
and beneficial as they can be, given environmental and
anatomical constraints. I suggest that this is the "natural
ground" of the normative notions of epistemology. "Rational
inference," "best explanation," and so on ultimately reflect
the optimality of certain human design features. We are fully
rational when our optimally selected belief-forming mecha-
nisms are working as they work when they are not flagging
because they lack energy, are jammed by conative noise, or
whatever. In this sense, I agree with Cohen that "we cannot
attribute inferior rationality to those who are themselves
among the canonical arbiters of rationality." [See also Pyly-
shyn: "Computational Models and Empirical Constraints"
BBS 1(1) 1978.]
I have suggested that the rationality of an inference is at
bottom the optimality of a design feature. But there are
several ways in which Mother Nature s choices are at the
same time suboptimal. First, if She had used better materials
in the first place, She could have built a much more successful
cognizer. We could have far greater storage capacity and
better memories if we had bigger heads; if we were made of
more durable hardware we would be subject to fewer
malfunctions; if we had more sensitive receptors we would be
less subject to perceptual illusion. Second, as Dennett (forth-
coming a) remarks, Mother Nature is a satisficer and has
made any number of design shortcuts. A human cognizer is a
"passable jury rig," a "bag of tricks." No doubt some of our
inductive rules are overly general in the interest of simplicity;
a tendency to jump quickly to conclusions may be more
useful on the whole than a respect for textbook adequacy of
sample size; at the same time, as Dennett mentions, erring on
the side of prudence in certain matters may be the best
strategy. Third, proneness to false beliefs of certain sorts may
serve important noncognitive evolutionary needs. We tend to
overestimate the attractiveness and other admirable qualities
of our own children; we quickly forget the painfulness of
certain otherwise useful activities; we habitually deceive
ourselves in any number of beneficial ways.
It is these three respects in which our cognitive design is
suboptimal that make me more willing than Cohen is to grant
the efficacy of a wide reflective equilibrium for inductive
logic. He maintains that experiments conducted from the
standpoint of educated induction or sophisticated statistical
theory reveal only the extent to which subjects have or have
not profited from training, rather than any built-in irrational-
ity or erroneous competence. In one sense, I think, this is
right: The fact that training and sophisticated reflection can
improve our reasoning abilities and correct our preanalytical
judgment does not impugn Mother Nature's craftsmanship -
on the contrary. It does not show that She did not do the best
job She could have done, given what She had left herself to
work with. Thus, if my hypothesis as to the natural ground of
epistemic value is correct, the fact of correctibility cannot
reveal any built-in epistemic feloniousness. Hut in another
sense it does reveal a relative cognitive inadequacy: We could
have been better cognizers than we are if environmental
conditions and raw materials had been different. With
enough reflection, calculation, and discipline we may learn to
recognize our specific cognitive shortcomings and to abstract
from them when reasoning self-consciously. In this sense it is
possible to achieve a wide reflective equilibrium that may
differ nonnegligibly from Cohen's narrow bootstrapping
equilibrium. Whether Cohen himself would agree with this I
cannot say.
NOTE
1. It is interesting that this symmetry goes generally unperceived.
Many many philosophers and laymen alike are scoffing moral
subjeetivists, relativists, emotivists, or nihilists, yet very few of these
same people would think even for a moment of denying the
objectivity of epistemic value.
Propensity, evidence, and diagnosis
J. L. Mackie
University College, Oxford OX I 4BH, England
In Cohen's argument about cabs and diseases (part II, section
4), everything turns upon the interplay between three kinds
of "probabilities," namely frequencies, propensities, and epi-
stemic probabilities, and the derivation of the last from the
other two. "Propensity " may refer either to a nondeterminis-
tic causal tendency literally present in each single case (as the
propensity of a radioactive atom to disintegrate may be), or to
a statistical property resulting from a scatter of inputs to
processes each of which is deterministic (as is the propensity
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of a coin to fall heads; Mackie 1973, pp. 179-87; 1974, ch. 9).
The propensity of a witness to give reports of various sorts
about cab colours depends on the frequency of each colour of
cab. This witness and the cab frequencies in this town
together constitute a setup that has, as the experimenters
calculated, a stronger propensity to produce incorrect identi-
fications of cabs as green than correct ones of cabs as green.
This in no way conflicts with the fact that the witness, having
been confronted with a green cab, has an 80% propensity to
report it as green. Hence, although, as Cohen says, the
cab-colour ratios neither raise nor lower "the probability of a
specific cab-colour identification being correct on the condi-
tion that it is an identification by the witness," they do help to
determine the (epistemic) probability of a cab-colour identifi-
cation being correct on the condition that it is an identifica-
tion of the colour as green by the witness. And it is reasonable
for a juror to be guided by the latter conditional probability,
not the former. Why should he restrict the condition in
relation to which he states the probability that is to guide his
verdict, excluding the relevant and known fact that it was an
identification as green? Although a change in the relative size
of the green fleet would not affect the accuracy of the
witness's vision, it would affect the credibility of his testi-
mony when he reports a cab as green.
The logical point here was made long ago by Hume.
Quoting the saying "I should not believe such a story were it
told me by Cato," he argued that however good the witness, it
is almost impossible for a miracle report to achieve credibility
(Hume 1975, "Enquiries Concerning Human Understand-
ing," section 10). Although it would not, in the circumstances
envisaged, be a miracle for a cab involved in an accident to be
green, this is sufficiently less likely than that it should be blue
to need more than an 80% reliable witness to substantiate it.
The diseases example brings out the issue even more
clearly. Although Cohen argues elsewhere (Cohen 1977b)
that the standard probability calculus should be replaced by a
nonstandard one for certain uses in relation to evidence, here
he explicitly accepts Bayes's theorem; what he disputes is the
choice of prior probabilities. Whereas the experimenters
assumed prior probabilities of 95% that this patient has A and
5% that he has B, Cohen says that the prior probabilities are
equal.
Cohen implicitly admits that he would use the unequal
prior probabilities if we were told that among people who
share all the patient's relevant characteristics 95% have A. But
unless we are told that, he says, we have no reason to assume
unequal predispositions to A and B in this patient: He refuses
to assign unequal prior probabilities merely because there are
unequal frequencies in the population. Such refusal would be
legitimate if we had positive knowledge that this patient is in
some relevant way not representative of the population. But if
we have no specific information about him that points either
to equal or to unequal predispositions, we are thrown back on
the principle of indifference or insufficient reason, and the
question is how we are to apply this principle. Cohen is (in
effect) saying: "Focus on the individual patient; since there is
nothing pointing either way about him by himself, we must
regard the prior probabilities of his having A and of his
having B as equal." The experimenters are saying: "Since we
know that this patient is a member of the population, and
don't know anything that relevantly differentiates him within
it, we must take the prior probabilities as proportional to the
frequencies of A and B in that population." And surely they
are right. What is of practical importance, of course, is not the
patient's abstract propensity to contract A or B, but his
propensity to do so in the concrete situation, which will
include whatever factors make A much more common than B
in this population. Unfortunately this propensity is unknown.
This patient may have a relative propensity to contract A as
against B which differs from the 19:1 average relative
propensity of members of this population. But neither he nor
his doctor knows this, and the data stated give them no
ground for assuming that his propensities for the two diseases,
in the concrete situation, are equal. So in relation to what
information they have, they must take the prior epistemic
probability that he has A as 95%.
Cohen admits that an administrator with a long run of
patients would regard the probability of A as greater than
that of B even where the test indicates B, and would therefore
dispense with the test. But this commits him to a paradox.
Suppose that for none of the individual patients is there any
positive evidence that he is relevantly nonrepresentative.
Then Cohen is saying (i) that for each patient for whom the
test indicates B it is more likely that he has B than that he has
A, but also (ii) that for a large class of patients, for each of
whom the test indicates B, it is very likely that nearly all of
them - strictly, 19 out of 23, or 82.6% - have A. Each patient,
he says, should demand the treatment for B, but the adminis-
trator should give them all the treatment for A. But how can
this be, since the administrator is surely concerned only with
the survival of all the patients, and there is no conflict of
interest between one patient and another — for example, no
competition for scarce resources? (The reference to "minimal
cost" is a red herring, since Cohen would still say what he
does if the cost of the test were negligible). Cohen's answer,
therefore, cannot be defended within the Bayesian frame-
work that he here allows.
Cohen suggests that the subjects, who tended to agree with
his answer, were thinking rationally. It seems more likely that
they failed to distinguish between these two statements about
the test:
(i) When it is applied to people who have B, it is right 80%
of the time.
(ii) When it says that someone has B, it is right 80% of the
time.
If (ii) were true, it would be sensible to follow the indication
of the test and opt for the treatment for B. But in fact only (i)
is true; it does not entail (ii), and (ii) is false. Applied to
members of this population with these symptoms, when it
says they have B the test is right only 17.4% of the time. And
all that each patient relevantly knows, however keenly inter-
ested he may be in himself as an individual, is that he is a
member of a class (members of this population diagnosed by
the test as having B) about which the test has only this degree
of success. Since it is easy to confuse (i) with (ii), the tendency
of the subjects to agree with Cohen's answer cannot be taken
to express an authoritative intuition about the real force of the
evidence in such cases as these.
The irrational, the unreasonable, and the
wrong
Avishai Margalit and Maya Bar-Hillel
Department of Psychology, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel
A normative theory of logical or probabilistic reasoning is
acceptable, says L. J. Cohen, "only so far as it accords, at
crucial points, with the evidence of untutored intuition."
Such untutored intuitions, therefore, setting the standard that
defines normativeness, can never be considered deviations
from normative prescriptions. Ergo, if irrationality is taken to
mean such deviation, experimental studies cannot demon-
strate irrationality. Cohen allows, however, that experimental
studies can demonstrate human fallibility, but insists that
errors of performance do not reflect on our inherent compe-
tence for reasoning validly.
One could argue that many of the documented errors of
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reasoning can be construed as deviations from normative
prescriptions even by Cohen's own criterion. In other words,
the deviations are from a theory with the proper credentials
of agreeing at crucial points (which Cohen has left unspeci-
fied) with untutored intuition. But in any event, when errors
in reasoning are both systematic and pervasive, it matters
little to the investigator of human reasoning whether they are
construed as deviations from an internally possessed compe-
tence, or from some external normative theory. Thus Cohen's
thesis in itself leaves the body of research that he attacks
intact. Far more disturbing is Cohen's attempt to justify some
of the established errors. In some instances Cohen is not
content merely to defend human rationality in the face of
error, but would use these very errors as evidence of the
superiority of intuition over supposedly normative prescrip-
tions.
In what follows we question both the persuasiveness of
Cohen's philosophical thesis, which we find an unreasonable
one, and his reanalysis of one specific problem from the
literature, which we find wrong.
Are there objective criteria for Inferential validity? Let us
consider first the case of deductive inference, which Cohen
dwells on extensively. The justification of a rule of inference,
we would like to claim, does not lie in its ability to meet some
syntactic intuitions, but rather in its ability to preserve truth.
Proper application of valid rules of inference guarantees that
we never reach false conclusions from true premises. Cohen is
not unfamiliar with this standard justification, but believes
that "it does not come to grips with the whole of the
underlying epistemological problem." He suggests an exam-
ple of a formal argument which is valid in classical preposi-
tional calculus, but "which would obviously be invalid " once
interpreted in natural language. His choice of example is most
unfortunate. Far from finding it "easy to imagine situations
in which [the argument's premise] is true and [the conclusion]
is false, ' we found it quite impossible to imagine such a
situation. To be sure, it is easy to imagine a situation in which
1. "If John's automobile is a Mini, John is poor and
if John's automobile is a Rolls, John is rich"
sounds right while
2. "Either if John's automobile is a Mini, John is rich,
or, if John's automobile is a Rolls, John is poor "
sounds wrong. But in that selfsame situation
3. "Either if John's automobile is a Mini, John is poor,
or, if John's automobile is a Rolls, John is rich"
sounds right, while
4. "If John's automobile is a Mini, John is rich, and
if John's automobile is a Rolls, John is poor "
sounds wrong. Indeed, it is hard to distinguish between the
truth conditions of (1) and (3), or of (2) and (4). The mental
exercise of imagining a situation in which (1) is true and (3) is
false will either fail - in which case the intuition that (2) does
not follow from (1) (which is false) will be indistinguishable
from the intuition that (2) does not follow from (3) (which is
true) - or it will succeed, in which case it will readily be seen
that while (2) contrasts with (3), it does indeed follow from
(I).1
Setting this particular example aside, it is well known that
the natural language connectives "and," "or, ' "if then," do
not always correspond exactly to their propositional calculus
counterparts 'A', ' V , '—•'. So obviously other examples can
be generated, where untutored intuition concerning the natu-
ral language case would differ from the normative prescrip-
tions concerning the corresponding propositional calculus
case. Since the correspondence is only superficial, nothing is
proved by such a deviation. But Cohen insists that the
meaning of connectives cannot be acquired independently of
our intuitions concerning the legitimacy of deductions in
which the connectives are embedded. This is an unreasonably
strong claim, however. Clearly connectives do not limit their
appearances to inferences, and we see no reason why their
understanding should hinge only, or even mainly, on their
role in inferences.
Even if Cohen were to be granted his point, his account
bears at most on how meaning is acquired and rules of
inference are identified, but not on the justification of validi-
ty. Suffice it to imagine what would happen if some intui-
tively acceptable rule of inference failed to preserve truth:
Clearly the intuition would yield to the truth-preservation
criterion rather than vice versa. Cohen himself, when propos-
ing his own example (part I, section 1) suggests that the
inference there seems invalid because the premise seems true
while the conclusion seems false.
Cohen aligns his thesis with one of Nelson Goodman's. But
Goodman saw a two-way relation between intuitive infer-
ences and normative inferences, with each affecting the
other: "A rule is amended if it yields an inference we are
unwilling to accept; an inference is rejected if it violates a rule
we are unwilling to amend" (Goodman 1954, p. 67).
In probabilistic reasoning there is no analogue to the
criterion of truth preservation. Nevertheless, here too there is
a notion of consistency - to wit, compliance with the axioms
of probability theory. The normative status of the demands
for such consistency can be justified independently of intui-
tions by reference to the fact that only such consistency
removes the threat of a dutch book being made against one.
To be sure, this is a justification that is anchored in decision
theory, where other justifications for other normative
prescriptions for probabilistic reasoning are to be found. This
commentary is not, however, the place to go further afield in
discussing the justifications for probability theory as a model
of rational reasoning under uncertainity.
Is It rational to have a policy of Ignoring base rates? In
spite of the consensus among many researchers that the errors
that people are found to exhibit in judgment under uncer-
tainty are dismaying (at the least), most if not all of these
researchers would refrain from concluding that people are
therefore irrational - though not necessarily for the same
reasons put forth by Cohen. Thus, by directing his thesis
against "the experimental study . . . of validity in deductive
or probabilistic reasoning," Cohen is setting up a straw man.2
We regard with greater alarm Cohen's inclination not only to
excuse, but to actually condone, people's mistakes. For exam-
ple, Cohen elevates the notorious gambler's fallacy into a
"system" for beating the odds in some gambling situation!
We focus our rebuttal of this enterprise of Cohen's on his
analysis of the base-rate fallacy in the cab problem, and the
fatal disease problem, bringing both analytical and empirical
objections to Cohen's treatment of these two problems.
Cohen reconstructs the Bayesian reasoning underlying the
cab problem in the standard manner. However, while agree-
ing that "the ratio 17/29 is the value of the conditional
probability that a cab-colour identification by the witness is
incorrect, on the condition that it is an identification as
green," he warns us that "jurors . . . or [other] people . . .
ought not to rely on that probability." Instead, says Cohen, "if
the jurors know that only 20% of the witness's statements
about cab colours are false, they rightly estimate the probabil-
ity at issue as 1/5."
In fact, however, the jurors know more than that 20% of the
witness's statements about cab colors are false. They also
know which particular color was mentioned by the witness on
the particular occasion at issue. As Cohen himself shows, the
proportion of times in which the witness's cab color identifi-
cation is incorrect when it is an identification as green is
expected to be 17/29 (59%), rather than 1/5 (20%). Moreover,
while Cohen denies the relevance of this statistic concerning
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long-run cab color identifications to determining "just the
probability that the cab actually involved in the accident was
blue" (part II, section 4, emphasis ours),3 he does not hesitate
to appeal to some statistic concerning a long run of witness
statements to justify assigning 1/5 to the probability that the
witness was wrong concerning the color of the cab actually
involved in the accident.
It seems that Cohen considers 1/5 a more compelling
estimate for the desired probability than 17/29 because the
former, but not the latter, represents a causal propensity of
some sort. But it is crucial to note that the causal chain is such
that a green distal stimulus (i.e., cab) produces an 80%
propensity of generating a "green" proximal stimulus (i.e.,
percept), not that a subjective sensation of green produces an
80% propensity of the perceived object being green.
Formally, it is p (witness sees green | cab is green) which is the
physiology-of-vision constant, while p (cab is green | witness
sees green) depends on the ecological distribution of cab
colors as well as on the witness's visual accuracy, as Bayes's
theorem nicely shows (see also Bar-Hillel 1980). We wonder if
Cohen would justify basing the probability that a cab is blue
when the witness said it is green on the witness's probability
of erring even in the following two extremes: (i) when the
percentage of blue cabs in the city is 0% (i.e., when the cab
color couldn't possibly be blue, no matter what the witness
says); (ii) when the witness makes correct color identifications
50% of the time (i.e., when the witness does no better than
chance, and so for all practical purposes is worthless).
Cohen addresses the role of base-rate considerations in the
fatal disease problem as well. In this problem, an imperfect
diagnostic test is to help in determining which of two possible
diseases a patient suffers from. Cohen states his commitment
to choosing a therapy on the basis of the test's outcome alone,
rather than on the basis of the joint implication of the test
outcome and the epidemiological statistics. The "standard
statistical method" here, says Cohen, "is propagating an
analysis that could increase the number of deaths from a rare
disease. " Unfortunately, Cohen's recommendation is propa-
gating an analysis that could increase the number of deaths
from the more common disease.4
We wish to emphasize that we agree with Cohen that in
many instances causal tendencies are of more interest than
mere concurrence statistics (see Jeffrey 1980). But in the two
schematic examples Cohen analyzes, neither he nor the story
itself provides any grounds for disassociating the propensity-
type probabilities from the frequency type probabilities
implied in the problems. Indeed, we urge the reader to
consider Cohen's admission that "the administrator who
wants to secure a high rate of diagnostic success for his
hospital at minimal cost would be right to seek to maximise
just that probability [presumably the probability of correct
diagnoses over a long run of patients], and therefore to
dispense altogether with the tests." Does the problem really
justify that an individual patient's understandable concern for
"s1 jcess in his own particular case" should call for a medical
policy different from the one dictated by concern for "sto-
chastic success for the system "?
Cohen's defense of the base-rate fallacy encounters diffi-
culties on empirical grounds as well. Consider a cab problem
in which 85 to 15 represents not the ratio of blue to green cabs
at large, but rather only of those in the records of local
accidents. Surely if the first ratio "neither raises nor lowers
the probability of a specific cab-colour identification being
correct," then the second one shouldn't either. Hence if
subjects were acting on Cohen's recommendation, they would
ignore the base rate in this example as well. Such, however, is
not the case. The distribution of responses to the latter
problem was "radically different" (Tversky & Kahneman
1977, p. 176) from the one elicited by the original cab
problem, and its median was substantially closer to the
Bayesian answer.
Now Cohen cannot eat his cake and have it, too. He is faced
with the necessity of acknowledging the existence of error in
the pattern of responses to at least one of these problems (or in
the rationale he provides for justifying the pattern elicited by
the first).
The difference between the response patterns given to the
two versions of the cab problem highlights another weakness
of Cohen's account. According to that account, people's
performance in such tasks is less than optimal either because
they lack the competence to perform adequately (as in
problems that only advanced education provides the neces-
sary intuitions to deal with), or because "conditions are rarely,
if ever, ideal for the exercise of such competence." How can
such an account handle the fact that people with the same
education and background, and operating under the same
external circumstances, perform poorly on one task and
adequately on another, nearly identical one (identical at least
in the sense of making the same demands on the solver's
competence)?
Conclusion. The position that rationality is defined by
untutored intuitions is basically a metaphysical one. The
observation that people, whether rational or irrational,
whether tutored or untutored, often err when reasoning
intuitively, is an experimental one. The experimental study of
deductive or probabilistic reasoning is motivated by the desire
to understand the cognitive processes involved in such reason-
ing. The implications of its findings to the image of man are
extraneous to the study itself. The concern with erroneous
intuitions has proven both convenient and fruitful, but is
never an end in itself.
Cohen rises to the defense of intuitions that their propaga-
tors themselves are often willing to relinquish when
confronted with their implications. Thus, for example, the
gambler's fallacy, far from reflecting a "metaphysical belief"
in "a spirit of distributive justice that regulates the whole
cosmos, " can be overcome by confronting people with the
inconsistency between the fallacy and the belief in the
absence of just such a spirit.
On the other hand, Cohen considers some intuitions too
sophisticated to be held by "ordinary people, untutored in
statistical theory, ' when in fact they do possess them, at least
to some degree. Thus, for example, while the untutored
clearly are not familiar with the law of large numbers in its
mathematical form, they are aware that, ceteris paribus, a
large sample provides a more accurate estimate of population
parameters than a small one (Bar-Hillel 1979).
It seems that instead of debating the inherent rationality of
humans, everyone stands to benefit from assisting them in
overcoming some common and powerful biases in their
intuitive thinking. So long as many decisions of monumental
consequence to the individual and to society rely on the
intuitive judgments of the unintelligent and the uneducated
(which by Cohen's criteria most of us seem to be, see part II,
section 2), we cannot rest on our laurels, content in the
competence for rationality that Cohen guarantees us.
NOTES
1. Consider the statement "If John earns a million shekel a year,
then John is rich, and if John lives on welfare, then John is poor. " We
handed subjects a page on which were listed versions (1) through (4)
of this statement (analogous to (1) through (4) in the text). We asked
them to indicate which of the statements was true and which was
false, and whether any of them seemed to be saying the same thing.
Of 17 subjects who marked (1) as true (6 others marked it false), 15
marked (2), (3), and (4) as false, true, and false, respectively. Eleven
subjects stated explicitly that they thought (1) and (3), or (2) and (4),
said essentially the same thing.
2. Cohen himself, in discussing the fatal disease problem, says: "It
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is the former option that would be the irrational one for you, qua
patient" (part II, section 4).
3. We gave subjects the following problem (after Lyon & Slovic
1976): "A certain factory manufactures light bulbs, 155o of which are
known to be defective. To help in identifying the defective bulbs
before they are marketed, the factory has a mechanical device that
diagnoses the bulbs. This device identifies correctly 80% of the okay
bulbs, as well as 80% of the defective bulbs. Consider 100 bulbs
which the device has labeled 'defective.' What percentage of them
would you think really are defective? ' This problem is isomorphic to
the cab problem, but asks for a percentage in a long run of correct
identifications as defective, rather than for the probability that a
particular identification as defective is correct. Thirty-one subjects
out of a total of 52 gave 80% as their estimate.
4, Indeed, the following computation shows that Cohen's recom-
mendation is likely to cost more lives. If the "standard statistical
method " is employed, than all patients will be treated for disease A,
the more common one, resulting in an average of 5% deaths (i.e., the
1 out of every 20 patients that actually suffers from B). If treatment is
based on the test's outcome, then 20% of the patients will die, on the
average, since the test gives the wrong diagnosis in 20% of the cases.
L. J. Cohen versus Bayesianism
Ilkka Niiniluoto
Department of Philosophy, University of Helsinki, 00170 Helsinki 17,
Finland
Of the many interesting issues that L. J. Cohen discusses in his
article, 1 shall concentrate on those raised in section 4 of part
II. There Cohen argues that experimenters in the area of
cognitive reasoning "risk imputing fallacies where none exist"
if they test the subjects by applying an inappropriate norma-
tive theory of rationality. While this general thesis is no doubt
correct, Cohen's defense of it is problematic.
Cohen's earlier criticism of the experiments of Tversky and
Kahneman gives the background for his thesis (cf. Cohen
1979; 1980b; Tversky & Kahneman 1977). His main point is
that the experimental results - which seem problematic for
Bayesians - can be easily explained by assuming that the
subjects apply what Cohen calls "Baconian probabilities"
rather than the standard "Pascalian probabilities."
This issue is in fact closely related to an old controversy
about the value of testimony on the "credibility of extraordi-
nary stories" (Venn 1888, ch. 17). If p is the prior probability
of a certain event, and if t is the probability that a certain
witness tells the truth, then the posterior probability that the
event did take place, given that the witness asserts that it has
taken place, is
probability that the cab in fact was blue, given the report by
the witness, is
p t _
 t) (1)
This formula, which is a direct application of Bayes's theo-
rem, was known to Condorcet in 1785. One objection to
formula (1) is the observation that in certain situations the
testimony of a good witness will be "enormously depre-
ciated": For example, if a reliable person (with t = .99)
announces that the ticket number 267 has won in a fair lottery
with 10,000 tickets, the credibility of this fact is, by (1), only
1/102 (cf. Todhunter 1949/1865, p. 400; Venn 1888, p. 415).
Moreover, Venn suggests that "those who had made no study
of Probability " would not treat this problem in the methodi-
cal way of (1): They would be at a loss in trying to choose
between the opposite probabilities p and t (Venn 1888, pp.
418-19).
In the experiment of Tversky and Kahneman (1977), the
prior probability p that a cab involved in an accident is blue is
taken to be .15 and the reliability t of a witness who has
identified the cab as blue is .80. According to formula (1), the
(.15) • (.80)
(.15) • (.80) + (.85) • (.20)
12
• —29— « .41 (2)
However, the most frequent estimate by the subjects in the
experiment was .80, which is equal to the value of t. Tversky
and Kahneman interpret this result as an error caused by the
subjects ignoring the "relevant base-rate," that is, the infor-
mation that the relative frequencies of green and blue cabs in
the city are .85 and .15, respectively.
Cohen makes the important and correct point that we
should distinguish here between the conditional probability
that a cab-colour identification by the witness is correct, on
the condition that it is an identification as blue, and the
probability that the cab actually involved in the accident was
blue, on the condition that the witness said it was blue. This
difference is based upon a distinction between generic events
(event types) and singular events; the former probability is
relevant to a "long run of cab-colour identification problems"
(just as Venn explicitly thinks in related situations), whereas
the court should be concerned with the latter single-case
probability.
While Cohen is thus right in criticising Tversky and Kahne-
man, his claim that the latter probability can be estimated
"without any transgression of Bayes's law" is doubtful. A
natural Bayesian interpretation of this situation is the follow-
ing: The calculation (2) is wrong, because there are no com-
pelling reasons to assume that the prior probability p is .15. In
other words, there is no reason to suppose that the prior
probability p (as a rational degree of belief) would be equal to
the relative frequency of blue cabs in the city. This issue is
related to the notorious problem of the choice of the right
reference class: The relative frequencies of blue and green
cabs might be very different in the whole country, in the local
area of the city where the accident took place, and so on.
Thus, it is not clear that the frequencies within the whole city
have any special relevance for the problem. If this is so, then
one strategy - which is traditional in the Bayes-Laplace
school - is to divide the prior probability evenly between the
two possible hypotheses on the colour of the cab. And if we
choose p = % in formula (1), we obtain the result that the
posterior probability is equal to t, precisely in agreement with
the behaviour of Tversky and Kahneman's subjects.
This argument shows that the rationality of the probability
appraisals of Tversky and Kahneman's subjects can be
rescued by assuming that they are Bayesians who - in a quite
old-fashioned way - employ uniformly distributed prior
probabilities. It also follows that there is no need to impute
"Baconian" rather than "Pascalian" probabilities to them.
Lay arbitration of rules of inference
Richard E. Nisbett
Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.
48106
Cohen's article is very useful, I believe, for two reasons. First,
the analogy between discovering normative rules of inference
and discovering the grammar of natural language is apt in
many ways. I would not carry the analogy as far as Cohen
wishes to do, but I believe that working it through will prove
to be an interesting enterprise with many benefits. Second,
the article shows in high relief the nature of the problems that
can result from making the untutored lay individual the
arbiter of reasonableness in inference. Stich and 1 (Stich &
Nisbett 1980) have argued that any such attempt is mistaken,
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but I will not repeat those arguments here. Rather, I will
argue that Cohen has not made a case for a lay standard of
rationality at all (in fact, has not offered us any reasons why
we should want untutored lay practice to provide the stan-
dard from which there is no appeal). Instead, Cohen has
offered two contradictory lines of thought, one moving in the
direction of no standards at all, and another implying that if
education affects us in any way, it can only move us further
away from rationality.
To illustrate the difficulties with Cohen's position, let us
take a concrete problem of a type that most people would
agree to be extremely common in everyday life (no parlor
tricks) and see how Cohen might deal with the difficulties
posed by people who happen to disagree with his solution:
After the first two weeks of the major league baseball season,
newspapers begin to print the top ten batting averages.
Typically, the leading batter after two weeks has an average
of about .450. Yet no batter in major league history has ever
averaged .450 at the end of a season. Why do you think this
is?
The answer that is preferred by most people who have been
tutored in statistics (any by many who have not) is that two
weeks is a relatively small sample of batting behavior and that
deviant averages in such a small sample are much more likely
than they are for the larger sample provided by the season as
a whole. Suppose Cohen agrees with this answer. What can he
do about a subject who persists in his assertion that "your
so-called law of large numbers has nothing to do with it - it's
just that the game favors batters over pitchers early in the
season"?
Cohen acknowledges that there are such things as "cogni-
tive illusions, " so one might guess that he would simply
maintain that this subject had fallen prey to such an error. But
apparently this is not the position Cohen would wish to take
since "nothing can count as an error of reasoning among our
fellow adults unless even the author of the error would, under
ideal conditions, agree that it is an error" (part I, section 3).
By one reading, then, those lay subjects who refuse to admit
their error are in fact not wrong. But of course, neither are the
other lay subjects. Thus those who believe that the law of
large numbers provides a satisfactory answer to the problem
and those who do not are both right. Cohen is not likely to
find many allies, lay or otherwise, if it is such a standard-free
world he wishes to urge.
But perhaps Cohen would maintain that it is extremely
unlikely that any subjects would continue to refuse to agree
that they had made an error, "under ideal conditions." For
most people, ideal conditions would involve education in the
law of large numbers and, more broadly, in statistics and
probability theory. But not for Cohen. On the contrary, such
education in theory introduces a "bias," (part I, section 3),
resulting in "substantially different conceptions of deducibil-
ity or probability from those once operating in their untu-
tored judgments" and thus "the judgments of everyday
reasoning must be evaluated in their own terms and by their
own standards." [Cf. Warren: "Measurement of Sensory
Intensity" BBS 4(2) 1981.]
So the ideal conditions necessary to get the subject to agree
with Cohen do not include education. On the contrary,
education is bias, and thus if the more educated person and
the less educated person disagree, apparently Cohen would
have to hold that it is the less educated person who is right.
This at least avoids epistemic chaos, but at quite a price.
Perhaps Cohen means by ideal conditions just that the right
answer is suggested to the subject and then the subject is
allowed to reflect on his own answer and the proferred
answer at leisure, so as to attain a new (narrow) reflective
equilibrium. Cohen ought to be disturbed, then, by my
empirical finding that just such conditions are sufficient to
persuade most untutored lay people of the relevance of base
rates for problems of the sort for which Cohen denies their
relevance.
If "ideal conditions" refers to neither education nor reflec-
tion, then it would seem that Cohen's position has no clear
content.
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Human rationality: Misleading linguistic
analogies
Geoffrey Sampson
Institut Dalle Molle d'Etudes Semantiques et Cognitives, CH- 120S Geneva,
Switzerland
I accept much of Cohen's argument. He is surely right to say
that it is circular to regard norms of reasoning as confirmable
mathematically or empirically; their validity must be a
matter of "intuition" in some sense. And I agree that some
response patterns have been deemed irrational only because
inappropriate norms were applied: I concede Cohen's part II,
sections 3 and 4. But this leaves certain disagreements.
First, the psychological research discussed in part II is
interesting because it reveals a paradox, that is, a pair of
theses that both appear to be valid but that prima facie
contradict one another - in this case, (i) the laws of thought
derive their validity from human intellectual behaviour yet
(ii) human intellectual behaviour often violates these laws. To
reaffirm one side of a paradox, as Cohen does in part I, is not
to resolve the paradox.
Second, Cohen's arguments rely heavily on analogies with
Chomskian linguistics, and the aspects of linguistic methodol-
ogy appealed to are questionable. This applies particularly to
Chomsky's "competence/performance" distinction. It has
often been observed (see, for example, Fodor & Garrett 1966,
Moravcsik 1969) that this pair of terms is used equivocally by
Chomsky and other linguists; by now it is perhaps no longer
controversial to suggest that one of its chief functions is to
protect linguists' theories from refutation, by permitting
observations contradicting the theories to be dismissed as
"performance effects," while those that confirm the theories
are taken as a true reflection of a speaker's "competence." A
clear case, discussed by Reich (1969 - and cf. Sampson 1975:
77-79), concerns the phenomenon of "self-embedding":
Certain syntactic constructions that are normal enough when
used singly produce bizarre, scarcely comprehensible utter-
ances when iterated two or three times in a nested fashion, as
in for example, "The boy that the cat that my wife found
scratched was angry." It happens that Chomsky's grammati-
cal theory predicts that such a sentence should be "good, "
since each individual construction it contains is normal, and
the theory makes grammaticality depend exclusively on the
properties of individual constructions rather than on the
global patterns into which constructions are organized.
Accordingly, Chomsky treats the unacceptability of such
sentences as a matter of performance rather than compe-
tence. Yet it appears that the unacceptability of self-embed-
ded sentences is systematic and is not predictable on the basis
of any principles known independently of linguistic theory;
the only basis for assigning the phenomenon to performance
rather than competence is that this preserves the theory from
refutation. (Reich rightly argues that we ought to prefer a
different linguistic theory which predicts the "badness" of
self-embedded constructions in a non-ad-hoc fashion, thus
recognizing this phenomenon as a matter of competence.)
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[See also Chomsky: "Rules and Representations" BBS 3(1)
1980.]
Cohen's discussion in part II, sections 1 and 2 might be
thought to involve a circularity comparable to Chomsky's.
What he says about, for example, the four-card experiments
might be summarized as: Subjects intuitively observe both the
law of contraposition and a rule making application of that
law dependent on the familiarity of the materials involved in
a given reasoning situation. On what grounds does Cohen
treat the former as part of our competence but the latter as
merely a performance limitation? - surely, only because to
treat both rules as "competence rules " would damage his
thesis that humans are not irrational.
If subjects in a reasoning experiment were presented with
materials that were much less familiar even than cards
bearing letters and numbers - if they perceived the experi-
mental situation as some sort of science-fiction world in which
all their commonsense assumptions broke down - then it
could be that they would produce no answers, or randomly
varying answers, to the experimenter's questions. In this case
it might be appropriate to describe their performance as
failing to reflect their reasoning competence because they
were not in a position to apply their competence. (Similarly,
my competence to distinguish grammatical from ungram-
matical word strings in English will not be reflected in
performance if the strings are written illegibly, say.) Or again
subjects might produce no responses, or random responses, in
situations in which the amount of computation needed to
reach the correct answer was extremely large (just as my
grammatical competence might not be reflected by my
performance in response to enormously long sentences). But
in the results discussed in part II, sections 1 and 2, subjects did
not simply fail to reason and give random responses; rather,
they systematically gave "bad " responses. It is not clear what
(other than incompatibility with his theory) leads Cohen to
dismiss these systematic responses as not being genuine reflec-
tions of subjects' reasoning competence.
The Piagetian point about logical competence not being
expressly formulated by most people in a general fashion
seems irrelevant, since it can hardly be supposed that ability
to make a principle of rationality explicit is a necessary
condition for being able to act in accordance with it. Similar-
ly, in the case of language, it is not necessary and indeed not
usual for a speaker who can use a given construction compe-
tently in his native language to be able to state the grammati-
cal rules defining the construction. This problem may again
stem from an unfortunate analogy with linguistics. Cohen
uses the word "intuition" to stand for an unreflecting disposi-
tion to obey a given principle, but the word sounds as if it
implies conscious reflection on the principle; Cohen expressly
appeals to the precedent of "grammatical intuitions" in
linguistics, but the term is quite equivocal in linguists' usage
(Sampson 1979: Ch. 6).
Conditional probability, taxicabs, and
martingales
Brian Skyrms
Department of Philosophy, University of California at Irvine, Irvine, Calif.
92717
Under "Applications of inappropriate normative theory '
Cohen argues at length that in Kahneman and Tversky's
taxicab problem, it is the psychologists rather than the
subjects who have got the answer wrong. The mistake is held
to have arisen from a confusion of two conceptions of proba-
bility: relative frequency and causal propensity. Since, as
Cohen points out, an incorrect treatment of such problems
could have serious practical consequences, it is perhaps
worthwhile to look at the problem more closely, with special
attention to the interaction of various types of probability.
Let us begin by introducing a third conception of probabil-
ity into the picture; credibility or rational degree of belief,
which is closely what is at issue for the mock jurors. Credibili-
ties apply to single cases, via the singular statements that
describe those cases. Information as to relative frequency or
causal propensity has an effect on credibility, with the effect
of propensity information being more dramatic. Given the
value of a propensity, we will in general take that as the value
of the credibility of the associated statement. Furthermore,
we will take it as the value of the credibility even if we are
given, along with the propensity, other frequency informa-
tion. For example, the credibility of heads on toss 100 (given
that the propensity of heads on toss 100 is % and that the
relative frequency of heads in the first 99 tosses is 100%) is %.
The effect of relative frequency information is more modest.
If we have no salient prior information about the outcomes in
a finite class, our ignorance may be symmetric in such a way
(exchangeability) that given the relative frequency of an
outcome in that class and only that, we would take that value
as the credibility of each statement attributing that outcome
to a member of that class. For example, for the subjects of
Kahneman and Tversky's experiment, it is plausible that the
credibility of the statement that the taxi involved in the
accident was green given that the relative frequency of green
taxis among the taxis of Mudville is 85%, is 85%. There is a
great deal more to be said about the interaction of these three
kinds of probability (I have tried to say some of it in Skyrms
1980), but what I have said so far suffices for the analysis, and
is, I trust, relatively uncontroversial.
Let us suppose that on the basis of the information that the
relative frequencies of blue and green cabs are 85% and 15%
respectively, the subjects adopt these numbers as their credi-
bilities that the cab in question is blue and that it is green. Let
us take the information as to the reliability of the witness as
supplying the following information as to conditional propen-
sities:
Propensity (the witness identifies the cab
as green given it is green) = .8
Propensity (the witness identifies the cab
as blue given it is green) = .2
Propensity (the witness identifies the cab
as blue given it is blue) =• .8
Propensity (the witness identifies the cab
as green given it is blue) = .2
and accordingly, on that information the corresponding cred-
ibilities assume the same value. This information, in itself,
would not plausibly change the prior credibilities as to the
color of the cab involved. Finally, let us condition on the
information that the witness identified the cab involved as
green, to get the posterior credibility distribution. The poste-
rior credibility that the cab in question is blue is, by Bayes's
theorem, (.85)(.2)/[(.85)(.2) + (.15)(.8) = 17/29, not %. All
the probabilities involved in this application of Bayes's theo-
rem are credibilities. Cohen's suggestion that a confusion of
various kinds of probability renders the experimenters'
reasoning invalid cannot be sustained.
Perhaps Cohen is interpreting the statement about the
reliability of the witness as supplying information about the
converse conditional causal propensities: The propensity that
the cab is green given that the witness identifies it as green,
and so on. Such is hardly a plausible interpretation, however.
The color of the cab acts on the nervous system of the witness,
not conversely. Suppose (to vary the example) that our prior
information was that 100% of the cabs were blue. Would
Cohen maintain that the cab in question had a .8 propensity
to be green conditional on the witness identifying it as green?
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I think that Cohen's discussion does establish the possibility
that the subjects are involved in a probabilistic version of the
fallacy of illicit conversion, moving from conditional proba-
bilities going in one direction to those going in the opposite
direction. This is not an implausible hypothesis, given that
fallacies of illicit conversion occur in nonprobabilistic cases. I
do not see, however, how conversational [implicature] can be
brought in here to save the day for the common man.
Under "Misapplications of appropriate normative theory"
Cohen offers a "pragmatic ' defense for subjects thought to
have been indulging in the "gambler's fallacy" or "fallacy of
the maturity of chances." I find this discussion very puzzling.
In it Cohen seems to be recommending a martingale strategy
as a rational course of action. In the first place, I do not see
how a predilection for martingale strategies is supposed to be
mistaken by experimenters for a belief in the maturity of
chances. In the second place, I am sure that Cohen is aware
that for a gambler with a limited fortune, a martingale
strategy constitutes as much of a gambler's fallacy as the
fallacy originally at issue. (For a general treatment of
gambling policies with stopping rules see Billingsley 1979.) As
Cohen notes, in real life fortunes are always finite. What,
then, is the point of his suggestion? Perhaps I have misunder-
stood the thrust of Cohen's brief remarks on this subject. If so,
some amplification of them would be welcome.
Rationality is a necessary presupposition in
psychology
Jan Smedslund
Institute of Psychology, University of Oslo, Blindern. Oslo 3, Norway
I regard Cohen's arguments and conclusions as essentially
correct, but as suffering from a certain vagueness and incom-
pleteness in some respects. I will try to reinforce his thesis by
introducing some modifications.
Cohen sometimes appears to vacillate between a subjectiv-
ist and an objectivist position, that is, between a vocabulary
referring to beliefs, judgments, intentions, and the like, and a
vocabulary including expressions such as "malfunction of an
information-processing mechanism." It should be clear that
the question of rationality is meaningful only within a subjec-
tivist framework - meanings and, therefore, implications and
contradictions exist only for subjects. A causal mechanism as
such is neither rational nor irrational. This means that when
subjects fail on a task, the issue of rationality is meaningful
only as long as the performance is described in terms of the
subject's actual premises and conclusions.
Cohen relies heavily on the notion of intuition as a criterion
of rationality. The question of how the validity of an intuition
is established is answered by reference to consensus among
adult laymen under optimal conditions of judgment. The
optimality of conditions is, presumably, also a matter of
intuitions. The suggested procedure defines the validity of an
intuition in a given context by simple consensus. However, it
does not establish the intuition as being necessarily, that is,
noncontingently, true (in all possible worlds). I would, there-
fore, suggest that another criterion be added, namely, that the
negation of the formulated intuition be absurd or meaning-
less. This would establish the intuition as true in all possible
worlds. Although the negation test must also be based on
consensus among normal adult speakers of the natural
language involved, it may, in actual practice, be evaluated by
the researcher with a few spot checks on available subjects. A
particular subclass of such intuitions, based on proofs showing
the negations to be meaningless or absurd, is described with
the label "acceptable explanation" in one of my papers
(Smedslund 1978).
So far, I have attempted to strengthen Cohen's argument
by introducing the explicit presupposition of a subjectivist
frame of reference and a check on the necessity of intuitions
by negation. The next step is to reject Cohen's competence-
performance distinction in favor of the simple assumption
that all performance is rational. One difficulty of Cohen's
distinction is that competence apparently must be described
in terms of pure logico-mathematical operations, and that this
leads to a reification of conceptual entities and an unfortunate
ontological position that I have labeled conceptual realism
(Smedslund 1977). There is not space to go into this here.
However, the main reason the competence-performance
distinction must be rejected is that it leads to the acknowledg-
ment that performance is sometimes irrational. Cohen
himself refers to Quine, acknowledging that "we have to
impute a familiar logicality to others if we are to suppose that
we understand what they say." However, he fails to acknowl-
edge that this argument holds, not only for what others say,
but also for what they do (Smedslund 1970). A consequence of
this is that if the other individual's performance is not logical,
then we cannot hope to understand him and are forced to
resort to causal explanations in an objectivist framework. A
simpler and more consistent position is simply to assume
rational performance, that is, to assume that the other indi-
vidual's performance is always a logical consequence of his
momentary premises. This means that failures on experimen-
tal tasks demanding logical performance are interpreted as
stemming from a lack of adequate communication between
experimenter and subject. The most general reason for this is
the experimenter's failure to take into account the subject's
point of view, predispositions, previous learning, and limita-
tions in capacity. As a consequence, the subject is acting on a
set of premises different from those intended by the experi-
menter. In summary, it is suggested that, given a subjectivist
conceptual framework, every act of every subject, including
children and animals, must be interpreted as a logical conse-
quence of the subject's momentary premises.
Having established the subjectivist frame of reference and
the necessity of intuitions, and having abolished the
competence-performance distinction, it is possible to classify
all experiments attempting to demonstrate degree of rational-
ity of subjects as pseudoempirical in the sense of involving
attempts to test logically necessary statements by empirical
methods. Cohen also (correctly) illustrates an important
feature of such experiments, namely that they can be reinter-
preted as testing the adequacy of procedures. An experimen-
tal procedure that results in apparent irrational behavior
must be regarded as inadequate. In conclusion, I regard
Cohen's work, with the suggested modifications, as a substan-
tial contribution to a research program pursuing the question
of what is necessarily true in psychology (Smedslund, in press
a, in press b).
Some questions regarding the rationality of
a demonstration of human rationality
Robert J. Sternberg
Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, Conn. 06520
Cohen sets out "to show why recent research in the psychol-
ogy of deductive and probabilistic reasoning does not have
the 'bleak implications for human rationality,' as has some-
times been supposed." Even if this research does not have
such bleak implications, there are aspects of Cohen's article
that possibly do have bleak implications for human rationali-
ty. I will consider three such aspects.
Base rates. I found Cohen's arguments regarding base
rates, and why in individual cases it often makes sense to
ignore them, bizarre. Cohen seems to be arguing that the laws
of probability work differently for individual cases than they
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do for aggregates of cases. For example, he points out that "a
patient is concerned with success in his own particular case,
not with stochastic success for the system." He considers a
case where "for a variety of demographic reasons disease A
happens to be nineteen times as common as B." But he notes
that "there is no information about you personally that
establishes a greater predisposition in your case to disease A
than to disease B. We have to suppose equal predispositions
here, unless told that the probability of A is greater (or less)
than that of B among people who share all your relevant
characteristics, such as age, medical history, blood group, and
so on." But if one were to pursue this line of argument to its
conclusion, one would end up either with a sample size of one
(oneself), or with so few cases that it would be difficult or
impossible to estimate accurate prior probabilities in the first
place. If one disease is 19 times as prevalent in the general
population as another, should one really assume that the
likelihoods are equal in one's own case, especially if, as in
Cohen's example, the two diseases are equally dangerous in
their potential consequences? The most reasonable strategy is
to apply the population base rate to individual cases unless
special circumstances, such as an unusual hereditary disposi-
tion toward a rare disease that shares symptoms with a more
common disease, dictate otherwise.
Cohen's line of argument has been responsible for the
maintenance of any number of essentially superstitious
patterns of behavior. For example, classical psychodynamic
therapy has probably survived as long as it has because of
people's (and therapists'!) beliefs that despite the overwhelm-
ing statistical evidence against the method's general thera-
peutic effectiveness, the method will probably work in indi-
vidual cases [See also Eysenck: "The Conditioning Model of
Neurosis" BBS 2 (2) 1979.] "Miracle" cures for diseases such
as cancer have survived for much the same reason: The
desperate individual hopes that even though the treatment
does not work on the average, it may work in ones individual
case. After all, how could the "cure" have become popular-
ized if it never worked? And of course smokers would have
much greater difficulty continuing smoking, and soldiers
facing enemy gunfire, if they did not believe themselves
immune from the laws of probability that apply to everyone
else. In some cases, such as that of the soldier facing battle,
irrationality may actually serve a very rational purpose. But
this shows only that irrational thinking can serve a rational
purpose, not that the thinking is itself rational. Dreams, for
example, serve a very rational purpose, yet are often irration-
al.
Deductive competence. Cohen claims that "in their famil-
iar concrete concerns human beings show themselves well
able to apply the law of contraposition to appropriate prob-
lems." This is a subset of a more general claim that people's
reasoning processes may appear to be quite rational with
concrete or everyday content, although not with abstract or
artificial content. But does such a pattern of findings tell us
something about people's logical competence, or about their
ability to use knowledge of the world to supplement their
logical competence? I would argue strongly for the latter
claim. Consider, for example, the conditional, "If I drink a
gallon of deadly poison, I will die." Most people would
presumably recognize, correctly, that if I live, I didn't drink
the poison. If presented with the same contraposition problem
in terms of As, Bs, and Cs, the same people would, in most
cases, fail to recognize the validity of the contrapositive. But
this contrast seems to show that when the logical component is
supplemented in its activities with real-world knowledge,
people do not ignore the real-world knowledge, but can use it
to their advantage. And it is not merely the concrete content
of the terms that makes the difference, since nonsense syllo-
gisms, with premises such as "If this object is a book, it is a
typhoon," do not produce the same improvement in perfor-
mance over abstract problems that factually accurate prob-
lems do. Cohen's own examples are generally open to this
criticism. Cohen discusses the reasoning involved in chains of
thinking such as "if the soap is not in the basin . . . it must be
in the bath." But our reasoning processes are greatly facili-
tated by our past experience with soap and baths, and our
knowledge about where we have kept soap in the past. This
particular example, in fact, could be soluble solely on the basis
of one's real-world knowledge without any recourse to reason-
ing. Abstract problems measure logical competence in the
absence of a facilitative (or, in the case of counterfactual
premises, possibly inhibitory) real-world component; and
they show people's logical competence. Abstract problems do
not show people's real-world "reasoning" abilities well,
because real-world problems usually contain cues that facili-
tate the work of the strictly logical component.
The role of training. Cohen further claims that many of the
fallacies people exhibit in their reasoning reflect nothing
more than the absence of training in probability, statistics, or
logic. This claim is no doubt correct in part. But the more
interesting aspect of Tversky and Kahneman's work (1974) is
that even extensive and intensive training doesn't seem to
matter much: Mathematical psychologists attending a mathe-
matical psychology meeting were prone to the same errors as
laymen. Cohen claims that this only shows that "those who
are supposed to have some statistical training . . . still fail to
recognise new examples of regression to the mean for what
they are." But the failure of these psychologists to recognize
regression to the mean in new examples seems to tell us more
about the psychology of thinking than about training. These
are not just psychologists who have had "some statistical
training." They include the world's experts in the field of
mathematical psychology. If their training was not adequate,
then whose would be? In fact, they supply the limiting case in
which one can draw a conclusion about thinking rather than
training, since they have more training in regression effects
than practically anyone else, and also use regression concepts
in their own research.
Conclusion. I have dealt with three of a number of
instances in which I believe Cohen takes a basically sound
point and attempts to push it much too far. His target article
was potentially a good corrective: After the publication of
striking findings such as those of Tversky and Kahneman
(1974), Wason and Johnson-Laird (1972), there is an under-
standable tendency to go from one extreme to another - to
assume that people are really quite irrational rather than
really quite rational. Cohen correctly points out that it is easy
to exaggerate people's irrationality. But, in certain places,
Cohen goes to irrational extremes in his arguments, showing,
perhaps, that people are not quite so rational as he claims.
Inferential competence: right you are, if you
think you are
Stephen P. Stich
Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland, College Park, Md.
20782
The central move in Cohen's clever argument is the claim
that the empirical theory of inferential competence must
inevitably coincide with the normative theory of inference.
The reason is that both theories exploit the same data, and in
the same way. The data are intuitions about inferential
validity, and in both normative and descriptive theories the
goal is to construct the simplest and most powerful idealized
theory that captures the bulk of the data. So the empirical
investigator studying inferential competence must come up
with the same account as the normative theorist. My disagree-
ment with Cohen is easy to pinpoint. As I see it, he has simply
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told the wrong story about the normative theory of inference.
His narrow reflective equilibrium account of the way norma-
tive theories of inference are supported or justified cannot be
maintained.
Perhaps the quickest way to underscore the problem with
Cohen's account of the justification of normative theories of
inference is to pursue the analogy, noted by Cohen, between
grammatical theory and the empirical theory of inferential
competence. Both a grammar and a theory of inferential
competence are based on the data of intuition, and both are
idealized to produce the simplest and most powerful theory
that accounts for the bulk of the data. But as Cohen tells the
story, there is one striking and paradoxical disanalogy. In
grammar we expect different people to have significantly
different underlying competences which manifest themselves
in significantly different linguistic intuitions. The linguistic
competence of a Frenchman differs radically from the
linguistic competence of an Englishman, and both differ
radically from the linguistic competence of an ancient Baby-
lonian. Less radical but still significant are the differences
among the linguistic competences of an Oxford don, a Shet-
land Island crofter, and a cockney fishmonger. Cohen,
however, says remarkably little about the possibility or the
extent of differences in inferential competence. At one point
(part I, section 4) he suggests that within a community all
normal persons would have the same inferential competence.
His scattered remarks about "innate ability ' and the abilities
of "all normal adults ' suggest that he thinks there is little or
no intercultural difference in inferential competence either.
Cohen's reticence on the question of differences in cogni-
tive competence is understandable enough. For the story he
wants to tell about the grounding of normative theories would
have considerable plausibility if there really were an innate
inferential competence shared by all normal human adults.
Yet there is substantial reason to think that inferential compe-
tence is far from uniform, either within a given culture or
across cultures. Within our own culture, for example, surely
education makes a difference. Subjects with training in logic,
probability theory, and statistics are better intuitive reasoners
than subjects lacking such training - not flawless, but better
(see Nisbett & Ross 1980). If this were not so, logic, probabil-
ity theory, and statistics would have no sensible place in a
nontechnical education. Of course, Cohen might insist that
education merely eliminates performance errors, allowing
actual performance to approximate underlying competence
more closely. But it is hard to see how he is in any position to
insist on this a priori. The view has about as much to
recommend it as the parallel suggestion that in teaching Eliza
Dolittle to speak the English of the aristocracy, Henry
Higgins was simply eliminating performance errors and
enabling an underlying aristocratic linguistic competence to
shine through. In the intercultural case, such data as we have
are notoriously hard to interpret (Berry & Dasen 1974; Cole &
Bruner 1971). Yet Cohen's own remarks suggest that we
should expect intercultural differences in inferential compe-
tence. For he holds that "to ascribe a cognitive compe-
tence . . . within a given community is to characterise the
content of a culturally or genetically inherited ability, which
under ideal conditions, every member of the community
would exercise" (part I, section 4, emphasis added). To the
extent that the competence is culturally inherited we should
expect people from different cultures to manifest different
cognitive competences.
Now, if it is true that different people have different
cognitive competences, then Cohen's account of the justifica-
tion of a normative theory of reasoning faces considerable
embarrassment. Recall that on his account of normative
theory of reasoning is identical with a descriptive theory of
cognitive competence. So if there are many cognitive compe-
tences abroad in our society and others, then there are many
normative theories of cognition. But if there are many norma-
tive theories of cognition, which is the right one?
Though Cohen does not address this question head on,
there are hints that he would endorse some version of individ-
ual or cultural relativism. In the case of apparently conflicting
intuitions, he maintains, the people involved might come to
recognize some tacit misunderstanding, or they might repu-
diate some previously robust intuition, "or they might
conclude that different idiolects or conceptions of deducibil-
ity are at issue " (part I, section 1). Presumably the point of
this last option is that if different conceptions of deducibility
are at issue, then the problem of differing intuitions or
competences is defused. For each person's (or culture's)
intuitions may be right for him (or right for it). Right you are,
if you think you are! But surely this relativist view is even
more unpalatable for the normative theory of cognition than
is its analogue in ethics. We are not in the least inclined to say
that any old inference is normatively acceptable for a subject
merely because it accords with the rules that constitute his
cognitive competence. If the inference is stupid or irrational,
and if it accords with the subject's cognitive competence, then
his competence is stupid or irrational too, in this quarter at
least. If he shares this irrationality with the majority of his
compatriots, so much the worse.
By way of conclusion, let me note that there is a variation
on Cohen's narrow reflective equilibrium story that does a
much better job of making sense of our normative judgments
about reasoning, both in everyday life and in the psychology
laboratory. It seems clear that we do criticize the reasoning of
others, and we are not in the least swayed by the fact that the
principles underlying a subject's faulty reasoning are part of
his - or most people's - cognitive competence. We are,
however, swayed to find that the inference at hand is
sanctioned or rejected by the cognitive competence of experts
in the field of reasoning in question. Many well educated
people find statistical inferences involving regression to the
mean highly counterintuitive. But sensible people come to
distrust their own intuitions on the matter when they learn
that principles requiring regressive inference are sanctioned
by the reflective equilibrium of experts in statistical reason-
ing. In an earlier paper, Nisbett and I tried to parlay this
observation into a general account of what it is for a norma-
tive theory of reasoning to be justified (Stich & Nisbett 1980).
On our view, when we judge someone's inference to be
normatively appropriate or inappropriate, we are comparing
it to (what we take to be) the applicable principles of
inference sanctioned by expert reflective equilibrium. On this
account, there is no puzzle or paradox implicit in the practice
of psychologists who probe human irrationality. They are
evaluating the inferential practice of their subjects by the
sophisticated and evolving standard of expert competence.
From this perspective, it is not at all surprising that lay
practice has been found to be markedly defective in many
areas.1
NOTE
1. Much of this commentary is based on the more detailed discus-
sion in my "Could Man Be an Irrational Animal?" (to appear).
L. J. Cohen, again: On the evaluation of
inductive intuitions
Amos Tversky
Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif. 94305
The paper under discussion is the fourth publication in which
L.J. Cohen attacks the work of Kahneman and myself. Since
his position has shifted from paper to paper, it is instructive to
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review his arguments briefly. Initially, Cohen (1977b; 1979)
argued that people's tendency to predict by representative-
ness and to neglect (or underweight) sample size and prior
probability should not be viewed as errors of judgment
because, he claimed, such a tendency is consistent with his
new calculus of Baconian probabilities, which has normative
status equal to that of the standard theory of probability.
Thus, we were accused of misclassifying some common
patterns of judgment and inference as erroneous, relative to
the standard theory, when they should have been classified as
valid relative to Cohen's theory.
An examination of Cohen's theory, however, reveals that
his normative claims are unfounded, his descriptive assertions
are false, and his theory of inductive probability is therefore
unacceptable from either normative or descriptive stand-
points. For example, Cohen maintains that a conjunction is as
probable as its less likely component. Let P [A | X] be the
(inductive) probability of A given evidence X, and consider a
simple case where P [A | X] - P [B|X] = '/2 hence P [A and
B | X] — % Now suppose that, on the available evidence, the
probability that A is longer than B is % and the probability
that B is longer than A is also %. According to Cohen, then,
the probability that A is both longer and shorter than B is
also %• Or, if the probability that the defendant killed the
deceased is % and the probability that the defendant did not
kill the deceased is '/t, then the probability that the defendant
both killed and did not kill the deceased is also %. This is not a
caricature; Cohen actually assigns positive inductive probabil-
ity to self-contradictory propositions (Cohen 1977b, p. 222).
On the other hand, if the probability of the conjunction of
two events is set at zero, then, according to Cohen, only one of
them can have a positive probability. Thus, if we assume that
the defendant cannot be both guilty and innocent, and there
is a positive probability, however small, that the defendant is
guilty, then the inductive probability of innocence must be
zero, contrary to both legal usage and common sense.
Cohen also insists that P [A | X] > P [A], that is, an item of
evidence X can increase but not decrease the inductive
probability of a hypothesis (Cohen 1977b, p. 220). In this
model, therefore, circumnavigation does not reduce the prob-
ability of the flat earth hypothesis, and an established alibi
does not reduce the probability that the defendant is guilty.
One can derive many similar anomalies in this system, but the
point is clear. Cohen has produced a new concept of Baconian
probability that differs drastically from the notions of proba-
bility that are used in everyday discourse, in courts of law, or
in science. Cohen presents no valid arguments, descriptive or
normative, to support his model. Instead, he claims that "this
inductive form of probability fits the judicial discourse
perfectly" (1977b, p. 45) and that "the experimental method
of reasoning in modern science seems to have an essentially
Baconian structure" (Cohen 1979, p. 393). And although
intuitive judgments of probability in general and our experi-
ments in particular contradict Cohen's model (e.g., evidence
reduces the judged probability of an event as often as it
increases it) he continues to claim that our experiments
"merely confirm ' the hypothesis that people reason in
accordance with Baconian principles.
In our brief reply (Kahneman & Tversky 1979) to Cohen's
earlier criticism, we exposed some of the defects of his system
and invited the reader to examine Cohen's normative claims
and to reflect on whether the tendency to neglect sample size
or base rate should be viewed as mistakes that many of us are
prone to make but would wish to correct or as opinions that
should be maintained and defended. Cohen reacted by criti-
cizing our appeal to reflective intuition. "We in any case
expect, since we are no longer in the Middle Ages, that serious
contributions to science should rest on deeper foundations
than impressionistic appeals to intuition, common sense and
ordinary usage" (Cohen 1980b, p. 89).
Commentary/'Cohen: Demonstrating irrationality
In the present paper, Cohen reverses his position on two
basic issues, without warning or acknowledgment. First, after
asserting that appeals to intuitions are worthless for the
evaluation of the normative adequacy of a theory, he now
argues at great length that intuitions are the only data by
which normative issues can be settled. Second, after claiming
that Baconian probability, rather than the standard calculus,
captures the logic of controlled experiments and forensic
proof he abandons the theory completely, again without an
admission or an explanation. He introduces a new concept of
propensity probability which, unlike the previous one, satis-
fies the classical probability axioms. Cohen does not tell us,
however, whether the new system is intended to replace the
Baconian system, and if so, why or whether it should supple-
ment it, and if so, how.
Cohen's theories, we are told, are part of a factual psycho-
logical theory of inductive competence. Such a theory, I
presume, should capture the patterns of judgments and infer-
ence that people find convincing or intuitively compelling.
But how can such a set be characterized? People may endorse
a given argument with confidence at first but reject it later,
after several minutes, hours, or months of thought and reflec-
tion. Furthermore, human intuitions are often incomplete,
inconsistent, and context dependent (see e.g., Kahneman &
Tversky 1981, in press; Tversky & Kahneman 1981). The
attempt to map and formalize human inductive intuitions,
therefore, presents formidable empirical and conceptual
difficulties.
Cohen proposes a simple solution. Using his own intuitions,
rather than experimental data, he invents normative theories.
If you are tempted to ask, How do we know that these
intuitions are valid,? you will be told that "to ask for knowl-
edge here is to ask for what is in principle impossible." The
problem now is essentially solved because "accounts of
human competence can be read off from the appropriate
normative theories" (emphasis added). So empirical theories
of competence are to be derived from armchair speculations.
The division of labor between disciplines, according to
Cohen, is clear. Psychologists should be confined to the study
of (fallible) performance. Theories of cognitive competence
will be "read off" by philosophers, "and though it is a
contribution to the psychology of cognition, it is a by-product
of the logical or philosophical analysis of norms rather than
something that experimentally oriented psychologists need to
devote effort to constructing. It is not only all the theory of
competence that is needed in its area. It is also all that is
possible. ' These quotes from the target article need no
comment. Cohen's unquestionable normative intuitions are
not only the basis for a cognitive theory of competence, they
also set the limit for what such a theory could achieve!
The second part of Cohen's paper is a misguided critique of
the psychological literature on judgment and inference. For
example, he argues that people's failure to appreciate the
effect of sample size on sampling variability is of little interest
because naive subjects are not expected to know the law of
large numbers. This argument misses a major point about
psychological research. Of course, naive subjects are not
expected to formulate or prove laws of statistics or geometry.
However, the psychologist is very interested in whether naive
subjects have learned from lifelong experience that nonrepre-
sentative results are more frequent in small than in large
samples. The question of which of the basic qualitative
principles of statistics are represented in people's intuitions is
not reducible to tests of intelligence or education.
Finally, Cohen misrepresents the psychological work,
which he labels "the literature on cognitive irrationality. " In
fact, this work has been primarily concerned with the psycho-
logical processes that govern judgment and inference and has
portrayed people as fallible, not irrational. Psychological
studies show that human intuitions are sometimes wrong, and
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that people often admit, upon reflection or discussion, that
their failure to consider sample size or base rate was mistaken.
In denying that inferences based on representativeness are
prone to error, Cohen acts like a defense lawyer who tells his
client "don't admit a thing, we will plead a Baconian inter-
pretation of probability ' even after the client has already
admitted guilt.
The importance of cognitive illusions
Peter Wason
Psycholinguistics Research Unit, University College London, London NW1
2HE. England
The world is full of cognitive illusions. For instance, I some-
times suffer under them when I indulge in high level chess. It
is not that I miscalculate, but that I misconceive the whole
position. And I think that this sort of thing happens in a wider
variety of spheres than is generally acknowledged, rather
than merely being something that occurs at the behest of the
sly psychologist. So I have no argument with Jonathan Cohen
(other than to stress the generality of cognitive illusions)
because, as he himself admits, none of us has claimed that my
favourite one, the selection task or four card problem, in any
way denigrates, or could denigrate, a competence theory of
rationality. And yet I must correct one factual error concern-
ing the alleged superficiality of the subjects' responses. In so
doing I am not necessarily implicating the views of any of my
collaborators; we have all developed rather different ideas
about the relevance of the task.
There do seem to me to be some minor confusions in
Cohen's account of our work, but I let them pass in order to
avoid dreary technical niggles which would detract from my
main point. Cohen asserts: "They [the experimenters] have
manipulated the circumstances of a situation in such a way
that subjects are induced to indulge in a form of reasoning
that on a few moments' prompted reflection they would be
willing to admit is invalid. ' But it is a cardinal feature of the
four card problem that a fair proportion of subjects conspicu-
ously fail to correct their initial responses even when all the
relevant information is made available to them to show that
they are wrong. This was first dramatically demonstrated by
Wason (1969) and corroborated with improved controls by
Wason and Johnson-Laird (1970) and by Wason and Golding
(1974). The critical, unselected, and potentially falsifying
card is frequently dismissed as irrelevant to the problem after
it has actually been shown to falsify the test sentence, and
admitted to do so. The subjects say things like, "It doesn't
matter."
In one experiment (Wason & Johnson-Laird 1970) 74
percent of the undergraduate subjects (25 out of 34) failed to
correct their solution after the falsifying card had been fully
revealed and evaluated, and only 48 percent of these (12 out
of 25) did so, even at a verbal level, after a twenty-minute
clinical interview.
Now by any standards such behaviour seems irrational. The
utterances of our subjects often resemble those of a hypno-
tised person. "The subject talks as if he were deluded; his
attention is funnelled on his first decision; he contradicts
himself in a way in which he would not do ordinarily; and he
even denies the very facts which confront him " (Wason and
Johnson-Laird 1972, p. 239). Our experiments have, in fact,
been designed to probe the temporary effects of just such
performance variables. And the most salient feature of
performance is the subjects' incorrigible conviction that they
are right when they are, in fact, wrong. (That is what the
problem is all about, rather than being a pseudotest of how
conditionals are understood.) When this conviction is contra-
dicted by the facts, the subject is often presented with an
acute conflict between two belief systems. This has analogies
to real life crises of belief. Anyone who has campaigned for
minority causes, such as unilateral nuclear disarmament, or
witnessed the belief that love lasts for ever ("This is, and is not
Cressid"), will know how ordinary people evade facts,
become inconsistent, or systematically defend themselves
against the threat of new information relevant to the issue.
Cohen might retort that it hardly needs an experiment to
demonstrate that kind of behaviour. But the point is to show
that it can be manifested with innocuous material, and to
explore ways in which the conflict might be resolved.
Through experimental techniques we have the opportunity of
simulating and ameliorating it.
On a miniature scale, such emotionally driven behaviour
has been evinced from time to time in my experiments on
reasoning since 1960, and it seems to me of much greater
psychological interest than manifestations of rational compe-
tence outside the laboratory. The artificiality of experiments
can be turned to good account by revealing factors that make
people unreasonable: We do not uncritically extrapolate from
them to real life, but (like an ablation experiment in physiol-
ogy) we may learn from them something about the conditions
that maintain rationality in everyday discourse.
There is something interesting, however, about the reaction
of some people to my research. Jonathan Cohen is not the first
academic to criticize it, but such criticisms have sometimes
been rather affective in tone. In an earlier draft of the present
paper Cohen referred to my experiments, not as cognitive
illusions, which is splendid, but as conjuring tricks, which is a
little derogatory. Others have been more impolite. Why?
Those who are most concerned to vindicate the basic rational-
ity of man seem to me a little worried by what might be
construed as evidence to the contrary. Freud experienced
this, and so, for that matter, did Picasso. Recently the four
card problem was given (for reasons that escape me) to 801
French armed services recruits (Dumont 1980). Thirty-eight
percent refused to attempt it, but their written comments on
the test papers were enlightening; "C'est pourri, idiot, debile;
c'est gaspi "° and "ca c'est beige une fois. "°° Perhaps some of
my critics would joyously acclaim such sentiments as singu-
larly apt. I think they support my view that the problem is
often perceived as perverse because it seems to invite but defy
understanding. The possibility of deception in obvious
answers is unsettling. But it does not impugn rational compe-
tence.
EDITORIAL NOTE
* "This is rotten, idiotic, feeble-minded; it's a waste of time. "
" "Now this is even Belgian" - the Belgians being benignly
stereotyped by the French as getting everything backwards; for
example, using the familiar form of address "tu" with strangers and
the formal form "vous " with dogs.
Competence, performance, and ignorance
Robert W. Weisberg
Department of Psychology, Temple University, Philadelphia, Pa. 19122
Cohen's target article is valuable because it proposes an
alternative interpretation for experimental results that
purportedly demonstrate the pervasiveness of fallacies in
human reasoning, and that have been cited as having impor-
tant implications for the understanding of human reasoning.
Given the acceptance of the work of Kahneman and Tversky
(e.g., 1972b; 1973) and others by many psychologists (e.g.,
Glass, Holyoak & Santa 1979), Cohen's target article and past
work (Cohen 1979; 1980b) have provided a valuable service
in stimulating a closer look at the basic assumptions involved
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in this work. While on the whole one may be sympathetic to
Cohen's viewpoint, several questions are, however, raised by
the present article. The first of these concerns the overall
structure of Cohen's argument.
Cohen first attempts to demonstrate that rationality must
be attributed to normal adult humans, because, to formalize a
theory of logical reasoning in the first place, one must assume
human rationality. Having established the "logical compe-
tence" of adult humans, Cohen goes on to analyze research
results that have been interpreted as supporting the claim that
human reasoning is defective in certain circumstances.
Although I am not competent to judge the adequacy of the
argument for the necessity of attributing logical competence
to human adults, it seems that the data interpretations in the
second part of Cohen's article are not at all dependent on the
conclusions from the first part, as Cohen seems to believe. It is
possible to disagree with Cohen's claim about logical compe-
tence and to agree with the main thrust of the second part of
the article, that is, that human rationality may have been
underestimated in various studies. From a psychologist's point
of view, it is not clear why the first part of the article is
necessary.
A second question concerns the competence-performance
distinction which Cohen wishes to make. Cohen argues that
the criteria that we use to evaluate human reasoning are
founded on ordinary people's intuitions of deducibility. These
intuitions are judgments that normal adults make in certain
circumstances. If, therefore, an adult fails to make an appro-
priate judgment in some situation, there must be a perfor-
mance problem of some sort involved. An example involves
Wason's (1966) four-card problem. Subjects make errors in
reasoning in this problem when the stimuli are cards with
letters and numbers on them. When the stimuli are open or
closed envelopes with stamps on them, fallacious reasoning is
almost eliminated (Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi & Sonino
Legrenzi 1972). Cohen explains these results by arguing that
all subjects in these experiments possess deductive compe-
tence, but that competence is not generalized to the four-card
problem, because that situation is too different from those
earlier situations in which the relevant reasoning (use of the
law of contraposition) has been carried out. Thus, the exten-
sion of one's logical competence to a new situation depends
upon the similarity of content between that situation and
previous situations.
The parallel that Cohen wishes to draw between logical
competence and grammatical competence does not hold. The
analysis of grammatical competence and performance is
based on a distinction between the speaker's knowledge of
rules of a language, and the psychological factors that play a
role in the ultimate expression of this knowledge in the
behavior of the speaker. Some of these psychological factors
are memory limitations, changes in attention, and distrac-
tions. These, however, are not the sorts of factors that Cohen
brings forth to explain why people commit fallacies in the
four-card task. Cohen argues that a content difference is
crucial in limiting the generalization of past experience to a
new reasoning problem, which is not a psychological factor of
the sort assumed to influence the expression of linguistic
competence. Problems with Cohen's argument can be seen if
we try to take his analysis of logical competence and formu-
late a comparable argument concerning language. Cohen
seems to be saying that a speaker who has learned to talk
about hockey will not be able to extend this competence to
talk about the orbits of the planets, say, which is not the usual
way in which performance factors influence the expression of
linguistic competence. This introduces the further possibility
that the postulation of logical competence may not be neces-
sary for the understanding of logical reasoning. Indeed, if one
accepts Cohen's content-based explanation for the failure to
use the law of contraposition in the four-card task, then one
has already accepted a noncompetence view, in the sense that
Cohen is arguing against an abstract system of rules.
The final issue is of a different sort, and concerns questions
of data interpretation. Cohen proposes four categories into
which previous research results can be assigned without
assuming that people commit fallacies of reasoning: cognitive
illusions, tests of intelligence or education, misapplications of
appropriate normative theory, and applications of inappro-
priate normative theory. The second category involves situa-
tions in which the alleged fallacy occurs because the situation
involves principles of which nonspecialists would be ignorant.
In such cases, as Cohen argues, judgments of fallacious
reasoning are unwarranted. An examination of the examples
placed in the other three categories suggests that several of
them may more parsimoniously be interpreted as examples of
ignorance on the part of the subjects.
One example of an illusion, according to Cohen, is Tversky
and Kahneman's (1973) finding that words beginning with re
are mistakenly judged to be more frequent than words ending
with re. Tversky and Kahneman (1973) attribute subjects'
errors to the heuristic of availability. Cohen argues that the
term "heuristic ' is misapplied here, because subjects are not
using some sort of discovery plan, as "heuristic " implies. On
the basis of his earlier discussion, Cohen argues that subjects
must be granted the competence to avoid fallacies in reason-
ing about probabilities or frequencies, which includes some
procedure requiring that the person check whether the avail-
able evidence constitutes a fair sample. The differential ease
of recall of the two sorts of words in the judgment task
circumvents the evaluation of the representativeness of the
evidence.
An alternative explanation is simply to assume that the
adult believes that the evidence is representative; one there-
fore does not have to make any claims about why procedures
are not carried out. One need only assume that people who
are ignorant of memory research do not know about the role
of various sorts of bigram cues in determining the relative
ease of recall of words.
As an example of misapplication of appropriate normative
theory, Cohen discusses the alleged fallacy of illicit conver-
sion, in which a person draws an inference from "if p then q "
to "if q then p." This tendency has been attributed to people's
unwarranted treatment of conditionals as if they were state-
ments that allowed one to infer q from p. Cohen argues that
one does not have to assume that people are making unwar-
ranted assumptions, but rather that rules of conversation
(Cohen's interpretation of Grice 1975) make it likely that an
isolated statement of the form "if p then q" will be treated in
such a way that conversion is permissible. In this situation it
again seems possible that the prevalence of illicit conversion is
due to ignorance on the subject's part. In the context of formal
logical reasoning, a conditional statement is not interpreted in
the same way as it is in the context of ordinary conversation.
Explicit instruction is required for one to learn to compute the
truth value for a conditional statement, given the truth values
of its components. One would not therefore expect naive
college students to reason correctly from such statements.
As an example of the final category, applications of inap-
propriate normative theory, Cohen discusses why subjects fail
to take prior probabilities into account when judging the
probability of a given outcome. He argues that the tendency
to impute fallacious reasoning to subjects depends on the
application of an incorrect model of probability as the basis
for determining correctness of judgment. As an alternative,
Cohen proposes a "Baconian" analysis of probability, which,
if applied to such cases, would not result in the attribution of
fallacious reasoning to someone who ignored prior probabili-
ties. As in his other examples, however, it can again be argued
that simple ignorance is involved here. If most subjects are
ignorant of Bayes's theorem, then one would not expect prior
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probabilities to have any systematic effect on judgments.
Cohen discusses this possibility in passing, but does not pursue
it, perhaps because he considers the presentation of his
interpretation of probability to be of higher priority.
However, discussions of alternative models of probability
(e.g., Cohen 1970; 1980; Kahneman & Tversky 1979) may
become superfluous if one concentrates more on what subjects
know in these various situations.
In conclusion, in the target article and in his earlier work,
Cohen has raised potentially important questions concerning
the interpretation of a sizable body of experimental results.
However, his interest in philosophical questions concerning
foundations of logical theory and models for probability may
have resulted in some over interpretation of the data.
Cohen on contraposition
N.E. Wetherick
Department of Psychology. King's Collage, University of Aberdeen. Old
Aberdeen AB9 2UB, Scotland
My comments will be concerned mainly with Cohen's inter-
pretation of the results obtained by Wason and his associates.
Many papers have been published using the four card task,
and I accept Cohen's view that they have identified what
might be called a "cognitive illusion" analogous to "percep-
tual illusions." The perceptual illusions have also been the
subject of much experimental work, but while it may be held
that they are phenomena of interest in their own right, it
seems to me that, by an extension of Cohen's arguments,
Wason's illusion may be seen to be of relatively little interest.
Cohen's identification of the difficulty as "a failure to
apply the law of contraposition" is almost certainly correct.
Suppose the rule were "all ravens are black." The contraposi-
tive equivalent of this rule is "all nonblack things are nonrav-
ens." So, logically, an observation of a nonblack nonraven
confirms the rule in the same sense as does an observation of a
black raven (Hempel 1945; see in particular p. 11 et seq.).
This is of course counterintuitive; although there may be both
an infinite number of ravens and an infinite number of
nonblack things, most people feel that, in the world as it is,
there must also be infinitely more of the latter than of the
former, so that the contrapositive observation, although logi-
cally equivalent, does not (to say the least) confirm the rule as
strongly as the direct observation. It might be argued that the
reason that either the direct or the contrapositive observation
confirms the rule is that the observation might have been
negative. The raven might have been (but was not) nonblack,
and the nonblack thing might have been (but was not) a
raven. The same consideration applies when we consider an
observation that was negative. Ravens that are nonblack are
logically equivalent to nonblack things that are ravens, but we
feel intuitively that there are infinitely more nonblack things
than there are ravens, so that it must be at least uneconomic to
set out to test a rule about ravens by observing nonblack
things. Wason, however, requires his subjects to act as if it
were as reasonable to observe nonblack things (i.e., not-q s) as
to observe ravens (i.e., p's), in order to be judged correct.
It was always difficult to see why realism (in Cohen's first
sense) should affect the issue, but Manktelow and Evans
(1979) now seem to have shown conclusively that it does not.
While I accept Cohen's argument that realism in his second
sense abolishes the fallacy, Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, and
Sonino Legrenzi (1972) do not succeed in demonstrating the
fact. They used fourpenny stamps and fivepenny stamps,
which were at the time the minimum postage rates for
unsealed and sealed envelopes. There are good grounds for
believing that their subjects tested the real life rule "if a letter
is sealed it has a fivepenny stamp on it and if unsealed it has
a fourpenny stamp." Thus a sealed letter (p) was examined
(it needs a fivepenny stamp), but an unsealed letter (not-p)
was not examined (either stamp will do); a fivepenny stamp
(q) will do for either a sealed or an unsealed letter, but a
fourpenny stamp (not-q) is only sufficient if the letter is
unsealed. This is a valid process of reasoning, leading to the
choice of p and not-q only, but it is not the process that was
supposed to be under investigation.
Wason (1960) is open to analogous criticisms. There the
rule was "any three numbers are correct so long as they are in
ascending order." This rule entails many less general rules,
such as "three successive even numbers," "a number, twice
the number, three times the number," and any set of numbers
satisfying one of these less general rules also satisfies the
correct rule. The contrapositive suggests only that numbers
not in ascending order are incorrect - which is true but
unhelpful. It requires considerable subtlety to question a rule
that always generates positive instances, particularly in view
of the fact that a prejudice in favour of rules of minimum
generality is widely regarded as evidence of commendable
scientific caution. Nevertheless, that is what Wason's subjects
were required to do.
In three papers (Wetherick 1970; 1971; 1973), the last a
review of Wason and Johnson-Laird (1972) I advanced criti-
cisms of this work similar to those of Cohen, but they were
ignored. Perhaps coming from a logician of Cohen's
eminence more notice will now be taken of them. Both the
four card problem and the series problem used in Wason
(1960) deceive intelligent subjects into giving what is logically
the wrong answer without telling us anything about the
behaviour of such subjects outside the laboratory. There is,
however, no doubt that the authors believed at first that they
were contributing to a scientific understanding of intellectual
function in real life. Later, as so often happens in psychology,
the experimental task came to be regarded as an object of
interest in its own right, and some recent contributors to the
literature are scarcely aware why it was invented in the first
place. This illustrates what is perhaps the most important
general point arising out of Cohen's target article. Granted
that formal logic (whether Aristoltelian or modern) and
mathematics are the products of human intellectual function
near its highest pitch of excellence, why should it be deemed
appropriate to measure ordinary (intelligent but untutored)
human beings against the standards set by logic and mathe-
matics in order to condemn them as irrational when they fail?
It is not difficult to design experimental tasks in which
subjects behave in accord with the prescriptions of logic, but
this of course is not news, and the experiments would proba-
bly not be published. It is a mark of the almost total failure of
creative imagination among experimental psychologists that
they so rarely attempt to come to grips with human intellec-
tual function as it is, but clutch at anything that has the
appearance of constituting an external objective standard.
Such investigations serve no useful purpose because, as Cohen
has pointed out, standards of rationality are and can only be
set by human reason.
Unphilosophical probability
Sandy L. Zabell
Department of Mathematics, Northwestern University, Evanston, III. 60201
Cohen believes that normative theories must accord "at
crucial points, with the evidence of untutored intuition"
(emphasis added), a view he also ascribes to Nelson Goodman.
In doing so he seriously misreads Goodman. For what Good-
man (1979, p. 64) really says is:
358 THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1981), 4
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00009298
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:45:24, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Response/Cohen: Demonstrating irrationality
Inferences are justified by their conformity to valid general rules,
and . . . general rules are justified by their conformity to valid
inferences. But this circle is a virtuous one. The point is that rules
and particular inferences alike are justified by being brought into
agreement with each other. A rule is amended if it yields an
inference we arc unwilling to accept; an inference is rejected if it
violates a rule we are unwilling to amend. The process of
justification is the delicate one of making mutual adjustments
between rules and accepted inferences; and in the agreement
achieved lies the only justification needed for either.
Our untutored intuitions are contradictory, and any consis-
tent normative theory must contradict some of them. In this
light let us examine the base-rate examples discussed by
Cohen.
1. Consider the example of the two diseases, A and B, that
Cohen refers to. To make matters even clearer, let us suppose
that (i) A is not merely 19 times as prevalent as B, so that
P(B) - '/JO, but that P(B) - 10~6, and that (ii) the frequency of
a correct diagnosis is 51%. Suppose the test reports disease B.
According to Cohen's logic, it is more reasonable to believe
that an event of frequency 0.51 x 10~6 has occurred (the
patient has disease B) than an event of frequency 0.49 x
(1 - 10 6) * .5.
Cohen contradicts himself here, since he first charges that
"the literature under criticism is propagating an analysis that
could increase the number of deaths from a rare disease of
this kind, ' but then almost immediately concedes that a
hospital following the procedure of always diagnosing A
would maximize its rate of diagnostic success. And therein lies
the absurdity of Cohen's position. He believes that an individ-
ual patient is better off concluding he has disease B, given the
test so indicates, even though, under the frequencies postu-
lated above, only about one in a million patients will survive
such a choice. (If the frequencies postulated are less extreme,
as are Cohen's, the same difficulty remains, albeit it is less
striking.)
Now in fact, before the test, the probability that the test
will give a correct diagnosis is indeed 51%; Cohen is confusing
this prior probability with the posterior probability that a
particular diagnosis is correct. This is somewhat akin to
Fisher's famous fiducial error: The frequency with which a
random interval covers a fixed but unknown parameter is not
the same as the posterior conditional probability that a given
interval contains the parameter (see, e.g., Good 1971, pp.
138-40).
2. Cohen argues that a "causal propensity analysis" indi-
cates that we should take P(A) - P(B) - % even though the
frequency of B in the overall population is known to be l/x> (or
10 6), unless we know the probability of B for people who
share all "relevant characteristics." This is an unwarranted
application of the principle of insufficient reason, given that
we do have information as to the population frequency. But
moreover, people do not act as Cohen says they should; his
explanation is inconsistent with Kahneman and Tversky's
own results.
Take the cab example. Cohen says we should adopt equal
predispositions "unless we are told that because of faulty
maintenance, say, the probability of a blue cab's being
involved in accidents that share all the relevant characteristics
of the present one, such as poor braking, worn tires and the
like is greater (or less) than that of a green cab's being
involved." But Kahneman and Tversky in fact report that as
soon as test subjects are told that "85% of cab accidents in the
city involve Green cabs" (Tversky & Kahneman 1980, p. 63) -
all accidents, not just those that share all "relevant character-
istics" - the test subjects do take base rates (at least approxi-
mately) into account.
3. Cohen states that if Kahneman and Tversky's conclu-
sions about such examples stand, then it would be "difficult to
defend the continued use of lay juries." This is a worry Cohen
has expressed before (1977b, p. 263), and he has also argued
that his alternative interpretation of their results is preferable
because "it does not imply such widespread and evolution-
arily valueless stupidity among lawyers and other non-
psychologists" (1977b, p. 262).
It is easy to find, however, instances in which common
practice is often seriously in error, even among professionals;
or the dubious portacaval shunt (Grace, Muench & Chalmers
et al., 1966), for example, Blondlot's nonexistent N-rays
(Klotz 1980), or the embarrassingly high number of scientists
who have been conned by Uri Geller (Randi 1975). And juries
in particular are known to be highly imperfect instruments.
The parallel with the use of eyewitness identification is
instructive. Although recent research has made it clear just
how flawed this type of evidence can be (Clifford & Bull
1978; Loftus 1979), Munsterburg's pioneering work (1908) on
this subject was already available at the beginning of the
century. Yet the legal system still relies on eyewitness identifi-
cation, for much the same reasons that it still relies on the jury
system: It is - or at least was until an era of Nixon tapes and
Abscam videos - the best one can do in most situations. The
work of Clifford, Bull, and Loftus is valuable precisely
because it alerts us to the limitations of eyewitness testimony;
one hopes it will enable us to adjust for them.
And just so the results of Kahneman and Tversky: Their
insights into how people go astray in making intuitive proba-
bility assessments have already found application, for exam-
ple, in statistics texts (see Freedman, Pisani & Purves 1978,
pp. A-12, 15, 24).
In his Treatise of Human Nature (1739), David Hume
described certain types of "unphilosophical probability," and
gave a primitive psychological description of how they could
arise as a result of a conflict between judgment and imagina-
tion. We are indebted to psychologists such as Kahneman and
Tversky for their efforts to replace Hume's tentative insights
with those of a sounder, more scientific basis.
Author's Response
Are there any a priori constraints on the
study of rationality?
L. Jonathan Cohen
The Queen's College. University of Oxford, Oxford OX t 4A W, England
I. The overall perspective. Those who write about
experimental research on rationality have an under-
standable tendency to suppose that no controversial
issues are raised by their choice or application of
normative criteria for rationality. Instead they tend to
concentrate on new or old experimental data and on
the extent of the data's conformity to these criteria.
Such writers may well be provoked, like Weisberg, to
query the relevance of the philosophical remarks in
part I of my target article to the interpretations of
experimental data in part II, or even to suggest in
general, as Fischhoff does, that philosophers and
psychologists cannot usefully co-operate with one
another in any way at the present stage. What I was
trying to show, however, was that the actual interpreta-
tion of experimental data is bound to be affected by the
resolution of certain fundamental issues about the
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normative criteria for rationality. If the fundamental
credentials of those criteria are as I claimed them to be
in part I, then it follows, first, that any replicable defect
in human performance must be put down to some
situationally explicable malfunction or underdevelop-
ment of mainline computational mechanisms rather
than to the routine functioning of sideline "heuristic"
mechanisms, and, second, that there are several impor-
tant ways in which performances that seem at first
sight to be defective may turn out not to be so.
It was no part of my purpose, as Griggs seems to
suppose, to contend that all contemporary psycholo-
gists are "despairing about the irrationality of
humans." On the contrary, I pointed out that diametri-
cally opposed opinions are still to be found on this
subject, and I suggested that at one extreme there is too
much emphasis on competence and at the other on
performance. Nor did I anywhere even accuse some
psychologists, as Kahneman curiously misreads me, of
claiming that people are never rational. But I did
suggest, as do Nisbett and Ross (1980, p. 74), that an
unflattering characterisation of the layman's capacities
has become rather commoner in the past decade than
in previous ones. And this is quite compatible with
accepting the value of much previous work, such as
that referred to by Henle, as constituting excellent
vindications of lay rationality in the performance of
certain deductive tasks.
Moreover, not only are psychologists, evaluating
replicable laboratory data, still deeply divided about
the extent of lay rationality, as the commentaries on
my present paper suffice to show; so too are philoso-
phers, evaluating one-off utterances outside the labora-
tory. Finocchiaro (1981) has argued rather cogently
that many of his fellow philosophers are much too
prone to impute fallacies to nonacademic people.
Alternative interpretations can be easily constructed,
he shows, for many of the texts that philosophers quote
as examples of fallacies actually committed by journal-
ists, politicians, advertisers, administrators, and the
like.
Nor was it my purpose to theorise about rationality
in general, so as to cover rationality in action, as is
supposed both by Mynatt, Tweney & Doherty0 and by
Einhorn & Hogarth. "Rationality" is unfortunately
rather an imprecise term, so in the first sentence of my
target article I defined the sense in which I was
concerned with it as "validity in deductive or probabil-
istic reasoning." And in this area it certainly seems
rather paradoxical to claim, as do Daniels & Smith,"
that correct performances "generally reflect the exer-
cise of collective or social and not just individual
critical faculties." Unless this is just a truism about the
general guidance afforded by education, it is true only
if the correctly performing adult normally submits
every deductive or probabilistic issue to the delibera-
tion and decision of his family, workmates, and so on.
But that is manifestly false even in tribal or collectivist
countries, let alone in western democracies: surely we
very often estimate for ourselves - from our general
knowledge and immediate perceptions - when it is
most probably safe to cross a road, wade a river, climb
a tree, or whatever.
II. The epistemological credentials of criteria for
assessing the validity of laymen's deductive infer-
ences or the accuracy of their probability judgments. I
argued that the validity of criteria for lay inference
need to be broadly in accordance with lay people's own
intuitions. The objections to my argument fall into nine
categories.
1. Tversky claims that the present argument is
inconsistent with the criticism in Cohen (1980d) of
Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) appeal to their own
intuitions and those of their readers. However, I
emphasised in the target article that the intuitions that
can support normative criteria are "of those who are
not theorists themselves." The trouble with Kahneman
and Tversky's (1979) mode of reasoning was that it was
intrinsically circular. Tversky is therefore rather
obviously misrepresenting my position when he says
that "using his own intuitions" Cohen "invents norma-
tive theories." On the contrary, I specifically repu-
diated such a procedure, and cited, "the practice of the
courts," for example, as a source of evidence for the
theory about probability in forensic reasoning that was
developed in Cohen (1977b).
2. Kahneman objects that I am treating mere
accordance with lay intuitions as a sufficient founda-
tion for normative theory, and this objection is also
implicit in the subtitle of Stich's commentary: "Infer-
ential competence: Right you are, if you think you
are." However, what I actually argued was something
quite different. Common sense and ordinary usage are
certainly not a sufficient foundation. First, good
normative theories, like good scientific ones, should
exhibit the derivability of a very wide variety of
relevant hypotheses from a rather narrow set of funda-
mental ones. Particular hypotheses come to corroborate
one another by their derivability within such a system
(Cohen 1970, p. 86). The system building carried out
by logicians and probability theorists is integral to the
establishment of a solid normative theory. Hence if
certain intuitions do not fit an existing model, that is a
reason for either discarding the intuitions or construct-
ing a new model; it cannot be a reason for giving up the
search for a systematic model (and systematisation in
these areas is bound to involve logical or mathematical
formalisation). Second, a systematic logic of deducibil-
ity aims to be inferentially sound, in the sense that the
conclusion of any inference that it licenses should be
true if the premises are. This requirement is implicit in
the first-mentioned objective of the system, since each
of the actual or possible intuitions whose content it aims
to systematise is about a deduction that, allegedly, has a
true conclusion if its premises are true. We have here
an indispensable minimum for what is meant by "de-
ducibility. " Similarly, a normative system for probabil-
istic reasoning must operate with a concept of probabil-
ity that satisfies one fundamental constraint: it must be
able to function as a gradation of inferential soundness
(Cohen 1977b, pp. 13 ff.). One way of ensuring this is
to establish an appropriate interpretation for the classi-
cal calculus of chance, as was achieved by Ramsey
(1931) and the other authors I cited. Another way of
doing this is to establish an appropriate interpretation
for a suitably generalised modal logic, as in Cohen
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(1977b).
3. The task of constructing adequate normative
theories is therefore by no means an easy one; and, as
Kyburg says, even deductive logic is not a finished
system. Many issues remain notoriously controversial
because the relevant intuitions are hard to reconcile.
But the intuitions of which I speak here are in every
case "intuitions in concrete individual cases," as I
described them. It is against these that hypotheses
about normative laws are to be tested, just as hypo-
theses about natural-scientific laws are tested against
individual observations, and hypotheses about ethical
principles are tested against the deliverances of
conscience in real or imaginary quandaries. So Mynatt,
Tweney, & Doherty" are wrong to compare my view
with that of Thomas Reid (1969) and to object that I
am invoking '"intuitions' of criteria for fallacies."
(Shafer0 makes a similar misinterpretation.) Some
philosophers do indeed proceed in this way. For exam-
ple, Kyburg's commentary appeals to "a relatively
small number of very basic intuitions from which
others can be derived." But such a procedure is inher-
ently question begging. Theorists are out to establish
general principles, and so their ultimate evidential data
must be particulars (see Cohen 1982).
4. All this is perfectly compatible with different
people sometimes having inconsistent intuitions about
the same inference. In such a case the appropriate
analysis may either be that marginally different
conceptions of deducibility are involved, as in the
Lewis and Langford (1959) versus Anderson and
Belnap (1974) controversy to which I referred. Or it
may be that someone has made a mistake. Zabell is
therefore no doubt right to insist that not all untutored
intuitions are mutually consistent. But he is wrong to
think that this is an objection against what I wrote, or
that I am misreading Goodman (1954). Normative
theories do indeed require as much confirmation as
they can get from people's concrete intuitions. But
their normative role requires them to operate also as
standards that reject conflicting intuitions as false.
5. Smedslund, on the other hand, objects that no one
should ever be interpreted as having made a mistake in
reasoning. According to Smedslund, if we are to
suppose that we understand what others say, we have
to impute logicality to them, not just as a normal
practice but as gracing each and every one of their
inferences. But this argument does not succeed. It must
surely be allowed that people sometimes intentionally
contradict themselves on a matter of fact, since they
often admit to having changed their minds; and it is
then difficult to deny that such contradictions may also
take place unintentionally because of forgetfulness. So
a pair of mutually inconsistent assertions by the same
person may sometimes be quite well understood, on the
assumption that each is separately self-consistent. And
the conventions of interpretation that allow such
mutually independent understanding for molecular
units of discourse are all that are needed to allow the
intelligibility of invalid inferences.
6. Sampson has a different kind of objection,
though his point may also lie behind Stich's and
Kahneman's objections. He argues that I offer no
resolution for the paradox implicit in attempts to
combine the view that "the laws of thought derive their
validity from human intellectual behaviour," as he puts
it, with the view that "human intellectual behaviour
often violates these laws." But I offered no views at all
about the actual source of validity for the laws of logic,
and I certainly would not wish to identify this source
with human behaviour. What I actually said was that
laws of logic may derive their existence from linguistic
definitions, or from the most general features of reality,
or from the structure of ideally rational belief systems,
or from something else. The issue is irrelevant because I
am concerned, as I said, only with the epistemology of
normative theories, not with the ontology of normative
laws - only with how we judge the credentials of
normative theories, not with what those theories are
ultimately about. In fact, I do not believe that logical
truth is dependent at any point on what human beings
actually do: the laws of logic, whatever they may be,
hold good irrespective of whether or not there is life in
the universe. So it is easy enough to see how a systemat-
ically sound theory about the laws of logic might
accord with the overwhelming majority of normative
judgments that have actually been made and still not
accord with all of them. Since it is not being claimed
that these laws derive their validity from human
behaviour, there is nothing inconsistent in admitting
that human inferences sometimes fail to conform to
them.
7. Kahn & Rips" remark that many idealisations in
natural science describe an ideal state in such a way
that departures from the ideal may be explained in
terms of factors predictable by parameters of the
model, whereas nothing like this is the case in regard to
normative theories of deducibility or probability. The
point is well taken. But other idealisations in natural
science do require deviations to be independently
explained. If this were not so, the physiologists who tell
us how a healthy body functions (and who is perfectly
healthy for long?) would already have solved all the
problems of pathology.
8. Several commentators (Daniels & Smith,"
Lycan, and Stich) object that wide reflective equilib-
rium would provide a better established normative
theory than the relatively narrow equilibrium that I
endorse. But the issues that have to be settled in order
to transform a narrow reflective equilibrium about
deducibility or probability into a wide one tend to have
two features that render a quest for the latter inappro-
priate here. The first feature is that all such issues
(about the law of the excluded middle, about deduci-
bility from self-contradictory propositions, about
extensionality, and so on) are highly controversial and
therefore rather unsuited to being raised in the context
of providing background assumptions for the experi-
mental study of irrationality. And the second relevant
feature of these issues is that they are all rather fine-
grained and therefore intrinsically unsuited to form the
topic of experimental tests that presuppose an absence
of prior tutoring in the problems and terminology of
normative philosophy. Nisbett objects that, since ideal
conditions for human reasoning would on my view
include appropriate education, I ought to admit the
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relevance of training in sophisticated normative theo-
ries: hence, since these theories are the product of wide
reflective equilibrium, it is the latter, he claims, that
ultimately underwrites the appropriate criteria for
evaluating lay reasoning. But the education to which I
referred in the target article (part II, section 2) was
education in the incontestable mathematical implica-
tions of accepted ideas. That is how a knowledge of
Bernoulli's theorem, for example, might be regarded as
forming part, under ideal conditions, of a lay individu-
al's competence. It is implicit in his narrow reflective
equilibrium. And that is quite a different matter from
being trained to approach all logical problems with a
Quinean extensionalism, or a Kripkean essentialism, or
from being trained to approach all natural-scientific
problems with a Popperian horror, or a Carnapian love,
of inductive reasoning. Yet it is just such a training that
a wider reflective equilibrium might endorse.
9. Finally, a number of commentators argue against
my example of how we need to appeal to particular
intuitions in order to validate criteria of deducibility.
Grandy0 claims that, for it to be false according to
most intuitions that
4. Either, if John's automobile is a Mini, John
is rich, or, if John's automobile is a Rolls,
John is poor,
it would have to be true that
5. John's automobile is a Mini and John is not
rich and John's automobile is a Rolls and
John is not poor.
But I am willing to wager Grandy £5 that his claim is
experimentally refutable. If he wins, I shall just make
all these sentences, (1) through (5), a little more explicit
by inserting the word "sole" before each occurrence of
"automobile ' and shall then renew the wager.
Margalit & Bar-Hillel claim that (4) here does indeed
follow from
3. If John's automobile is a Mini, John is
poor, and if John's automobile is a Rolls,
John is rich.
But I can reply only that at current U.K. prices (3) is
true, for most U.K. Johns, and (4) is false.
III. The competence-performance distinction in regard
to deductive and probabilistic reasoning. I argued that
the attribution of a correct deductive and probabilistic
competence to normal adults is implicit in the episte-
mological truism that conformity to normal intuitions
is a necessary credential for theories about criteria of
everyday deducibility and probability. Seven kinds of
objection are urged against this attribution.
1. Einhorn & Hogarth object that the only reason I
give for assuming rationality of competence is "a naive
evolutionary adaptationist position." On the contrary. I
specifically denied (in part I, section 4 of the target
article) that evolutionary considerations are fitted "to
predict the precise level of rationality that is required
for this or that species' continued survival within its
present environment. "' Einhorn and Hogarth's objec-
tion is cogent against what Lycan's commentary says
about nature, not against what I say. Instead, the only
reason I accept for assuming rationality of competence
is the argument relating to intuitions.
2. Sampson claims that my arguments "rely heavily
on analogies with Chomskian linguistics" and that "the
aspects of linguistic methodology appealed to are ques-
tionable"; and Shafer" makes a similar objection. But
in fact all references to analogies with grammar could
be removed from my essay and still leave the validity
of the argument for rational competence unaffected.
So whatever equivocations or other weaknesses may
exist in Chomskian linguistics cannot undermine the
hard core of the argument in my essay. That argument
has to be judged on its own merits. In particular, critics
who dislike the argument's reliance on the need for
relevant normative theories to conform with dominant
intuitions are invited to explain how else they think
that the relevance of these theories can be ensured: that
is, how else can we be sure that the normative criteria
in question are those that apply to the particular
concepts of conditionality, disjunction, probability,
evidence, relevance, and so on with which lay subjects
are actually operating?
3. Glucksberg raises an interesting problem about
children. If education can help remove inequalities of
reasoning performance among adults, like those in
regard to Bernoulli's theorem, it seems plausible to hold
that it may also help remove such inequalities between
children and adults, as the children grow older; and if
this is so it looks as though I must have been wrong to
say that we are free to ascribe an inferior competence
to children. But what I say about children does not
depend at all on any empirical theory about intellec-
tual maturation. It depends instead entirely on the fact
that children's intuitions are not normally invoked as
evidence for the correctness of the criteria for deduci-
bility or probability that are applied to adults' reason-
ing. It is this that leaves psychologists free to test
hypotheses about the correctness of a child's compe-
tence, at various ages and under various environmental
and educational conditions, whereas the correctness of
adult competence is not an issue for experimental
enquiry.
4. Kahneman complains that to suggest reading off
a theory of deductive competence, say, from a theory
of deducibility is to make a "disconcerting" proposal
for "a new domain of study," and he is worried about
who will undertake this work. But no one who is
familiar with the relevant literature need be discon-
certed here. The work on natural deduction that has
been carried out by logicians since 1934 (Quine 1952,
pp. 166 ff.) has always aimed at closeness to natural
procedures (see Kneale & Kneale 1962, pp. 538 ff.);
and the actual reading off of a theory of competence is
an utterly trivial procedure involving, at its simplest,
the replacement of "may" by "can" in rules of permis-
sible deduction. For example, if "p may be inferred
from p & q" were a suitable logical rule (and perhaps
primitive in the system of logical theory), then "p can
be inferred from p & q" would be a suitable
statement of the corresponding competence (and
perhaps axiomatic in the theory of competence). Anal-
ogously, there has been much discussion among
philosophers for half a century or so about which
systematic interpretation or interpretations of the
362 THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1981), 4
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00009298
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:45:24, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Response /Cohen: Demonstrating irrationality
mathematical calculus of chance come closest to the
conceptions of probability that operate in everyday life
(see Nagel 1939 and Mackie 1973, for summaries and
references).
5. I quite agree with Lopes that the ascription of a
competence cannot explain the performances that
accord with it, and that an explanation of these perfor-
mances is just as much needed as an explanation of the
deviant ones. But I was not attempting to provide
either kind of explanation in specific terms: I was
discussing what needs to be explained rather than how
it might be explained.
6. Several commentators (M. S. Cohen, Kahn &
Rips," Lycan, and Sampson) object that my theoreti-
cal framework allows no room for systematic errors
that result from the presence of "satisficing" mecha-
nisms. This is certainly an important issue, on which I
have taken a distinctive line. On my view, if a normal
person's competence includes some heuristic short-cuts
or computational dodges, then these are all intrinsically
valid procedures (if correctly operated), like the so-
called anchoring and adjustment heuristic - not intrin-
sically invalid ones, like the "availability heuristic."
Where systematic errors occur we have thus to
conceive their causation as being mediated through the
malfunctioning of otherwise adequate mechanisms
rather than through the normal functioning of intrinsi-
cally inadequate ones. But I cannot see how any
psychological experiments could ever arbitrate be-
tween my kind of hypothesis and that of the commen-
tators. M. S. Cohen suggests that experimenters might
enquire whether evidence for the use of intrinsically
invalid procedures might increase with the presence of
a disturbing factor (such as fatigue or lack of motiva-
tion), independently of any increase in errors. If it does,
he says, there would be experimental support for the
claim that "heuristics" replace more normatively
appropriate procedures under conditions of stress. Not
so. If there were no increase in errors, the evidence
could just as well be construed as showing the increased
use, under a certain kind of stress, of some intrinsically
valid dodge, which could be described by the addition
of some necessary qualification or restriction to the
description of the alleged intrinsically invalid dodge.
For example, such a modification of the so-called
availability heuristic might take the form: "Take as
evidence the data that come most readily to mind
unless you have reason to suppose that they may
constitute a biased sample." Of course, a further expla-
nation would then have to be found for errors in the
operation of this heuristic, for example, errors that
manifest neglect of the restriction in regard to biased
samples. Moreover, even if we adopted M. S. Cohen's
view, we would still have to look, in lieu of such an
explanation, for additional factors (or intensifications
of existing ones) that promote use of the imperfect
heuristic in situations in which it does result in errone-
ous conclusions. Nor would any short-run failure to
discover such a factor count as evidence that it does not
exist. Biologists have long since given up supposing that
a process is spontaneous just because its cause is hard to
discover.
In sum, the issue in dispute here is a purely concep-
tual one: all possible psychological data could be
explained either way. My rejection of the view
supported by M. S. Cohen et al. stems only from the
desire for a coherent conceptual framework that
acknowledges the essential role of lay intuitions in the
establishment of criteria for evaluating lay reasoning.
Some competence for detecting biased selections of
evidence, for example, is inherent in the intuitions that
have to be invoked as a basis for inductive norms. The
strawberries on top of the punnet, we all know, may be
rather better than those underneath.
7. Griggs is quite right to insist that a purely
descriptive and explanatory account of human reason-
ing - an account that eschews all judgments on validity
or fallacy - would not be subject to my argument. Only
when researchers seek to determine the conditions
under which people reason correctly or incorrectly
does a competence-performance distinction come to be
needed, and only then can questions arise whether
"satisficing" heuristics are in operation. Griggs is on
rather weaker ground, however, as the present
commentaries help to show, in asserting that "most
reasoning researchers are not concerned with experi-
mentally testing for rationality." In any case, the valid-
ity or invalidity of an inference is hardly an unimpor-
tant feature of it, with respect to the resultant impact
on ordinary human concerns. An experimental science
of reasoning that was not concerned at all with the
extent and conditions of rationality could not hope to
say as much to educators, administrators, businessmen,
and other potential users of psychological discoveries.
Nor would the problem of rationality just disappear if
psychology departments ceased to concern themselves
with such issues. The problem is so important that it
would immediately be taken up by others.
IV. Some issues in the literature. The special problems
of normative enquiries like ethics or logic fall outside
the accepted field of experimental psychology. Hence
experimental psychologists who work on problems
about rationality naturally tend to take their normative
assumptions at second hand from standard authorities
and to apply them in a relatively unselfcritical fashion,
while devoting their primary attention to the construc-
tion and interpretation of experiments. My target arti-
cle took an opposite course. I assumed the robustness of
certain reported results, which I took at second hand
from the literature, and tried to explore two main issues
about normative criteria of rationality: first, what is
presupposed by invoking them and, second, how do
such criteria relate to the experimental results? I have
already discussed the points raised by commentators in
regard to my remarks on the first of these two issues,
and I turn now to comments about my remarks on the
second. These comments were concentrated around
seven areas of experimental enquiry, which I shall
discuss in the same order as in the original essay.
1. The four-card task. Weisberg objects that my
content-based explanation of performance error in this
task commits me to a noncompetence view, in the sense
that I seem to be arguing against an abstract system of
rules. Similarly Evans & Pollard object that my defini-
tion of competence becomes unclear if it is held to be
situation specific. But there is a misunderstanding here,
for which my own phraseology is largely to blame.
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Instead of talking about people's failure "to apply their
logical competence" to certain tasks because their
competence is not formulated expressly at a sufficient
level of generality, I should have written instead of
their failure to apply the mechanism that underlies
their competence to certain tasks - a failure that is
facilitated by the fact that no sufficiently general
formulation of the principle embodied in this mecha-
nism has ever risen to the level of consciousness. So the
competence in question, namely the ability to contra-
pose, is a quite general one, the nonexercise of which in
certain tasks demands an explanation. And the match-
ing bias which seems to be operating here may well be
favoured, as Wetherick suggests, by a mistaken anal-
ogy with the "All ravens are black" kind of situation,
where it is normally a mistake to contrapose for
purposes of testing (see Cohen 1970, pp. 97ff.).
Wason's main criticism of my treatment of the
four-card phenomenon is that I assert that the subjects
are indulging in a form of reasoning that on a few
moments' prompted reflection they would be willing to
admit to be invalid, whereas in fact "a fair proportion
of subjects" fail to correct their initial responses even
when all the relevant information is made available to
them. However, my claim is just that the subjects are
capable of recognising their error here, when it is
properly pointed out to them (and the prompting may
need to be pretty explicit). My claim is not that they
won't make the same mistake again. In order to justify
description of this phenomenon as a cognitive illusion -
a description that Wason endorses - one must be able to
preserve enough of the analogy with those perceptual
errors (the apparently bent stick in water, the mirage
on the road, the Miiller-Lyer, conjuring tricks, and so
on) that are paradigmatic for the concept of illusion.
Now the position with visual illusions is that people
very often go on seeing things in the wrong way, even
when they have accepted (as a result of feeling the
stick, coming up to the mirage, measuring the lines)
that they were mistaken on the previous occasion. That
is why over many centuries such illusions afforded
Pyrrho, Sextus Empiricus, Montaigne, and others with
such plausible arguments for scepticism. Accordingly,
the four-card phenomenon would not justify descrip-
tion as an illusion unless its sources were so deep that
the tendency to make the relevant mistake resisted easy
eradication in many people. Of course, if Wason could
demonstrate that a high percentage of subjects cannot
even understand, within a relatively short period, that
they have made a mistake when it is carefully pointed
out to them why they have done so, he would certainly
show that he and I are wrong to call the four-card
phenomenon an illusion. But the papers that he cites
include no such demonstration.
2. Availability. On the availability issue Weisberg
reiterates Tversky and Kahneman's explanation in
terms of an intrinsically invalid heuristic, and implies
that this is a simpler type of explanation than the one I
offer. But such a difference in simplicity is not at all
obvious. On Weisberg's account the underlying mecha-
nism raises a query about representativeness, to which
the alleged heuristic permits ease of recall to supply an
affirmative answer. On my account the underlying
mechanism raises the same question, and the failure to
answer it is overlooked because of the immediacy of
the data. By what relevant criteria is the former process
simpler than the latter?
3. Sample size and regression. In relation to the
commission of fallacies by "the world's experts in the
field of mathematical psychology," Sternberg claims
that their fallacies cannot result from inadequate train-
ing. Why not? It is surely not to be supposed that in so
young a subject as statistical theory, where the founda-
tions are still highly controversial, pedagogic methods
have already been perfected beyond the possibility of
any improvement. Indeed there seems no practicable
way of establishing, at any one time, that the pedagog-
ics of statistical theory do not admit of further
improvement in efficiency. No doubt someone may
object that I am therefore advancing an empirically
unfalsifiable claim. Yes indeed, that is what I am doing,
though only in the sense in which "Everything has
some explanation" is unfalsifiable. Here too, as in what
was said above about the existence of causes for the
malfunction of intrinsically valid heuristic mecha-
nisms, my primary purpose is to sketch a coherent
framework of enquiry, not to propose conjectures
within such a framework. Specifically, the failure of
some experts to live up to expectations should direct
attention towards finding ways to improve the methods
for training and selecting them: we should not sit back
complacently and suppose that, if even they make
mistakes of a certain kind, then the tendency to do so
must somehow be an ineradicable feature of the
human mind. And, if some conjecture is called for, my
guess is that in such contexts a little gentle mockery by
colleagues would be a very effective reminder of
lessons that have been forgotten. On the other hand,
suppose it can be shown (as Tversky and Kahneman do
not attempt to show) that when a fallacy of the kind in
question is committed by an expert, he will still tend to
commit it again on later occasions even after accepting
that he was in error on the first occasion. All that is
thereby shown is that the fallacy has to be regarded as a
rather sophisticated form of illusion.
In this connection Tversky makes the rather odd
comment that "the psychologist is very interested in
whether naive subjects have learned from lifelong
experience that nonrepresentative results are more
frequent in small than in large samples." The first
thing that is puzzling here is that the subjects cited do
not seem to have been all septuagenarians or octogen-
arians, and Bar-Hillel's (1979) subjects, for example,
were all either students or applicants for university
entry: how could such subjects be expected to give a
fair indication of what people "have learned from
lifelong experience"? Alternatively, if Tversky means
by "lifelong" just "in their lives to date," then it seems
strange that psychologists have not studied whether
increasing age has any effect on the relevant learning.
Second, what Bernoulli proved - the law about sample
size that is relevant to the estimation of statistical
magnitudes - is a mathematical truth about the classi-
cal concept of probability. This truth holds indepen-
dently of anything that happens in the perceivable
world. In particular, it is independent of the empirical
question whether, over all samples actually selected in
some way from physically real populations (finite and
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infinite), nonrcpresentative results are more frequent
in small than in large samples. Tversky implies that he
knows the latter question to require an affirmative
answer. The rest of us can only await the publication of
his research in the matter with an interest tinged ever
so slightly with the politest of scepticisms.
Even if Tversky has found, by judicious selection
and exhaustive sample extraction, some actual popula-
tions and some actual samples for which his bold
empirical hypothesis holds good and none for which it
does not, this would scarcely justify extrapolation to
populations of very different kinds that are too large or
open ended for probabilities in them to be determined
independently of a partial sampling procedure. Nor
can there be any serious reason to suppose that naive
subjects, without a misguided zeal for putting mathe-
matical laws to empirical tests, would ever deliberately
indulge in - let alone happen accidentally upon - the
combinatorial explosions that are required for the
exhaustive extraction of different-sized samples from
relatively large populations.
4. The fallacy of the converse. I am happy to find
that, as Revlin" points out, my remarks about this
fallacy have been partly anticipated. However, those
remarks were addressed only to the alleged prevalence
of the fallacy: I was not denying that it is ever commit-
ted. Weisberg assumes that a general human tendency
towards illicit conversion has indeed been experimen-
tally established, and suggests that it results from
subjects' ignorance of how to carry out computations in
truth-functional logic. But he does not answer my
argument, or the arguments of others, that no such
tendency has been established and so there is no such
tendency to explain. Nor does he answer the argument
(in part 1, section 1 of the essay) that the logic of natural
language is not truth functional.
5. The gambler's fallacy. The gambler's fallacy "is
as current today as it was in Bernoulli's time,"
Diaconis & Freedman claim. This is another bold
empirical claim, and again - on the face of it - not an
easy one to substantiate. I look forward to the early
publication of Diaconis & Freedman's evidence (or to
their avowal of having none). Meanwhile I can only
emphasise that, despite their (admittedly "brutal")
reformulation of what I wrote, I was not denying that
anyone ever reasons fallaciously to the maturity of a
chance. 1 was merely pointing out (and this is my
answer also to Skyrms's query) that at least three
alternative interpretations need to be excluded or
discounted in any case in which it is suspected that
someone might be so reasoning, and that more
empirical work needs to be done on the subject. That is
quite different from "elevat[ing] the notorious gamb-
ler's fallacy, " which is what Margalit & Bar-Hillel
accuse me of; and their "alarm" at "Cohen's inclina-
tion not only to excuse, but to actually condone,
people's mistakes" shows a certain disposition to shy at
shadows.
6. The cabs. The essence of my claim here is that,
since the probability at issue is the Pascalian2 uncondi-
tional probability that the cab involved in the accident
was blue, information predictive of relevant base rates
would be information about the relative frequencies of
blue and green cabs among cabs recently involved in
accidents of the same kind. I am not trying to establish
a Baconian analysis of the problem (Niiniluoto), nor
am I repudiating Bayes's theorem (Levi, Shafer°).
What I actually suggested was that in the absence of
information determining appropriate prior probabili-
ties here the subjects did right to "suppose equal
predispositions" (as I put it), in accordance with what
Niiniluoto, in his valuable discussion of the history of
the problem (which effectively refutes what Diaconis
& Freedman say about Todhunter's [1949] lottery),
calls the traditional strategy in the Bayes-Laplace
school. It follows that if there are no cabs of one colour
at all, and all have the other colour (a possibility raised
by Margalit & Bar-Hillel and Skyrms), then a fortiori
there is a zero base rate for cabs of that colour being
involved in accidents of the relevant kind. But the
subjects were just told of an 85%-.15% distribution in
cab colour, and this fact, or any other distribution that
allows some cabs of either colour, is a very weak
foundation for an estimate of the relevant base rate. It
is certainly quite surprising that not only a few
psychologists, like Tversky and Kahneman, but even a
few people who say that they "make a living by
teaching probability and statistics," like Diaconis &
Freedman, should persist in supposing otherwise, even
after their error has been pointed out. Specifically, why
on earth should it be supposed that subjects, asked to
estimate the unconditional probability that the cab
involved in the accident was blue, ought to take into
account a prior distribution of colours that would at
best be relevant only if the issue at stake was just about
the colour of a cab that was said to have been seen
somewhere, not necessarily in an accident, and was
taken to be blue? Until Tversky, or Kahneman, or one
of their apologists, supplies a satisfactory answer to this
question, the scientific world will not be much
impressed by their response to those who criticise
them.3
Analogous considerations apply to the diagnosis
example. Bilharzia is now one of the commonest
diseases in the world, but it would be rather absurd to
take its current frequency in the world population as
predictive of the base rate, or prior probability, when
diagnosing a patient who never wades in fresh water.
Those (Blackburn, Evans & Pollard, Kahneman,
Krantz, Mackie, Margalit & Bar-Hillel, Sternberg,
Zabell) who hold that gross epidemiological statistics
are relevant here, irrespective of the patient's own
susceptibilities, are refusing to take into account what
Keynes (1921) called the "weight" of evidence.
The conclusion desired here is an unconditional
probability about a single case, p(A), and that conclu-
sion has to be detached from a conditional probability,
p(A | E). People sometimes think, as Mackie evidently
does, that such a detachment is legitimate just so long
as E includes all our relevant knowledge. But wherever
our relevant knowledge is rather limited in extent, and
so the weight of the evidence is low, this policy can lead
to disastrously bad estimates of the unconditional prob-
ability. Any insurance company that adopted such a
policy would rapidly become bankrupt. Instead, we
need to increase the weight of the evidence by discov-
ering quite a substantial amount of the causally rele-
vant facts (which means taking into account the
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causally relevant susceptibilities of the patient or the
specific circumstances of the cab sighting) and deter-
mining the corresponding conditional probability,
before we detach the unconditional probability. Of
course, it may well be impossible to be perfect here.
But that is no excuse for detaching the unconditional
probability on the basis of excessively lightweight
evidence. Moreover, just as some kinds of fact (such as
the patient's life-style or his past medical history) are
weight-increasing with regard to the detachment of a
particular unconditional probability, so too, other kinds
of fact may be weight-reducing.
Suppose, for example, that your name is Algernon
Charles Thomas and that, though nothing is known
about the frequencies of diseases A and B in the world,
in your country, or in your city, it does happen to be
known that among the twelve other (all unrelated)
Algernon Charles Thomases, scattered over different
continents and cultures, disease A is at the moment
twice as common as disease B. To compound a base-
rate probability estimated from that accidental and
very weakly predictive statistic, with the probability
deriving from the diagnostic test, would obviously be
weight-reducing. No doubt it is a matter for judgment,
experience, and expertise in particular cases to distin-
guish weight-increasing from weight-reducing evi-
dence. My claim was just that it is not unreasonable for
subjects to suppose that the distribution of cab colours
in a particular city, or current world-wide epidemio-
logical statistics, are relatively nonpredictive, and
generate weight-reducing base rates, in cases of the
kinds in question. Moreover, if I am right here, then
where no particular cause of error is operating, one
would expect subjects with a competence for rational
inference to take positive account of base-rate statistics
about causally relevant, or relevantly specific, features.
And this is just what Bar-Hillel (1980) has shown that
they in fact do (though unfortunately she takes such a
procedure to be fallacious).
Of course, the concept of weight is open to alterna-
tive explications. Levi gives a very clear account of
how Tversky and Kahneman's error may be exposed on
a subjectivist analysis of probability judgments. I
myself prefer to suggest that the difference between
weight-increasing and weight-reducing evidence, in
respect of a particular outcome, corresponds exactly
with the difference between evidence capable of deter-
mining propensity-type Pascalian probabilities, and
evidence capable only of determining short-run rela-
tive frequencies, for that kind of outcome. But the issue
between Levi's account and mine is not material here.4
What is important is just that sufficiently scrupulous
attention be paid to the various alternative semantics
that are available for the calculus of chance - alterna-
tive theories of what is meant by statements about
"probability" - so that equivocations and other sources
of confusion are avoided. Several of the commentators,
however, do not show any obvious awareness of the
vast literature that exists on this subject. For example,
Tversky says that I "[introduce] a new concept of
propensity probability which . . . satisfies the classical
probability axioms." But in fact I actually gave refer-
ences to recent discussions of this concept by Popper
(1959b; 1968) and by Mellor (1971); and Hacking
(1975) traces such a theory of probability back to the
seventeenth century.
It is Diaconis & Freedman who do come out with a
striking new interpretation for the classical calculus.
They tell us, in a footnote, that "p(A | B) can be
interpreted as the probability of A, if you know that B
has occurred." But this unfortunately confuses
"p(A | B)" with "p(A | you know that B has occurred),"
and "p(A|B) = n" both with "if you know that B has
occurred, then p(A) = n" and with "p(if you know that
B has occurred, then A) = n," as well as muddying
several other familiar issues. Unless Tversky and
Kahneman and their apologists are prepared to pay
adequate attention here to the relevant literature
(which also has quite a lot to say about the difference
between empirical and mathematical issues), they will
continue to risk making further errors of the kind that
most naive subjects may well avoid.
However, I think that my remarks about the disease
case need amplification in one respect, in order to
dissolve the paradox that Mackie describes. When I
wrote that "the literature under criticism is propagat-
ing an analysis that could increase the number of
deaths from a rare disease," I meant, as the subsequent
paragraph was intended to show, that this increase
would take place if, as a result of such papers' being
published, less regard were paid to the weight of
evidence than is currently paid. Specifically, this result
would follow if physicians supposed that the current
worldwide frequency of a disease was to be taken into
account and treated as predictive rather than its
current frequency among patients having this or that
kind of susceptibility. An administrator of a hospital
that took in patients at random from all over the world
might still secure good results if he insisted on all those
with the symptoms in question being diagnosed as
having the much commoner disease. But even better
results could be secured, though at greater expense, by
increasing the weight of the evidence on which diag-
noses were based (see further Cohen 1980a, especially
p. 60).
7. Representativeness. Since I still claim in part II,
section 4 of the target article that a Baconian analysis
makes good sense of judging probability in terms of
representativeness, I am at a loss to understand why
Tversky supposes that I have "abandoned" the Bacon-
ian theory. What was proposed quite explicitly in
Cohen (1979 p. 397) was that experimenters should be
prepared for their subjects to use different conceptions
and criteria of probability in different contexts, and
that it was worth while seeking cues to the discovery of
which conception is used when. I have in fact always
rejected the "either-or" kind of dogmatism that
Tversky imputes to me. Just as people measure fruit
sometimes by weight, sometimes by number, and
sometimes by volume, according to what seems most
appropriate in the context; just as they judge the
goodness of a play by criteria different from those by
which they judge the goodness of a car; so too we
should not be surprised if not only several different
Pascalian conceptions of probability may be found in
common use but also at least one non-Pascalian concep-
tion.5 Even Bernoulli, as Shafer (1978) has now conclu-
sively shown, was prepared to investigate the mathe-
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matics of nonadditive probabilities: He did not suppose
the complementational law for negation to be quasi
God-given,6 as Tversky seems to do.
Yet another of Tversky's easily verifiable miscon-
struals of what I say is his claim that "Cohen actually
assigns positive inductive probability to self-contra-
dictory propositions." What I actually assign to these
propositions is zero inductive probability (Cohen
1977b, p. 238, theorem 614). Here, as elsewhere (see
Cohen 1979 pp. 403-405) Tversky confuses conditional
and unconditional probabilities. In the Baconian
system p(A & not-A | B) may have a positive value in
certain circumstances, but p(A & not-A) is always zero.
This property of conditional probabilities in the Bacon-
ian system, along with their contraposability, makes
possible a generalisation of argument by reductio ad
absurdum. If a contradiction is deducible from a set of
premises then the premises are demonstrably not
cotenable: correspondingly, if a contradiction is
rendered inductively probable by a set of premises,
then the premises are probably not cotenable.)
Tversky also complains that in the Baconian system
at most one of two inconsistent outcomes can have a
positive probability. But that is just because this kind of
probability judgment states where the evidence is
pointing (and how weighty it is). If the totality of
relevant facts points in one direction, it can't point in
the other direction also. To complain about this is like
complaining that in a Pascalian system we can't allow
the same evidence to give greater than prior probabil-
ity to each of two inconsistent outcomes.
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NOTES
1. To that extent I now (hereby and herewith) repudiate
the quip that Einhorn & Hogarth correctly quote against me
from an earlier paper (Cohen 1980d).
2. In calling a probability function "Pascalian" I mean that
it conforms to the principles of the classical calculus of chance
- that is, to the standard mathematics of probability.
3. Tversky complains also that I do not discuss the relations
between propensity probabilities and Baconian ones. But that
topic is discussed in Cohen (1977b), to which I referred in the
target article.
4. Restrictions on the applicability of a subjective analysis
to probability judgments about past events are discussed in
Cohen (1977b, pp. 89-91) and in Cohen (forthcoming).
5. There seem in fact to be at least two possible kinds of
probability interpretation for the formal system underlying
what I call Baconian probabilities. One is the objective
interpretation (related to causality) which I prefer: the other
is the subjective interpretation constituted by Shackle's (1949)
and Levi's (1967) theory of potential surprise (see Cohen
1980c, p. 171).
6. In the last paragraph of his commentary Tversky implies
that he has evidence that his subjects admit to having been in
error when they judged probabilities by representativeness.
When this new evidence is published, it will need to exclude
the possibility that the circumstances of the experiment are
such as to make naive subjects suppose that they were asked
originally for a judgment of Pascalian probability. There is a
real problem about indeterminacy here (see Cohen 1979, p.
398).
EDITORIAL NOTE
"Asterisks indicate commentary will appear in forthcoming
Continuing Commentary.
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